"V. The United States has never made any alliance with, or pledge to, any other American state on the subject covered by the declarations. "VI. The declaration respecting non-colonization was on a subject distinct from European intervention with American states, and related to the acquisition of sovereign title by any European power, by new and original occupation or colonization thereafter. Whatever were the political motives for resisting such colonization, the principle of public law upon which it was placed was, that the continent must be considered as already within the occupation and jurisdiction of independent civilized nations." Dana's Wheaton; § 67, note 36. The position that Mr. Monroe's declaration "was intended as a caveat to the designs of the allies, and as an earnest protest against the extension to this continent of the political system' on which they were based" is supported at length in 82 N. Am. Rev., 483 (April, 1856). See 103 id., 471, (Oct., 1866). The failure to obtain Congressional approval for Mr. Clay's resolution “that the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, forcible interposition by the allied powers of Europe, on behalf of Spain," in South America, is noticed and explained in 82 N. Am. Rev., 488 (April, 1856). "The other principle asserted in the message is that whilst we do not desire to interfere in Europe with the political system of the allied powers we should regard as dangerous to our peace and safety any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere. The political systems of the two continents are essentially different. Each has an exclusive right to judge for itself what is best suited to its own condition, and most likely to promote its happiness, but neither has a right to enforce upon the other the establishment of its peculiar system. This principle was declared in the face of the world, at a moment when there was reason to apprehend that the allied powers were entertaining designs inimical to the freedom, if not the independence, of the new governments. There is a ground for believing that the declaration of it had considerable effect in preventing the maturity, if not in producing the abandonment of all such designs. Both principles were laid down after much and anxious deliberation on the part of the late administration. The President, who then formed a part of it, continues entirely to coincide in both. And you will urge upon the Government of Mexico the utility and expediency of asserting the same principles on all proper occasions." Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Poinsett, Mar. 26, 1825; MSS. Inst. Ministers. "The late President of the United States, in his message to Congress of the 2d of December, 1823, while announcing the negotiation then pending with Russia, relating to the northwest coast of this continent, observes that the occasion of the discussions to which that incident had given rise, had been taken for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States were involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they had assumed and maintained, were thenceforward not to be considered subjects for colonization by any European power. The principle had first been assumed in that negotiation with Russia. It rested upon a course of reasoning, equally simple and conclusive. With the exception of the existing European colonies, which it was in nowise intended to disturb, the two continents consisted of several sovereign and independent nations, whose territories covered their whole surface. By this, their independent condition, the United States enjoyed the right of commercial intercourse with every part of their possessions. To attempt the establishment of a colony in those possessions, would be to usurp, to the exclusion of others, a commercial intercourse which was the common possession of all. It could not be done without encroaching upon existing rights of the United States. The Government of Russia has never disputed these positions, nor manifested the slightest dissatisfaction at their having been taken. Most of the new American republics have declared their entire assent to them; and they now propose, among the subjects of consultation at Panama, to take into consideration the means of making effectual the assertion of that principle, as well as the means of resisting interference from abroad with the domestic concerns of the American governments." President John Q. Adams's Special Message, March 15, 1826. As to Congress of Panama, see House Doc. No. 443, 19th Cong., 2d sess.; 6 Am. President J. Q. Adams's Message of Dec. 26, 1825, giving the proceedings of the The commissions of Messrs. Anderson and Sergeant, March 14, 1826, ministers "The congress of Panama, in 1826, was planned by Bolivar to secure the union of Spanish America against Spain. It had originally military as well as political purposes. In the military objects the United States could take no part; and indeed the necessity for such objects ceased when the full effects of Mr. Monroe's declarations were felt. But the specific objects of the Congress, the establishment of close and cordial relations of amity, the creation of commercial intercourse, of interchange of political thought, and of habits of good understanding between the new Republics and the United States and their respective citizens, might perhaps have been attained had the Administration of that day received the united support of the country. Unhappily they were lost; the new States were removed from the sympathetic and protecting influence of our example, and their commerce, which we might then have secured, passed into other hands unfriendly to the United States. "In looking back upon the Panama Congress from this length of time it is easy to understand why the earnest and patriotic men who endeavored to crystallize an American system for this continent failed. * One of the questions proposed for discussion in the conference was "The consideration of the means to be adopted for the entire abolition of the African slave trade," to which proposition the committee of the United States Senate of that day replied: "The United States have not certainly the right, and ought never to feel the inclination, to dictate to others who may differ with them upon this subject; nor do the committee see the expediency of insulting other states with whom we are maintaining relations of perfect amity, by ascending the moral chair, and proclaiming from thence mere abstract principles, of the rectitude of which each nation enjoys the perfect right of deciding for itself." The same committee also alluded to the possibility that the condition of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, still the possessions of Spain, and still slaveholding, might be made the subject of discussion and of contemplated action by the Panama congress. "If ever the United States (they said) permit themselves to be associated with these nations in any general Congress assembled for the discussion of common plans in any way affecting European interests, they will, by such act, not only deprive themselves of the ability they now possess of reudering useful assistance to the other American states, but also produce other effects prejudicial to their interests."' "The printed correspondence respecting this mission will be found in the fifth volume of the Foreign Relations, folio edition, pages 834-905. It was the subject of animated discussion in Congress, which will be found in the second part of the second volume of the Register of Congressional Debates for the year 1826." Mr. J. C. B. Davis, Notes, &c. "The amount of it [Mr. Monroe's declaration] was that this Government could not look with indifference on any combination to assist Spain in her war against the South American states; that we could not but consider any such combination as dangerous or unfriendly to us; and that if it should be formed it would be for the competent authorities of this Government to decide, when the case arose, what course our duty and our interest should require us to pursue." Mr. Webster, Mar. 27, 1826, in House of Rep. ; 2 Deb. of 1826, 1807. "In December, 1823, the then President of the United States, in his annual message upon the opening of Congress, announced as a principle applicable to this continent, which ought hereafter to be insisted on, that no European nation ought to be allowed to plant upon it new colonies. It was not proposed by that principle to disturb pre-existing European colonies already established in America; the principle looked forward, not backward." Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Messrs. Anderson and Sergeant, May 8, 1826; MSS. "It [the Monroe doctrine] has been said, in the course of this debate, to have been a loose and vague declaration. It was, I believe, sufficiently studied. I have understood, from good authority, that it was considered, weighed, and distinctly and decidedly approved by every one of the President's advisers at that time. Our Government could. not adopt on that occasion precisely the course which England had taken. England threatened the immediate recognition of the provinces if the allies should take part with Spain against them. We had already recognized them. It remained, therefore, only for our Government to say how we should consider a combination of the allied powers to effect objects in America as affecting ourselves; and the message was intended to say what it does say, that we should regard such combination as dangerous to us. Sir, I agree with those who maintain the proposition, and I contend against those who deny it, that the message did mean something; that it meant much; and I maintain against both, that the declaration effected much good, answered the end designed by it, did great honor to the foresight and the spirit of the Government, and that it cannot now be taken back, retracted, or annulled without disgrace. It met, sir, with the entire concurrence and the hearty ap probation of the country. The tone which it uttered found a corresponding response in the breasts of the free people of the United States. That people saw, and they rejoiced to see, that, on a fit occasion, our weight had been thrown into the right scale, and that, without departing from our duty, we had done something useful, and something effectual, for the cause of civil liberty. One general glow of exultation, one universal feeling of the gratified love of liberty, one conscious and proud perception of the consideration which the country possessed, and of the respect and honor which belonged to it, pervaded all bosoms. Possibly the public enthusiasm went too far; it certainly did go far; but, sir, the sentiment which this declaration inspired was not confined to ourselves. Its force was felt everywhere by all those who could understand its object and foresee its effect. In that very House of Commons of which the gentleman from South Carolina has spoken with such commendation, how was it received? Not only, sir, with approbation, but, I may say, with no little enthusiasm. While the leading minister [Mr. Canning] expressed his entire concurrence in the sentiments and opinions of the American President, his distinguished competitor [Mr. Brougham] in that popular body, less restrained by official decorum, and more at liberty to give utterance to all the feeling of the occa sion declared that no event had ever created greater joy, exultation, and gratitude among all the free men in Europe; that he felt pride in being connected by blood and language with the people of the United States; that the policy disclosed by the message became a great, a free, and an independent nation; and that he hoped his own country would be prevented by no mean pride or paltry jealousy from following so noble and glorious an example. "It is doubtless true, as I took occasion to observe the other day, that this declaration must be considered as founded on our rights, and to spring mainly from a regard to their preservation. It did not commit us, at all events, to take up arms on any indication of hostile feeling by the powers of Europe towards South America. If, for example, all the states of Europe had refused to trade with South America until her states should return to their former allegiance, that would have furnished no cause of interference to us. Or if an armament had been furnished by the allies to act against provinces the most remote from us, as Chili or Buenos Ayres, the distance of the scene of action dimin ishing our apprehension of danger, and diminishing also our means of effectual interposition, might still have left us to content ourselves with remonstrance. But a very different case would have arisen, if an army, equipped and maintained by these powers, had been landed on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and commenced the war in our immediate neighborhood. Such an event might justly be regarded as dangerous. to ourselves, and, on that ground, call for decided and immediate interference by us. The sentiments and the policy announced by the declara tion, thus understood, were, therefore, in strict conformity to our duties and our interest." Mr. Webster's speech on the Panama mission, April 14, 1826. ; 3 Webster's Works, 203. When the question of the Panama Congress was before Congress, the following resolution, on motion of Mr. Buchanan, passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 99 to 95: "It is, therefore, the opinion of this House that the Government of the United States ought not to be represented at the Congress of Panama, except in a diplomatic character; nor ought they to form any alliance, offensive or defensive, or negotiate respecting such alliance, with all or any of the South American Republics; nor ought they to become parties with them, or either of them, to any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing the interference of any of the European powers with their independence or form of government, or to any compact for the purpose of preventing colonization upon the continents of America; but that the people of the United States should be left free to act, in any crisis, in such manner as their feelings of friendship towards these Republics, and as their own honor and policy, may at the time dictate." See 82 North Am. Rev. (Apr., 1856), 507. As to subsequent failures to obtain Congressional recognition of the "Monroe doctrine," see Tucker's Monr. Doct., 56. The Panama Congress is discussed in 1 Calvo., Droit Int., 2d ed., 255. "It is well known to the American people and to all nations that this Government has never interfered with the relations subsisting between other Governments. We have never made ourselves parties to their wars or their alliances; we have not sought their territories by conquest; we have not mingled with parties in their domestic struggles; and believing their own form of government to be the best, we have never attempted to propagate it by intrigues, by diplomacy, or by force. We may claim on this continent a like exemption from European interference. The nations of America are equally sovereign and independ ent with those of Europe. They possess the same rights, independent of all foreign interposition, to make war, to conclude peace, and to regulate their internal affairs. The people of the United States cannot, therefore, view with indifference attempts of European powers to interfere with the independent action of the nations on this continent. The American system of government is entirely different from that of Europe. Jealousy among the different sovereigns of Europe, lest any one of them might become too powerful for the rest, has caused them anxiously to desire the establishment of what they term the 'balance of power.' It cannot be permitted to have any application on the North American continent, and especially to the United States. We must ever maintain the principle that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny. Should any portion of them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to determine, with |