By the time that Mahomed Akbar arrived at Cabul (the 22nd November) the military leaders had lost all confidence in themselves and their men; and Macuaghten was pressed to save the force, by negociating for its safe retreat upon the humiliating condition of evacuating the whole of Affghanistan. The Envoy was loath to entertain a proposal so derogatory to the fame of the British name, and so subversive of the policy and plans, which he had strenuously advocated, and proved mainly instrumental in furthering. Moreover, he nursed hopes of accomplishing by secret intrigue and the distribution of large sums of money, that which the British arms failed to effect. To strike down the leaders of the rebellion, to create discord among their followers, and thus to break up the league against Shah Súja and his allies, was Macnaghten's dream. It must not be supposed, that upon the outbreak of the 2nd November, the Envoy limited his exertions to the request that Elphinstone should act. At the same time, that Macnaghten called upon the military authorities to quell the revolt by the employment of force, he secretly, with the same object in view, adopted measures of a much more doubtful character, which, failing of issue, subsequently exercised a most unfortunate influence, not alone upon his own individual fate, but upon that of the whole force at Cabul.

Mohun Lal, who was in the suite of Burnes, escaping massacre when his Chief and all with him were killed, ultimately found an Asylum in the house of the Kuzzilbash Chief, Khan Sherin Khan, in the Kuzzilbash, or Persian, quarter of the city. Mohun Lal, in the opinion of the Envoy, was there favorably situated for carrying on negociations and intrigues with such Chiefs, as Macnaghten entertained hopes of winning to his cause, and of rendering willing instruments in the fulfilment of his purposes. Accordingly, Mohun Lal was, shortly after the first burst of the rebellion, in daily communication with both Macnaghten and Captain J. B. Conolly, who, as Political Assistant and in the confidence of the Envoy, wrote early on the 5th November to Mohun Lal, and thus opened the correspondence with him." Tell the Kuzzilbash Chiefs, Sherín Khan, Naib Sheriff, in fact all the Chiefs of Shiah persuasion, to join against the rebels. You can promise one lac of rupees to Khan Sherín on the condition of his killing and seizing the rebels, and arming all the Shiahs, and immediately attacking all rebels. This is the time for the Shiahs to do good service. Explain to them that, if the Súnnis once get the upper hand in the town, they will immediately attack and plunder their part of the town; hold out promises of reward

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and money; write to me very frequently. Tell the Chiefs, who are well disposed, to send respectable agents to the Envoy. Try and spread "nifak" amongst the rebels. In everything that you do consult me, and write very often. Mír Hyder Purja Bashí has been sent to Khan Sherin and will see you." As a postscript followed the important addition-"I promise 10,000 rupees for the head of each of the principal ' rebel Chiefs." Mir Hyder Purja Bashí did not fail to see Mohun Lal; and, having repeated what Conolly had written respecting the reward of 10,000 rupees upon the head of each of the principal rebel Chiefs, he urged Mohun Lal to exertion, pointing out that he "would do great service to the State, if the principal rebels were executed by any means whatever." Mohun Lal was, however, in a position requiring address: for although the Kuzzilbash Chiefs were not heartily with the Ghiljies, the Kohistanis and other rebels, yet, there had been no such display of energy on the part of the British troops as encouraged Khan Sherín Khan and his Kuzzilbash friends hastily to compromise their own safety by at once taking a decided course in favor of the Shah and his unpopular allies: and the attempt to raise a hostile party amid the rebels and to take off their principal leaders, at the moment of their first brilliant successes, was evidently both a very delicate and a very hazardous operation. Mohun Lal was therefore forced to await a more favourable time, and to watch for such opportunity, as the course of events, or the fickle humours of the Chiefs, into whose hands fate had thrown him, might offer. The Envoy becoming impatient of the state of uncertainty in which the wary silence of the timid Mohun Lal left him, Conolly, on the 11th, again wrote-" Why do you not write? What has become of Mír Hyder? Is he doing 'anything with Khan Sherin? You never told me whe6 ther you had written to Naib Humza. What do the rebels propose doing now? Have you not made any arrangements I about the bodies of the murdered Officers ? Offer 2,000 rupees to any one, who will take them to cantonments, or 1,000 to any one, who will bring them. Has not Sir Alex's 'body been found? Give my salaam to the Naib. If Khan 'Sherin is not inclined to do service, try other Kuzzilbash Chiefs independently. Exert yourself; write to me often, for the news of Kossids is not to be depended on. There is a man called Haji Ali, who might be induced by a bribe to try and bring in the heads of one or two of the Múf'sids (i. e. rebels): endeavour to let him know that 10,000 rupees will be given for each head, or even 15,000 rupees.

'I have sent to him two or three times." Mohun Lal, feeling more secure as to his own personal safety, now reported to the Envoy the receipt of these instructions, and the steps taken to carry them into effect. To Aga Mahomed Soudah, the friend of Hají Alí, was explained Conolly's offer of 10,000, or 15,000, rupees for the head of each rebel Chief; and, as the two friends had also received direct communications from Conolly to the same effect, they entertained Mohun Lal's overtures. But, however desirous of obtaining so enormous a reward, they feared themselves to undertake the deed, and therefore suborned two others, Abdúl Aziz and Mahomed Ullah. Besides the foregoing particular instructions from Conolly, Mohun Lal had been further empowered by the Envoy to promise to the extent of five lacs of rupees, and to distribute as far as 50,000 rupees in aid of the Shah's cause. He therefore did not hesitate to advance at once 9,000 rupees, and to promise that a balance of 12,000 rupees would be paid, as soon as the heads of Mir Musjidi and Abdullah Khan were brought in-selecting these Chiefs as the first victims, because he believed them to have been actively concerned in the attack upon the Treasury and Burnes's house, and in the slaughter of his patron, and knew them to be the boldest and most influential leaders of the insurgents. Having thus set on foot this affair, Mohun Lal reported his proceedings to the Envoy, adding with naive simplicity, that he "could not find out by Lieut. Conolly's notes, how the rebels are to be assassinated; but the men, now employed, promise to go into their houses, and cut off their heads, when they may be without attendants." Macnaghten, nothing startled by the plain term applied to the transactions by his subordinate agent, replied on the 13th November,-“I have received your letters of this morning's date, and highly approve of all you have done.”*

