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tion,—are but the scientific expression of the results of experience, in all times and places, as to the intellectual and moral nature of Man,-an indispensable symptom of truth, with regard to all parent ideas, which must always be connected with the spontaneous indications of popular reason, as we have seen in preceding cases in natural philosophy. Thus, besides all guidance from analogy, after the study of the animal life, we derive confirmation from all the methods of investigation that physiology admits; from direct observation, experiment, pathological analysis, the comparative method and popular good sense, all of which converge towards the establishment of this double principle. Such a collection of proofs secures the stability of this much of phrenological doctrine, whatever transformations other parts may have to undergo. In the anatomical view, this physiological conception corresponds with the division of the brain into a certain number of partical organs, symmetrical like those of the animal life, and, though more contiguous and mutually resembling than in any other system, and therefore more adapted both for sympathy and synergy, still distinct and mutually independent, as we were already aware was the case with the ganglions appropriate to the external senses. In brief, the brain is no longer an organ, but an apparatus of organs, more complex in proportion to the degree of animality. The proper object of phrenological physiology thence consists in determining the cerebral organ appropriate to each clearly marked, simple disposition, affective or intellectual; or, reciprocally, which is more difficult, what function is fulfilled by any portion of the mass of the brain which exhibits the anatomical conditions of a distinct organ. The two processes are directed to develope the agreement between physiological and anatomical analysis which constitutes the true science of living beings. Unfortunately, our means are yet further from answering our aims than in the two preceding divisions of the science.

The scientific principle involved in the phrenological view is that the functions, affective and intellectual, are more elevated,

Divisions of the brain.

more human, if you will, and at the same time less ener

getic, in proportion to the exclusiveness with which they belong to the higher part of the zoological series, their positions being in portions of the brain more and more restricted in extent, and further removed from its immediate origin, according to the anatomical decision that the skull is simply a prolongation of the vertebral column, which is the primitive centre of the entire nervous system. Thus, the least developed and anterior part of the brain is appropriated to the characteristic faculties of humanity; and the most voluminous and hindmost part to those which constitute the basis of the whole of the animal kingdom. Here we have a new and confirmatory instance of the rule which we have had to follow in every science; that it is necessary to proceed from the most general to the more special attributes, in the order of their diminishing generality. We shall meet with it again in the one science which remains for us to review; and its constant presence, through the whole range, points it out as the first law of the dogmatic procedure of the positive spirit.

A full contemplation of Gall's doctrine convinces us of its faithful representation of the intellectual and moral nature of Man and animals. All the psychological sects have misconceived or ignored the pre-eminence of the affective faculties, plainly manifest as it is in all the moral phenomena of brutes, and even of Man; but we find this fact placed on a scientific basis by the discovery that the affective organs occupy all the hinder and middle portion of the cerebral apparatus, while the intellectual occupy only the front portion, which, in extreme cases, is not more than a fourth, or even a sixth part of the whole. The difference between Gall and his predecessors was not in the separation of the two kinds of faculties, but that they assigned the brain to the intellectual faculties alone, regarding it as a single organ, and distributing the passions among the organs pertaining to the vegetative life, the heart, the liver, etc. Bichat supported this view by the argument of the sympathies of these organs, under the excitement of the respective passions; but the variableness of the seat of sympathy, according to native susceptibility or to accident, is a sufficient answer to such a plea, and teaches us simply the importance of con

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sidering the influence exercised by the state of the brain upon the nerves which supply the apparatus of the organic life.

Subdivision.

Next comes the subdivision established by Gall and Spurzheim in each of these two orders. The affective faculties are divided into the propensities, and the affections or sentiments, the first residing in the hindmost and lowest part of the brain; and the other class in the middle portion. The intellectual faculties are divided into the various perceptive faculties, which together constitute the range of observation: and the small number of reflective faculties, the highest of all, constituting the power of combination, by comparison and co-ordination. The upper part of the frontal region is the seat of these last, which are the chief characteristic attribute of human nature. There is a certain deficiency of precision in this description; but, besides that we may expect improving knowledge to clear it up, we shall find, on close examination, that the inconvenience lies more in the language than in the ideas. The only language we have is derived from a philosophical period when all moral and even intellectual ideas were shrouded in a mysterious metaphysical unity, which allows us now no adequate choice of terms.

