and plunder, which both Chiefs and people regarded as a right. Every detachment that marched, every convoy that traversed their country, was a source of irritation, exciting the avidity and hurting the pride of the Ghiljies and their leaders. As spring set in, and the weather became more favourable, the Ghiljie discontent took new life; and disturbances arose, which showed that the tribes were afoot, and that measures must be taken to crush rebellion before it had time to become formidable.

Accordingly, from the side of Candahar, Anderson was sent forth by Nott to read them a lesson, which he did in a short, sharp combat, very creditable to the courage of the Ghiljies, who, though superior in numbers, were without artillery. The result somewhat disheartened them. Nott occupied Kelat-i-Ghiljie, and secured the communication between Candahar and Ghuzni; Macnaghten took measures to conciliate the Chiefs, who consented to abstain from infesting the highways, on the condition of being paid by the Shah an annual stipend of £3000. Upon these easy, though perhaps not very honourable, terms, communications lying along the Cabul and Turnuk rivers were exempted from a guerilla interruption, always harassing, and not unaccompanied by loss of men, cattle, and munitions. It was a moderate price to pay for the pacific conduct of Chiefs swaying tribes, which, when combined, could bring 40,000 combatants into the field; and which, but for the difficulty of uniting them in co-operation for a common purpose, were the most powerful and formidable in Affghanistan.

The communications between Candahar and Cabul were thus temporarily freed from Ghiljie interruption; but those between Candahar and Shikarpur became suddenly endangered by the occurrence of unforeseen events at Kelat-Quetta and in Upper Scinde.

We have not space to enter minutely into the grave error of occupying, in the month of May, the isolated post of Kahun. It cost the entire loss of Clarke's detachment and convoy, and kindled a flame, which spread throughout Beluchistan, where our political measures had prepared material enough for combustion. The adherents of Mehrab Khan's son rejoiced at the intelligence, and were soon actively devising measures for the deposition of Shah Nawaz Khan, who, without influence amongst the Brahuis, and leaning on the unpopular political agent, Loveday, was equally powerless and disliked by his subjects. The Kahurs too heard of the triumph of their old antagonists, the Murris, with satisfaction; for the hatred of British supremacy exceeded even the bitterness of a

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blood feud of long standing, and a rivalry of ages in acts of rapine. They knew that Bean calculated upon the strength of these feelings as a sure bond of union between the Kaburs and the British interests; and, by encouraging this idea, they lulled Bean's vigilance, and were nearly enabled to compass his destruction and that of the small force at Quetta. Nott and Leach saved him. We wish it could be added that, when perfectly in his power, he had saved Loveday by following up the insurgent Chiefs, who broke up from before Quetta, shaken in confidence and suspicious of treachery amongst themselves. This he neglected, and Loveday was sacrificed.

Whilst these events were taking place amongst the Beluchis above the Bolan Pass, those below obtained a signal triumph. Clarke's disaster was followed by still graver, and more dishonorable losses the Pass of Nuffush was again to witness Murri success and British discomfiture. Clibborne's defeat was a serious calamity; and a military commission condemned him, and all the superior officers who had ordered and provided for his expedition. Errors of detail there doubtless were on the part of Clibborne, and of those, who organised the expedition: but by far the most blame-worthy were they, who had led to the necessity for any such expedition at all, by thrusting Brown with a hundred and forty men into a position, where he was useless, except to risk the detachment sent for the purpose of providing him with what was needful for the maintenance of this strangely-selected post.

We pass rapidly over Bean's futile negociations; the arrest of Masson; the descent into Cutch of the insurgent Beluchis, with the view of acting in co-operation with the Murris upon the line of communication between Shikarpur and Candahar, their check at Dadur, and retreat before Boscawen, leaving on the ground of the Beluch encampment the warm, still bleeding, body of the murdered Loveday-the first victim of the rapidly-growing hate towards the political agents of our Government-followed by Marshall's successful blow, which again sent Nussib Khan a fugitive into the wild country around Kelat, and re-established at the moment the integrity of Nott's line of communication with his base. We glance at these events, because it must be borne in mind how widely-spread was the spirit of revolt, and that on every side our measures were raising an implacable spirit of hostility. Temporary success might here and there partially quell its ebullitions: but this only made it work more secretly, more deeply, and pervade the masses more entirely, until one feeling beat in every Moslem heart to the west of the Indus.

1

We would willingly pass over Dr. Lord's unhealthy ac tivity without any further allusion: but, as may be recollected by many of our Indian readers, spring had no sooner smiled upon the wintry summits of the Hindu Kush than the troops under his orders found occupation. Before winter was well ended, the capture of an Hazareh fortlet and the destruction of its defenders, under circumstances of a most painful nature, spread a feeling of hatred among an innocent and (at our hands) a well-deserving race. This act was the consequence of Macnaghten's sending a troop of horse artillery to Bamian, without inquiry or preparation, and therefore without advertence to the difficulty of procuring forage for them during the winter months. Once in its mountain position, it became essential to procure sustenance for the horses of the troop; and the only available resource was the small quantities of dried lucerne and straw, which the Hazarehs habitually store for the support of their live-stock during the severities of a protracted winter. To obtain this partial supply of forage from owners, to whom it was most valuable, the influence and exertions of the political agent, backed by a free expenditure of cash, were necessary. Practically, notwithstanding the price paid, this was an oppressive exaction, although for a time unaccompanied by any overt disaffection; considering the locality the demand was too great, and the exaction, though well remunerated, and therefore at first borne without number, became vexatious and injurious in proportion as it was unavoidably extended. The Hazareh impatience broke out on the occasion of a quarrel with some Affghans of Dr. Lord's detachment; supplies of forage were refused; and the political agent, having failed in his attempts at pacific negociation, marched with a force against the contumacious Hazareh fortlet. The troops forced an entrance into it, and made prisoners a portion of the garrison; but part, having taken post in a tower, refused to surrender, and fired upon the troops; the latter fired the fodder straw on the ground floor of the tower, and its ill-fated defenders were all slain either by shot or flame. Such success was of course bought at the expense of the good-will of the neighbourhood: and the Hazarehs and other tribes only awaited. a favourable moment to evince their hostile feelings. After the spring set in Dr. Lord's measures soon produced one.

