the stringent measures pursued by Todd, founded on a jealousy of Herati intrigues with Persia. Not only however did the grounds for the sudden break with Herat appear insufficient, but the latter event had the effect of casting ridicule on the whole of the operations in Affghanistan-clearly announcing to the world that British interference and protection were more dreaded by Herat than Persian thirst for conquest.

The Dúrani and Ghiljie outbreaks were a source of alarm to the Government of India, which was further irritated by the fact, that the Secret Committee, startled by the cost of the war, which, after exhausting the accumulated treasure, had plunged India into debt, had addressed the Government of India in terms, which, in reality, called in question the whole policy of the war. The weak Government in England, conscious that the then approaching elections would prove the downfall of the existing ministry, would, when too late, have gladly withdrawn from a conquest, the evils of which were forcing themselves upon the convictions of its originators, and could not stand scrutiny, should power pass into other hands. Auckland, vexed at the aspect of affairs, resolved at once to disavow Todd's measures. Conciliatory letters were immediately written to the Herat authorities, and regret expressed at the occurrences, which had partially interrupted mutual good understanding.

Lord

Todd had certainly acted imprudently in pressing a measure, which Macnaghten, at the time, from the want of available troops, and the state of the country around Candahar, was clearly unable to carry into effect; but the Envoy was as eager as his deputy, and, having led him into the mis-timed attempt, deserved as much blame. It fell, however, wholly on Todd, who was removed from political employment; whilst Macnaghten was simply advised, that "we should first learn to quiet and to control the positions that we occupied, before we plunged onwards."

Yar Mahomed's fears were completely allayed by the letters of the Governor-General. Both Kamran and his minister regretted the large sums which at one time were lavishly granted them; but, as the patience and credulity of the British Government had on this point been exhausted, the Herat authorities were glad to find themselves independent of its tutelage and domination. The Envoy was indeed amused by a friendly correspondence, particularly as such still held out the prospect of a continuance of the stipend of three lacs of rupees per annum, which Yar Mahomed did not despair of obtaining upon very easy terms; but it was only on such, that he entertain

ed any intention of favouring the British Government by the acceptance of its subsidy. Macnaghten, as late as August 1841, still hoped to effect a reconciliation, and to bring round Yar Mahomed to a more cordial understanding. The Government was advised to stipulate that Yar Mahomed must agree to follow the advice of the British authorities in all matters; that no demand beyond the three lacs per annum should be made; and that one of Yar Mahomed's sons was to reside at Calcutta, or Bombay, as a hostage for his father's sincerity. But events soon followed, which threw into utter insignificance Yar Mahomed, his petty intrigues, and the weakness and credulity of our over-reached agent's proceedings at Herat.

The observation has already been made, that the Secret Committee had taken alarm at the aspect of affairs to the westward of the Indus and as the altered tone, in which they suddenly expressed themselves upon the operations in Affghanistan, had a marked and an unfortunate effect upon the Envoy's measures, it here becomes essential to note the manner in which the opinions of the Secret Committee influenced the current of events.

Most readers are aware that the controul of the Government of India is a power entrusted to the President of the Board of Controul-a Member of the Ministry-and empowered by Act of Parliament to dictate instructions to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors. The influence of the latter body is, therefore, in all matters of real importance of a purely subordinate character, and is entirely dependent upon the ability and energy of the President, and the interest which the ministry for the time being may take in the welfare and good government of the vast empire under the sway of the British Crown. The name of the Secret Committee, the channel of the injunctions of the President of the Board of Controul, must not, therefore, when subsequently used, be misunderstood as attaching undue importance to that small section of the Court of Directors, which has always a qualified, and often a nominal, rather than a real, participation in the conduct of affairs of weight.

The insurrection, which recovered Kelat for the son of Mehrab Khan; the reverses sustained in Upper Scinde; the attacks on Quetta; the alarm produced by the return of Dost Mahomed, and his movements and intrigues in the Kohistan; the great cost of the occupation of Affghanistan; and the state of anarchy into which the Punjab seemed fast falling, and by which the position of the army to the west of the Indus threatened to be still farther compromised-had excited the vivid apprehensions of the Home Government, who, under the impulse of anxiety, addressed the Governor-General in a tone of complaint and

reprehension, inconsistent with the spirit of full approbation which had encouraged the opening of the war. The series of reverses were attributed to the error of having, at the close of 1839, withdrawn too many troops from Affghanistan ; whilst the spirit of hostility to the Shah's Government was charged to an absence of sufficient vigour in amending the defects of the civil administration of the country. The difficulty of meeting the extraordinary disbursements, consequent on the war and the continued occupation of the conquered territories, and the financial embarrassment, which the deficiency of revenue as compared with expenditure, could not fail to entail on India, were, with reason, mooted-it being evident, that, unless a change of policy took place, for many years to come the restored monarchy would have need of a British force, and that not a small one, in order to maintain peace in its own territory and prevent aggression from without. The Indian Government was therefore called upon to consider, with the utmost seriousness, the question of its future policy with respect to Affghanistan ;-the British position in that country being one, which must be either abandoned, or fully maintained at whatever sacrifice, and with all the consequences which a movement so far beyond our frontiers must entail.

