psychologists agree, however extreme may be their differences on other points. Doctrine. Relation between the Affective and Intellectual faculties. About the method of psychology or ideology, enough has been said. As to the doctrine, the first glance shows a radical fault in it, common to all sects,-a false estimate of the general relations between the affective and the intellectual faculties.. However various may be the theories about the preponderance of the latter, all metaphysicians assert that preponderance by making these faculties their starting-point. The intellect is almost exclusively the subject of their speculations, and the affections have been almost entirely neglected; and, moreover, always subordinated to the understanding. Now, such a conception represents precisely the reverse of the reality, not only for animals, but also for Man: for daily experience shows that the affections, the propensities, the passions, are the great springs of human life; and that, so far from resulting from intelligence, their spontaneous and independent impulse is indispensable to the first awakening and continuous development of the various intellectual faculties, by assigning to them a permanent end, without which-to say nothing of the vagueness of their general direction-they would remain dormant in the majority of men. It is even but too certain that the least noble and most animal propensities are habitually the most energetic, and therefore the most influential. The whole of human nature is thus very unfaithfully represented by these futile systems, which, if noticing the affective faculties at all, have vaguely connected them with one single principle, sympathy, and, above all, selfconsciousness, always supposed to be directed by the intellect. Thus it is that, contrary to evidence, Man has been represented as essentially a reasoning being, continually carrying on, unconsciously, a multitude of imperceptible calculations, with scarcely any spontaneity of action, from infancy upwards. This false conception has doubtless been supported by a consideration worthy of all respect, that it is by the intellect that Man is modified and improved; but science requires, before all things, the reality of any views, independently of their desirableness; THE AFFECTIVE AND INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES. 119 Brutes and Man. and it is always this reality which is the basis of genuine utility. Without denying the secondary influence of such a view, we can show that two purely philosophical causes, quite unconnected with any idea of application, and inherent in the nature of the method, have led the metaphysicians of all sects to this hypothesis of the supremacy of the intellect. The first is the radical separation which it was thought necessary to make between brutes and man, and which would have been effaced at once by the admission of the preponderance of the affective over the intellectual faculties; and the second was the necessity that the metaphysicians found themselves under, of preserving the unity of what they called the I, that it might correspond with the unity of the soul, Theory of the I. in obedience to the requisitions of the theological philosophy, of which metaphysics is, as we must ever bear in mind, the final transformation. But the positive philosophers, who approach the question with the simple aim of ascertaining the true state of things, and reproducing it with all positive accuracy in their theories, have perceived that, according to universal experience, human nature is so far from being single that it is eminently multiple; that is, usually induced in various directions by distinct and independent powers, among which equilibrium is established with extreme difficulty when, as usually happens in civilized life, no one of them is, in itself, sufficiently marked to acquire spontaneously any considerable preponderance over the rest. Thus, the famous theory of the I is essentially without a scientific object, since it is destined to represent a purely fictitious state. There is, in this direction, as I have already pointed out, no other real subject of positive investigation than the study of the equilibrium of the various animal functions,-both of irritability and of sensibility,-which marks the normal state, in which each of them, duly moderated, is regularly and permanently associated with the whole of the others, according to the laws of sympathy, and yet more of synergy. The very abstract and indirect notion of the I proceeds from the continuous sense of such a harmony; that is, from the universal accordance of the entire organism. Psychologists have attempted in vain to make. out of this idea, or rather sense, an attribute of humanity exclusively. It is evidently a necessary result of all animal life; and therefore it must belong to all animals, whether they are able to discourse upon it or not. No doubt a cat, or any other vertebrated animal, without knowing how to say "I," is not in the habit of taking itself for another. Moreover, it is probable that among the superior animals the sense of personality is still more marked than in Man, on account of their more isolated life; though if we descended too far in the zoological scale we should reach organisms in which the continuous degradation of the nervous system attenuates this compound sense, together with the various simple feelings on which it depends. Reason and It must not be overlooked that though the psychologists have agreed in neglecting the intellectual and moral faculties of brutes, which have been happily left to the naturalists, they have occasioned great mischief by their obscure and indefinite distinction between intelligence and instinct, thus setting up a division between human and animal nature which has had