attack, and the destruction of its Chief with fifteen of his men. This occurrence deeply embittered the Ghiljie hatred of their invaders; and they were resolved to contest the permanent occupation of their country. With great jealousy they watched the preparations for rendering the old fort of Kelat-i-Ghiljie tenable, and began to assemble in order if possible to interrupt and prevent the completion of the design. Nott, hearing of this, and having to dispatch stores of various descriptions to the post, sent them under the escort of seven hundred bayonets, a detachment of horse, and two guns, the whole commanded by Colonel Wymer. When the convoy neared its destination, the Ghiljies broke up from the loose beleaguer of Kelat-i-Ghiljie and marched to oppose Wymer. Macan followed them; but, apprehensive of a ruse, and that the enemy, having lured him from his post, might double back and carry it in his absence, he halted. The Ghiljies were however intent upon Wymer; and, at 5 P. M. of the 9th May, they boldly attacked him. Having a large convoy to protect, he was forced to stand on the defensive. In spite of Hawkins's guns, which threw their shot with effect amongst their masses, the latter advanced with good courage, and sought to assail one of Wymer's flanks, and thus discomfit him; whilst making a partial change of position to meet fairly this movement, the Ghiljies, thinking the sepoys shaken, rushed sword in hand to the charge; but the 38th were quick and steady in forming, and their close, well-delivered fire, aided by the grape of the guns, made the swords-men reel, and recoil from before the bayonets. The combat nevertheless lasted until 10 P. M., when the Ghiljies despairing of success, having lost many killed, and having to carry off many wounded, withdrew from their purpose, and left Wymer to accomplish his march.

Meantime Uktur Khan had been actively engaged in recovering from the check Farrington had given him, and a number of fresh followers had gathered around him. Macnaghten, warned that the state of the country was becoming "worse and worse every day," chafed at the truth and received it ungraciously. "These idle statements," he wrote, 66 may cause much mis.

chief; and, often repeated as they are, they neutralize my pro. testations to the contrary. I know them to be utterly false, as regards this part of the country (Cabul), and I have no reason to believe them true, as regards your portion of the kingdom (Candahar), merely because the Tukkis are indulging in their accustomed habits of rebellion, or because Uktur Khan has a parcel of ragamuffins at his heels." The seizure of Uktur Khan by a night march of the Janbaz, whom he knew to be untrustworthy; the offer of a large pecuniary

reward for the capture of the rebel leader; and the notice that he should be hung "as high as Haman," when caught, were Macnaghten's instructions for the tranquillization of the districts to the west of Candahar: whilst he hoped, by transferring to another Ghiljie Chief, on condition of his seizing the Guru, who had beleaguered Kelat-i-Ghiljie and attacked Wymer, the Guru's portion of the stipulated allowances or black mail, to sow dis sension amongst the Ghiljie leaders, and to obtain by treachery possession of an inveterate enemy of the British power.

Uktur Khan, who was to be thus summarily dealt with, had assembled about 6,000 men, and had taken up a safe position before Giriskh, on the right bank of the Helmund, which rapid river effectually secured him from surprize. Nott sent Woodburn at the head of his regiment of sepoys, the Janbaz horse, and a detail of guns under Cooper, to search for and attack the insurgents. Woodburn ultimately beat them; and the next morning crossed the river, and encamped at Girishk. He could shew three standards taken from the enemy, as trophies of the combat; but he wrote to Nott, that the conduct of the Janbaz (his only cavalry), the notoriously disaffected state of the country, and the numbers of the enemy, did not seem to warrant the pursuit of Uktur Khan, unless a re-inforcement of cavalry and infantry joined him.

Nott determined to strike both at the Ghiljies and at Uktur Khan two detachments, therefore, one under Colonel Chambers against the Ghiljies, and another under Captain Griffin against Uktur Khan, marched from Candahar, both strong in cavalry. Chambers on the 5th August was slightly engaged; the enemy however made no stand, but fled before the charges of the troops of horse, before the infantry and guns came into action. Griffin had more decided fortune; for, on the 17th August, at the head of four guns, eight hundred sabres, and three hundred and fifty bayonets, he drove Uktur Khan from a position at Rawind. The rebel leader had chosen ground, on which walls and gardens afforded cover for his men, about 5,000 in number, and promised to nullify the fire of the artillery and the compact discipline of the handful of infantry; but Griffin boldly attacked him, drove the rebels from their cover, and forced them out of their position. They were in the act of forming beyond the broken ground they had yielded, when Hart, seeing that the moment was favourable, charged with the Janbaz: Suftur Jung, a son of Shah Shuja, shared in the honour of this charge; and the Janbaz displayed no slackness, but, following their leaders, broke the enemy, and hotly pursued them.