These instructions, penned under a sense of alarm at a threatening crisis, reached the Governor-General, when the surrender of Dost Mahomed, the re-occupation of Kelat and flight of Mehrab Khan's son, and the successes of Nott's detachments against the Dúraní and Ghiljie insurgents, had not only improved the aspect of affairs in Affghanistan, but also brought about an opportunity most favourable for withdrawing with credit from an erroneous and dangerous policy. The unexpected surrender of Dost Mahomed was a second test of the honesty and sincerity of the Indian Government in its transIndus operations. No more striking event could be conceived for an honourable termination to the armed occupation of Affghanistan, and for the triumphant return of the Anglo-Indian Army to its own Frontier; and, by furnishing so unhoped an occasion, Providence removed all reasonable ground of excuse or hesitation, and afforded the Indian Government the very moment which it professed to await. But man, in his short-sighted elation, clung to ill-gotten conquests, and, rejecting the proferred occasion, was overtaken by a fearful and terrible retribution.

The Governor-General, vexed at the altered tone of the Secret Committee and at the blame imputed to the course pursued, was gratified that circumstances were such as enabled him

in reply to adduce plausible reasons for continuing the policy which had been called in question, and to speak, with a show of confidence in its ultimate success, of the necessity for maintaining the military occupation of Affghanistan, and supporting Shah Shúja until his authority should be securely established. Lord Auckland admitted that the British Power was unpopular in Affghanistan, and that it rendered Shah Shúja so; that the latter, leaning entirely on his British Allies, had no military means of his own worthy of the least reliance; that the actual condition of feeling in the country (whatever the degree of discontent with the established order of things) was owing rather to our presence and pervading ascendancy, than to any general sentiment of personal dissatisfaction toward Shah Shuja, whom the Governor-General believed to be intelligent, just, lenient, and zealously attentive to the duties of his station; that the cost of the British Force in Affghanistan was a heavy burthen upon the Indian finances-so much so indeed, that it caused a yearly deficiency of a million and a quarter, which could only be provided for by loan, and was therefore rapidly plunging the Indian Government into a heavy public debt; that it was clear that the Indian Government could not go on for many years providing for a deficit so considerable; that the restored monarchy, if we remained on the scene, would for many years to come need the maintenance, at an overwhelming cost, of a strong British force; that Russia had receded from her adavnce towards the Oxus; and that invasion from the westward by a large force, over an immense extent of barren country, occupied by tribes destitute of union and force, could only be made with much time and preparation. Yet, notwithstanding these plain and forcible admissions of the difficulties and embarrassments attending our position in Affghanistan, and of the withdrawal of Russia from the attempt to establish her influence on the Oxus, the Governor-General was averse from seizing the opportunity of retiring with honour from a false position: and he found a countervailing advantage in the repose of the public mind in India from our command of the avenues, by which the approach of invasion was alleged to have been apprehended, and in the facility, which the tenure of Affghanistan was asserted to afford, for watching and counteracting the first movements of hostile intrigue. On such visionary grounds, dignified with the name of advantages of vital importance, he, with the greatest earnestness, deprecated a retrograde movement from Affghanistan, unless under the controul of an imperious necessity.

To palliate this decision in favour of the alternative of continuing to occupy Affghanistan, necessarily in great force and at the cost of the financial prosperity of India, hopes were held out, that the embarrassments of the latter country might be ameliorated by its growing resources-from the falling in of large pensions-the escheat of lands-and reductions in the cost of the Civil establishments-all remote, and some of them but insignificant, contingencies.

The alleged neglect of the Civil Administration of Affghanistan was rebutted; and the impolicy and impracticability of the sweeping reforms, contemplated and recommended by the Secret Committee, in the system of collecting the revenue and of paying the Affghan troops, were characterized as admirably calculated to throw everything into confusion. Nevertheless, anxious to reduce the expenditure as much as possible, and to evince a spirit of economy in consonance with the objects of the Secret Committee, Lord Auckland pressed Macnaghten to effect reductions of outlay, and to diminish the amount of the various subsidies paid to the different Chiefs in Affghanistan. The Envoy had objected to this measure, foreseeing some of its possible consequences; and he had urged that the payments to the Chiefs were nothing more nor less than a compensation for the privileges given up of plundering the high roads through their respective jurisdictions, and that "we should be found in the end to have made a cheap bargain;" but, finding himself alone in his opinion, and pressed to reduce these stipends by Burnes, the Governor-General, and the Secret Committee, he resolvedas the outward aspect of affairs was improved, and his position strengthened by the presence of the troops sent to relieve the corps which were to return to India-to satisfy the wishes of the home authorities and of the Government of India, before resigning controul and authority to his successor. The Envoy therefore summoned the Ghiljie Chiefs to Cabul, and communicated to them, that the necessities of the State rendered the reduction of their stipends necessary. The Chiefs received the announcement without any apparent discontent or remonstrance: but they were no sooner clear of Cabul and amongst their own dependants and followers, than they issued orders to infest the Passes between Cabul and Jellalabad, and to interrupt the line of communication with India.

Such was the discretion, which after selecting, on the question of the main policy to be pursued, the worst of two alternatives, injudiciously and perniciously sought at once to enforce a petty economy incompatible with the course adopted. The heedless profusion, which could waste upwards of two hundred

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