Taking the ordinary terms in their literal sense, we should misconceive the fundamental distinction between the intellectual faculties and the others. When the former are very marked, they unquestionably produce real inclinations or propensities, which are distinguished from the inferior passions only by their smaller energy. Nor can we deny that their action occasions true emotions or sentiments, more rare, more pure, more sublime than any other, and, though less vivid than others, capable of moving to tears; and is testified by so many instances of the rapture excited by the discovery of truth, in the most eminent thinkers that have done honour to their race-as Archimedes, Descartes, Kepler, Newton, etc. Would any thoughtful student take occasion, by such approximations, to deny all real distinction between the intellectual and affective faculties? The wiser conclusion to be drawn from the case is that we must reform our philosophical language, to

raise it, by rigorous precision, to the dignity of scientific language. We may say as much about the subdivision of the affective faculties into propensities and sentiments, the distinction being, though less marked, by no means less real. Apart from all useless discussion of nomenclature, we may say that the real difference has not been clearly seized. In a scientific view, it would suffice to say that the first and fundamental class relates to the individual alone, or, at most, to the family, regarded successively in its principal needs of preservation, such as reproduction, the rearing of young, the mode of alimentation, of habitation, etc. Whereas, the second more special class supposes the existence of some social relations, either among individuals of a different species, or especially between individuals of the same species, apart from sex, and determines the character which the tendencies of the animal must impress on each of these relations, whether transient or permanent. If we keep this distinctive character of the two classes in view, it will matter little what terms we use to indicate them, when once they shall have acquired a sufficient fixedness, through rational use.

These are the great philosophical results of Gall's doctrine, regarded, as I have now presented it, apart from all vain attempts to localize in a special manner the cerebral or phrenological functions. I shall have to show how such an attempt was imposed upon Gall by the necessities of his glorious mission: but, notwithstanding this unfortunate necessity, the doctrine embodies already a real knowledge of human and brute nature very far superior to all that had ever been offered before.

Objections. Necessity of human actions.

Among the innumerable objections which have been aimed at this fine doctrine,-considered always as a whole, the only one which merits discussion here is the supposed necessity of human actions. This objection is not only of high importance in itself, but it casts new light back upon the spirit of the theory; and we must briefly examine it from the point of view of positive philosophy.

When objectors confound the subjection of events to invariable laws with their necessary exemption from modification, they lose sight of the fact that phenomena become

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susceptible of modification in proportion to their complexity. The only irresistible action that we know of is that of weight, which takes place under the Answered. most general and simple of all natural laws. But the phenomena of life and acts of the mind are so highly complex as to admit of modification beyond all estimate; and, in the intermediate regions, phenomena are under control precisely in the order of their complexity. Gall and Spurzheim have shown how human action depends on the combined operation of several faculties; how exercise develops them; how inactivity wastes them; and how the intellectual faculties, adapted to modify the general conduct of the animal according to the variable exigencies of his situation, may overrule the practical influence of all his other faculties. It is only in mania, when disease interferes with the natural action of the faculties, that fatality, or what is popularly called irresponsibility, exists. It is therefore a great mistake to accuse cerebral physiology of disowning the influence of education or legislation, because it fixes the limits of their power. It denies the possibility, asserted by the ideology of the French school, of converting by suitable arrangements, all men into so many Socrates, Homers, or Archimedes; and it denies the ungovernable energy of the I, asserted by the German school; but it does not therefore affect Man's reasonable liberty, or interfere with his improvement by the aid of a wise education. It is evident indeed that improvement by education supposes the existence of requisite predispositions: and that each of them is subject to determinate laws, without which they could not be systematically influenced; so that it is, after all, cerebral physiology that is in possession of the philosophical problem of education. Furthermore, this physiology shows us that men are commonly of an average constitution; that is, that, apart from a very few exceptional organizations, every one possesses in a moderate degree all the propensities, all the sentiments, and all the elementary aptitudes, without any one faculty being remarkably preponderant. The widest field is thus open for education, in modifying in almost any direction organisms so flexible, though the degree of their development may remain of that average amount which consists