thousand pounds upon Kamran and his Minister, suddenly turned with a nice parsimony to pare down the stipends of the Ghiljie Chiefs, in order to boast of a saving of three thousand pounds per annum.

We find that, in endeavouring to lay before the reader a brief but comprehensive outline of the political transactions and of the general state of affairs to the West of the Indus immediately prior to the insurrection, we are exceeding the usual limits of an article. Yet, it was necessary to remedy, or attempt to remedy, a defect, which we have observed to pervade every work, which has hitherto treated of this event. It was essential that the reader should perceive that the whole tendency of our policy, from the moment that the Shah was reseated on his throne, had been to excite far and wide, over the whole of Affghanistan and the countries on the Oxus and Jaxartes, the spirit of distrust and hostility; that this went on deepening into hate and open revolt, where the circumstances of the moment appeared favourable; that these occasional outbursts of the national mind and feeling, partially successful and incompletely subdued, were but the minor craters on the mountain's side, betokening the threatening presence and activity of deep subterrene fires, before the Volcano itself opened with the paroxysmal burst of a mighty eruption. The custom has been to treat the subject, as if it were independent of these precedent occurrences; as if it were an isolated fact, which could be viewed singly, and could even be discussed as a purely military question, disconnected from its intimately associated political adjuncts: it was necessary therefore to show the reader that the antecedents had a most important bearing upon the disastrous sequel, and to make him sweep with his eye the broad circle of a heaving, stormy sea, and trace the approach of the hurricane. We are no admirers

of the apologetic fashion of writing, which sacrifices truth to falsehood. Our nationality, under the convenient screen of consideration and delicacy, does not lead us to veil gross errors and manifest injustice, in order to soften the hues of an iniquitous policy, which no colouring can impose upon the world as other in character than nefarious and unwise. In what we shall have to say on the proximate causes of the outbreak at Caubul, and on the political and military measures which followed it, our speech will be as plain, as on the events which were the forerunners of that calamity. Such admonitions are from the hand of Him, who administers them for man's warning and contemplation-not with the view of their being filmed over with the web of a nice and curious vanity, which shrinks from calling things

by their right names, and shows truth no further than may serve to keep falsehood in countenance. We shall ill fulfil our mission in the east, if we cannot speak and write of our actions without flattery or subterfuge; if we cannot brook to read the lessons, which God gives us. Great power is great temptation: and the smiter of its excesses is the giver of the abused power, who can as easily humiliate with the hand of retribution, as raise by that of favour.

or

Major Hough, in his treatment of the subject, forms no exception to the general rule. His book is deficient in lucid arrangement; his array of authorities is sometimes out of place; his parallels are frequently remarkably inapposite, and the military doctrines and arguments advanced often open to question in their mode of application. He either omits, was not aware of, much that had an important influence on the current of affairs. But in this he is by no means singular : for nothing can well be more bald and poor than the manner in which the insurrection at Cabul is treated by an historian (Thornton), who, from the circulation of his works by the Court of Directors, seems to be a favourite with them.

Macnaghten, warned throughout 1841, both by Rawlinson at Candahar and by Pottinger in Kohistan, of the real state of feeling which pervaded the country, but blinded by his own wishes, reasonings, and fancied strength, was obstinate in depicting the Ghiljie rising as a partial and easily quelled revolt. Yet he knew that Akbar Khan was on the Bamian Frontier, and that intrigue and disaffection were rife in Cabul, Zúrmut, and the Kohistan; and he soon learned that the Ghiljies were assembling in earnest on the line of the Cabul River. Nevertheless, Sale's brigade was permitted to march upon its return towards Hindustan, as if the passes were clear, the Ghiljies contented, and no opposition to be anticipated. Monteith, with the 35th N. I., marched in advance on the 9th October, and halted at Bútkak, about nine miles from Cabul; whilst Sale, with the remainder of the brigade, remained at the latter place, being detained to complete his wants in baggage-cattle. The fact of the march of the brigade in such a manner is the more inexplicable, as it was known at Cabul on the 2nd that the passes were blocked up, and Burnes on the 3rd wrote to an officer, Captain Gray, returning with a small escort to India, advising him to join a Chief, who, with a party of four hundred men, was marching to Lughman. Gray did so: and we refer to the narrative of the adventurous march and of the chivalrous conduct of Mahomed Uzín Khan and his party for a detail of this officer's escape from the Ghiljies. Fellow.

ship in danger makes hearty friends. The fore-named Chief, interested in the fate of Gray and his companion, to save whom he had perilled himself and his followers, now frankly told Gray that "all Affghanistan were determined to make one cause, and to murder or drive out every Feringhi in the country; that the whole country, and Cabul itself, was ready to break out; that no confidence could be placed in the escort, and that the safety of Gray and his companion was matter of alarm and anxiety to him." Gray wrote to Burnes on the morning of the 7th, and reported officially all that had occurred, and the plot revealed by his gallant protector. The letter reached Burnes, for he wrote to the Chief acknowledging its receipt; yet, Monteith marched on the 9th, exactly as if all between Bútkak and Jellalabad were as quiet as the Envoy (about to proceed to take up the Government of Bombay) wished to be the case; and Sale, the fire-arms of whose corps were worn out by constant service, failed to obtain permission to replace the bad weapons with new, though at the time four thousand lay idle in store at Cabul.