Jubbar Khan, in charge of Dost Mahomed's family, was some time at Khúlúm, where he maintained himself and his charge, by levying the transit duties of the place-a supply, which the Khúlúm chief, partly through fear and partly through better

motives, assigned for the provision of a party still too numerous and well armed to be treated with disrespect. Macnaghten, anxious to have hostages as a check on Dost Mahomed's designs, endeavored to induce Jubbar Khan to submit himself and his charge to British protection and generosity. The subtile Chief was doubtful of the intentions of the Khan of Bokhara and of the ultimate fate of Dost Mahomed, and felt also the insecurity of his own position on sufferance at Khúlúm. He was not disinclined, therefore, to the only course which held out a certainty of security and liberal provision. Dr. Lord, on the other hand, was anxious to be doing, and to hint to Jubbar Khan that his residence at Khúlúm was within reach of the British troops. Accordingly a reconnoissance to the northward was determined, and the officers, weary of their winter's confinement, were eager for so amusing and interesting an expedition. In the course of its progress, an offer was made of the fortlet of Bajgah, which is situated at the mouth of the defile beyond Kamurd, and is considered by the natives of the country a stronghold of some importance. The offer of the Chief, if not suggested, was the result of apprehension, and not of good-will or policy; nevertheless, it was, without hesitation, accepted, and a small party of infantry lodged in the post. Dr. Lord, if he had not planned the offer, evinced as great readiness as his reconnoitering officers to take advantage of it, and wrote to Macnaghten and Cotton, urging the expediency of garrisoning Bajgah, and making it a frontier post. The Envoy acceded; and Dr. Lord, having his force increased by three hundred men of Hopkins's Affghan corps, pushed forward five companies of Gurkhas to Bajgah, occupying Syghan with two companies, and retaining one at Bamian. The rumour of these forward movements had hastened Jubbar Khan's decision, and, on the 3rd July, he reached Bamian with his brother's family, and proceeded onwards to place himself and them under British protection. This advantage was more than counter-balanced by the effect, which the occupation of Bajgah produced upon the surrounding countries. It was regarded as the first step towards ulterior operations; and a strong feeling of hostility was at once engendered amongst those, who anticipated that a struggle with the British power was imminent. The Walli of Khúlúm in par

ticular, as most threatened, was most alarmed; and Dr Lord thus prepared a cordial ally for Dost Mahomed, where hitherto he had usually encountered jealous enmity.

Bajgah was an ill-chosen post, and the engineer, Sturt, at once condemned it: but both Dr. Lord's political consistency

and military genius would have been compromised by a withdrawal from a position, which he had pronounced excellent and imposing; and he therefore disregarded the engineer's objections.

We could, with great pleasure, follow the thread of narrative through the sequence of events-and the more willingly, as it would give us the opportunity of doing justice to the very gallant conduct of the non-commissioned officer, Douglas, and his band of Gurkhas; but, referring our readers to the military accounts of these matters, we can only allude to Hay's sickness; his call for a European officer from Syghan; the detachment under Douglas to meet and strengthen the coming officer; their disappointment; the unsuspecting bivouac under the fort of Kamurd; the fire from the forts, which told of treachery, and made the Gurkhas spring to their arms; the charge of the Usbeg horse calculating on easy victory, but checked by the Gurkha fire before they charged home; the unequal contest kept up for miles by Douglas, making good his way steadily, in order, leaving no wounded, flinging the arms and ammunition of his slain into the deep river which edged the road; the many wounded; the ammunition of all nearly expended; the destruction of the gallant Gurkhas at hand; when suddenly the engineer, Sturt, with two companies, hastening to save their comrades, broke into view, checked the ardour of the Usbegs and Hajaris, saved Douglas and his band from their impending fate, and enabled them again to reach Bajgah. The affair was full of honour and credit to Douglas and Sturt; but the Usbegs and the neighbouring hill tribes, regarding it as the defeat of a body of British troops, hailed it as a triumph;-so that Dost Mahomed, who was then in the field to reap the full advantage of the spirit evoked by Lord's proceedings, not only found the Walli of Khúlúm a staunch ally, but his subjects and the tribes of the hill countries eager to espouse his cause. Then came his advance, the withdrawal from Bajgah of our troops, and the first remarkable disaffection of an Affghan levy, Hopkins's corps.

Macnaghten, apprised of disturbances on the Bamian frontier, had at first considered them unimportant, rightly ascribing to them a local origin; but, finding that time did not allay them, that Dost Mahomed, escaped from Bokhara, was on the frontier, profiting by the spirit which pervaded all tribes and classes, that Bajgah had been threatened, that the Affghan levies had been tampered with, and could not be trusted, and that the troops had fallen back on Bamian, he reinforced them with a regiment of native infantry, sending up Dennie to command.

The recovery of Kelat by the son of Mehrab Khan; the un