too much effect even upon zoologists to this day. The only meaning that can be attributed to the word instinct, is any spontaneous impulse in a determinate direction, independently of any foreign influence. In this primitive sense, the term evidently applies to the proper and direct activity of any faculty whatever, intellectual as well as affective; and it therefore does not conflict with the term intelligence in any way, as we so often see when we speak of those who, without any education, manifest a marked talent for music, painting, mathematics, etc. In this way there is instinct, or rather, there are instincts in Man, as much or more than in brutes. If, on the other hand, we describe intelligence as the aptitude to modify conduct in conformity to the circumstances of each case,—which, in fact, is the main practical attribute of reason, in its proper sense, it is more evident than before that there is no other essential difference between humanity and animality than that of the degree of development admitted by a faculty which is, by its nature, common to all animal life, and without which it could not even be conceived to exist. REASON AND INSTINCT. 121 Thus the famous scholastic definition of Man as a reasonable animal offers a real no-meaning, since no animal, especially in the higher parts of the zoological scale, could live without being to a certain extent reasonable, in proportion to the complexity of its organism. Though the moral nature of animals has been but little and very imperfectly explored, we can yet perceive, without possibility of mistake, ainong those that live with us and that are familiar with us,―judging of them by the same means of observation that we should employ about men whose language and ways were previously unknown to us,—that they not only apply their intelligence to the satisfaction of their organic wants, much as men do, aiding themselves also with some sort of language; but that they are, in like manner, susceptible of a kind of wants more disinterested, inasmuch as they consist in a need to exercise their faculties for the mere pleasure of the exercise. It is the same thing that leads children or savages to invent new sports, and that renders them, at the same time, liable to ennui. That state, erroneously set up as a special privilege of human nature, is sometimes sufficiently marked, in the case of certain animals, to urge them to suicide, when captivity has become intolerable. An attentive examination of the facts therefore discredits the perversion of the word instinct when it is used to signify the fatality under which animals are impelled to the mechanical performance of acts uniformly determinate, without any possible modification from corresponding circumstances, and neither requiring nor allowing any education, properly so called. This gratuitous supposition is evidently a remnant of the automatic hypothesis of Descartes. Leroy has demonstrated that among mammifers and birds this ideal fixity in the construction of habitations, in the seeking of food by hunting, in the mode of migration, etc., exists only in the eyes of closet-naturalists or inattentive observers. After thus much notice of the radical vice of all psychological systems, it would be departing from the object of this work to show how the intellectual faculties themselves have been misconceived. It is enough to refer to the refutation by which Gall and Spurzheim have introduced their labours and I would particularly point out the philo sophical demonstration by which they have exhibited the conclusion that sensation, memory, imagination, and even judgment, all the scholastic faculties, in short, are not, in fact, fundamental and abstract faculties, but only different degrees or consecutive modes of the same phenomenon, proper to each of the true elementary phrenological functions, and necessarily variable in different cases, with a proportionate activity. One virtue of this admirable analysis is that it deprives the various metaphysical theories of their one remaining credit, their mutual criticism, which is here effected, once for all, with more efficacy than by any one of the mutually opposing schools. Again, it would be departing from the object of this portion of our work to judge of the doctrines of the schools by their results. What these have been we shall see in the next volume; the deplorable influence on the political and social condition of two generations of the doctrines of the French school, as presented by Helvetius, and of the German psychology, with the ungovernable I for its subject; and the impotence of the Scotch school, through the vagueness of what it called its doctrines, and their want of mutual connection. Dismissing all these for the present, we must examine the great attempt of Gall, in order to see what is wanting in phrenological philosophy to form it into the scientific constitution which is proper to it, and from which it is necessarily still more remote than organic, and even animal physiology. Basis of Gall's Two philosophical principles, now admitted doctrine. to be indisputable, serve as the immovable basis of Gall's doctrine as a whole: viz., the innateness of the fundamental dispositions, affective and intellectual, and the plurality of the distinct and independent faculties, though real acts usually require their more or less complex concurrence. Within the limits of the human race, all cases of marked talents or character prove the first; and the second is proved by the diversity of such marked cases, and by most pathological states,especially by those in which the nervous system is directly affected. A comparative observation of the higher animals would dispel all doubt, if any existed in either case. These two principles,-aspects of a single fundamental concep |