Elphinstone, the General, who had relieved Cotton, was a brave gentleman, but inexperienced in command, a tyro in eastern warfare, ignorant of Affghanistan and its people, and so shaken by severe attacks of gout and illness before he quitted Hindústan, that he accepted the command in Affghanistan, because repeatedly desired by the Government, and from the honourable feeling that it is a soldier's duty to go wherever his services may be required, but from no personal wish; for he felt that, although partial recovery forbad him to decline the service, it left him in reality physically unequal to much exertion. Had he been experienced in men and affairs, and gifted with mental energy and ability, the vigour of a commanding intellect might, in some degree, have counterbalanced the disadvantages of physical debility, and have prevented his infirmities from rendering him a mere cipher. The proper man to have succeeded to command in Affghanistan was Nott :-but it was felt from his known character that, if he were appointed, it must be to real, and not to nominal, command-and this was not what either Burnes or Macnaghten desired. He had therefore again the mortification of being thrown into the back-ground and a secondary position, in order that the highest military authority might rest in the hands of a more manageable man.

a

Monteith's intimation of the state of the country was rough one. On the night of the 9th his camp was attacked at Bútkak; the assailants were repulsed, and, as the firing might have been heard at Cabul, and a report of the event

was quickly communicated, Sale, with the 13th, was suddenly ordered on the 10th to move out to Bútkak, and to clear the passes. Having joined Monteith, Sale was at the head of two regiments of infantry, Dawes' guns, Oldfield's squadron of 5th cavalry, a rissalah of irregular horse, and Broadfoot's sappers; besides two hundred Jazailchis under Jan Fishan Khan. Sale, with this very respectable force, resolved to force the Khurd Cabul Pass, and to encamp the 35th N. I. in the Khurd Cabul valley-the 13th returning to Bútkak after this should have been accomplished. Accordingly, on the morning of the 12th, he attacked and forced the Khurd Cabul Pass, with small loss, considering its length, strength and the numbers of the enemy; the 35th was encamped as intended; and the 13th, again traversing the Khurd Cabul Pass, returned to Bútkak. Sale, wounded on first entering the Pass, was thenceforward carried in a dúlí throughout the subsequent operations of his force.

The isolation of the 35th N. I. in an unfavourable position encouraged the Ghiljies again to attempt a night attack, and with greater chance of success than at Bútkak, where an open plain offered no special advantage to Ghiljie tactics. From the 12th to the 17th, full leisure was enjoyed to observe Monteith's encampment; and Macgregor, as Political Agent, being with him, it was no difficult matter, through the Political functionary, to obtain permission for a body of friendly Affghans to pitch their camp close to Macgregor, and therefore virtually in the British camp. Suspicious of no treachery within, Monteith's picquets were on the alert without; and, on the night of the 17th, they reported the advance of a strong column of the enemy on the rear of the camp. Thither the Grenadier company was sent; and it had passed the place where the camels were parked together, when, from behind the baggage-cattle, a body of armed men sprung up, fired, and brought to the ground Captain Jenkins and thirty of his The "friendly" Affghans having given this signal to the advancing column of the enemy, the latter pushed on to take advantage of the confusion, which unexpected treachery was likely to create, and in a short time the 35th was warmly engaged. Monteith, a cool soldier, though partially surprized, was not to be easily beaten ; on the contrary, he repulsed his assailants, friends and foes, and made them pay for their audacity by some loss, but could not prevent eighty camels being taken offat the moment a serious loss.

men.

Sale now saw the error he had committed-that the Ghiljies, flushed with partial success, would not fail to be encouraged, and

that the 35th N. I., left for days isolated and useless in the Khurd Cabul valley, was likely to suffer. Having received reinforcements from Cabul, he therefore marched on the 20th to effect a junction with Monteith; and, having accomplished this without loss or difficulty, and on the 21st obtained additional camels from Cabul, he on the 22nd marched towards Tazín. He had with him three corps of infantry, Abbott's battery of nine-pounders, Backhouse's mountain train, Broadfoot's sappers, Oldfield's squadron, a rissalah of irregular horse, and the Jazailchis. The Ghiljies offered no opposition on the Huft Kotul; and the column was permitted to thread the deep defile, which opens upon the valley of Tazin without contest; but the enemy were in force around the debouche into the valley, and seemed to contemplate there making a stand. A few rounds from the guns made them give ground; and the force took post in the plain without difficulty. An ill-managed, unnecessary skirmish, for which Sale (who was lying wounded in his dúlí) was not responsible, cost him a gallant young officer killed, two wounded, and (worst of all) a run before a pursuing enemy, which was a baneful occurrence amongst young soldiers.

Sale, with a stout force, was now in a position to strike a blow, from which important effects might have resulted; for the fort and possessions of one of the leaders in the revolt were within his grasp. The Chief had kept his men together in the valley, rather than on the Huft Kotul and Tazín defile, in order to defend his property and the winter stock of food for his cattle and followers: but the skirmish of the 22nd had, though very ill-managed on the part of the British, shown him that to save his fort he must have recourse to artifice, rather than to the valour of the Ghiljies. Affghan Chiefs were avowedly of the opinion of the French author-" Et sans point de doute (comme 'j'ay dit ailleurs) les Anglois ne sout pas si subtils en traités et appointemens, comme sont les Francois; et, quelque chose que l'on en die, ils vont assez grossement en besonque (besogne); mais il faut avoir une peu de patience, et ne débattre point colériquement avec eux." The Chief therefore determined to open negociations, and again to over-reach Macgregor. Sale had given orders for an attack on the fort in question, and Dennie, with half the infantry and most of the artillery, was about to proceed upon the execution of the enterprize, known to be an easy one by the Acting Engineer Broadfoot, when a messenger from the Chief presented himself before the Political Agent, tendered the submission of his master and the Chiefs leagued with him, and deprecated the impending attack on his castle. Macgregor, whose eyes were nothing