The victory was decisive: and thus both the Dúrani and the

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Ghiljie outbreaks received severe disheartening blows from Nott's detachments. Whilst the result of the military operations was still uncertain, Macnaghten had rebutted the existence of any difficulty in overcoming the national feeling against British supremacy. "From Múkúr to the Khyber Pass, all is content and tranquillity; and wherever we Europeans go, we are received with respect and attention and welcome."-(August 2, 1841). Persisting in regarding the insurrections in the vicinity of Candahar, as transient manifestations of an habitual spirit of indepen. dence, from which nothing unfavourable to the popularity of the British rule was to be inferred, he unhesitatingly denied the difficulty of its position in Affghanistan. "On the contrary I think our prospects are most cheering; and, with the materials we have, there ought to be little or no difficulty in the manage'ment of the country. It is true the population is exclusively Mahomedan; but it is split into rival sects, and we all know 'that of all antipathies the Sectarian is the most virulent. We ́have Hazarehs, Ghiljies, Dúranis and Kuzzilbash, all at daggers drawn with each other; and in every family there are rivals and enemies. Some faults of management must neces'sarily be committed on the first assumption of the administration of a new country, and the Dúrani outbreak may be partially attributable to such faults; but what after all do such outbreaks signify?" Supporting his opinion of the evanescent character of such insurrections by examples drawn from the history of India, Macnaghten, in allusion to Uktur Khan and his followers, thus summed up his views-" But these people are perfect children, and they should be treated as such. If we put one naughty boy in the corner, the rest will be terrified. We have taken their plaything, power, out of the hands of the Dúrani Chiefs, and they are pouting a good deal in consequence. They did not know how to use it. In 'their hands it was useless and even hurtful to their master, and we were obliged to transfer it to scholars of our own. They instigate the Múllahs, and the Múllahs preach to the people; but this will be very temporary. The evil of it is, we 'must have force; we have abandoned all hope of forming a 'national army." Thus thought and wrote the Envoy. Nott, to the full as bold a man, in spite of the successes of his troops, took a wholly different view of affairs from Macnaghten. "The conduct of the thousand and one politicals has ruined our cause, and bared the throat of every European in this country to the sword and knife of the revengeful Affghan and bloody Beluch; and, unless several regiments be quickly sent, not a man will be left to note the fate of his comrades. Nothing

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but force will ever make them submit to the hated Shah Shuja, who is most certainly as great a scoundrel as ever lived." Nothing could thus be more opposed than were the views of the Envoy and the General, who only concurred on the single point of ascribing blame to the subordinate political functionaries. Their errors, admitted by Macnaghten, and prominently adduced by Nott, were, however, as has been seen, but secondary causes, rather affording occasion for the exhibition of, than originating, that deep hate which now pulsed in the hearts of the Affghans. The whole policy of the Anglo-Indian Government was a grievous wrong to this people; and the instruments, who strove to work out a faulty system with a devotion and zeal worthy of a better cause, cannot justly be made responsible for its failure. If some were vain, shallow, and immoral, others were able, good and valorous men. The usual proportion of ability and merit was there; but these qualities had to struggle against adverse circumstances and false positions, and were expected to reconcile incompatibilities.

Cotemporaneously with the Dúrani insurrection in Zemindawar, events took place at Herat, which must now be noted.

Yar Mahomed, in constant communication with Uktur Khan and the rebels, sought to encourage the outbreak, and, by embarrassing the British Government and finding full occupation for its troops in the suppression of revolts in Affghanistan, to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to the military occupation of Herat. He knew that, so long as the Dúranis and Ghiljies were in arms, Nott could not spare men and cattle for a march on Herat. Secure on this point, the object next in importance was to devise means for re-opening the sluices of British prodigality. The minister was well aware that from the side of Persia there was now nothing to dread. A confidential agent was therefore despatched to Meshed, inviting Persian co-operation, pointing out the distracted state of Zemindawar and the Ghiljie country, and urging the opportunity as favourable for an armed demonstration in support of the kindling spirit of insurrection-the northern division of the British army of occupation having its communications with the southern interrupted by the snow on the Highlands of Ghuzni. Yar Mahomed was well apprised of the inability and unwillingness of Persia to act on his suggestions. His purpose was to operate upon the apprehensions of the British agent and thus again to effect a renewal of the now staunched donations. Todd, however, at the same time that he ascertained the nature of Yar Mahomed's letters to Meshed, learned that strong reinforcements were in Upper Scinde, and that there was a probability of Nott's hands being early strengthen

ed. He therefore deemed the occasion favourable for marking his sense of the conduct of Kamran, by enforcing a measure, which would be a severe blow to the avaricious ruler and his minister. On the 1st February, 1841, he informed the Herat authorities, that even the monthly stipend would be discontinued until the pleasure of the British Government were known. Yar Mahomed sought to parry this blow by artfully offering to accede to the admission of a British force into Herat-a measure, which Macnaghten had much at heart, and which had been the real object of the mission. Hitherto Yar Mahomed had carefully thwarted its fulfilment, nor had he any intention of altering his policy in this respect: but he rightly judged that it would at once induce Todd to re-open negociations; that it might not improbably lead to a grant of money; and that it was entirely free from danger, as no troops were disposable, nor for months could be, to dispatch to Herat. The immediate payment of two lacs of rupees was the condition coupled with the proferred concession. Todd, without adverting to the fact, whether troops were available or not for Herat, eagerly caught at the hope of realizing the object of his mission but he required, as a guarantee, before payment of the demand to which he otherwise made no objection, that Yar Mahomed's son should proceed to Girishk to meet and conduct the force to Herat, should the arrangement meet with the approval of the Anglo-Indian Government. The security demanded was in accordance with the Envoy's views: but Yar Mahomed, who never dreamt of admitting willingly a contingent of British troops, finding that Todd was no longer to be duped into actual payments without an equivalent, declined to furnish the desired guarantee, and, as a last resource for compelling Todd to submit to exaction, demanded either the payment of the stipulated allowance, or the withdrawal of the mission. Kamran's minister, in adopting this course, thought that the state of Zemindawar and the Ghiljie country would render Todd averse from taking a step, which involved open rupture with Herat but Todd, having failed in his ill-timed endeavour to accomplish the grand object of his mission, refused to meet the requisition, and, to the alarm of Yar Mahomed, withdrew the mission from Herat. The news of this rupture reached the Governor-General, accompanied by the Envoy's strenuous advocacy of a military expedition to reinstate British influence by the occupation of Herat, at a time which rendered the event and Macnaghten's suggestions thereon extremely unpalatable. By the cession of Ghorian, the differences with Persia had been brought to a conclusion; and there appeared, therefore, no real basis for