Mir Musjidi and Abdullah Khan were soon numbered amongst the dead. The former died very suddenly; how, Mohun Lal could not with certainty learn; but Mahomed Ullah assured him, that, in fulfilment of the engagement, the wretched man had been suffocated when asleep by the hands of Mahomed Ullah himself. Abdullah Khan fell severely wounded by a shot, whilst standing amongst his countrymen engaged

• At a later period (December 1st) Sir Wm. Macnaghten, awakening to the impolicy, if not to the immorality, of such treacherous practices, wrote to Mohun Lal, in reference to a similar proposal to take off Amin Ullah, "I am sorry to find from " your letter of last night, that you could have supposed it was ever my object to encourage assassination. The rebels are very wicked men; but we must not take un'lawful means to destroy them." We do not pretend to reconcile the discrepancy, [ED.]

in fight with the British troops; but whether struck down by a ball from the piece of Abdul Aziz, who claimed the merit of having shot his victim from behind a wall, or by the fire of the troops, Mohun Lal was not confident. Abdúl Azíz, however, assured him, that Abdallah Khan would soon die, as poison would complete what the shot had not done. He lingered for a week, and then fulfilled Abdul Aziz's prediction; who, as well as Mahomed Ullah, then demanded, through their suborners, Haji Ali and Aga Mahomed, the balance of the reward due to them. Mohun Lal, with a Shylock nicety, refused to pay the balance; alleging that the heads had not according to agreement been brought in, and that Abdúllah Khan might probably have been wounded by the musquetry of our troops. The Envoy having received intimation from Mohun Lal, who sent the suborners' notes making the demand and his own reply in refusal, Kurbar Ali, a confidential messenger in the employment of Macnaghten, was despatched by the latter with a message, attested by a reference to a past event known only to the Envoy and Mohun Lal,-" that had Ma'homed Ullah and Abdul Aziz sent the heads to the Envoy, 'Mohun Lal would have been ordered to pay the balance; 'but, as they had failed in so doing, they must rest content 'with the advance they had received for their doubtful ser'vices." The Envoy was forced to deliver this, and other dangerous injunctions, by the expedient (well known in the East) of an attested message, because some native writers of English, having gone over to the enemy, had made them acquainted with the contents of several of his intercepted letters.

The two ablest and most resolute leaders of the rebels in field and council being thus, either by fair or foul means, struck down, Macnaghten was unwilling to comply with the urgent, but, as he thought premature, requests of the military authorities to treat: for he laid much stress on the effect, which might result from the fall of these two obnoxious Chiefs, and anticipated deriving advantage from an event, which must leave the insurgents a prey to the factious emulation of the less influential leaders. Subsequently to the fall of Abdúllah Khan, severely wounded in the last action at Beymaru, circumstances seemed to favour the indulgence of such a hope; as, not only did the enemy fail to follow up their success, when our troops fled into disorder to cantonments, but, for a while, there was a lull in the activity with which hostilities were prosecuted, and the enemy seemed unaccountably paralyzed. Neither Conolly, nor Macnaghten, nor indeed Mohun Lal, had, however, been sufficiently cautious

in the overtures made to accomplish the destruction of the principal rebels. Too many persons had been entrusted with the secret, and some of them men upon whom it is wonderful that reliance should have been placed. When, therefore, in addition to such a dangerous diffusion of the secret, Macnaghten and Mohun Lal refused to fulfil the promises made, and withheld the reward claimed, not only was it impossible for Mohun Lal to find instruments willing to strike down more of the obnoxious Chiefs, but the latter became aware of the price set upon their heads, and were exasperated at the discovery of a tampering with the cupidity of their Affghan followers, and a base endeavour to effect, by the knife or shot of the assassin, that which the courage of the troops was unequal to secure. Their minds were therefore well disposed to support any leader, who could control their minor jealousies and advance undeniable claims to their allegiance. At this juncture Akbar Khan appeared upon the scene, and immediately became the rallying centre of hostile feeling and action. Naturally embittered against the British power, the intimation he received of the Envoy's secret machinations against the lives of the Chiefs enabled him to keep alive their suspicions, destroy all confidence in British good faith, and fan into a flame the spirit of implacable hostility.

Macnaghten, constantly pressed by the General, and himself aware that the supplies of the force were nearly exhausted, the troops spiritless and disorganized, and, with few, (but those noble) exceptions, not to be depended upon for the exercise of either discipline or courage, at length, in spite of his own aversion to a task beset with so much dishonour and difficulty, began, in apparent earnest, to negociate for the safe withdrawal of the army and the evacuation of Affghanistan. Never was courage more conspicuous than in the case of the ill-fated Envoy, who sought, by the display of a truly daring confidence towards Chiefs whom he knew to have much cause for distrusting him, to inspire them with confidence in the sincerity of his intentions. No one, judging from the hardihood with which he exposed himself to the knives and pistols of these exasperated men, would have imagined him conscious of having set so high a price upon their heads. On the 11th December, accompanied by Lawrence, Mackenzie and Trevor, Macnaghten met the assembled leaders of the rebellion on the plain near the Seah Sung Hill, and there discussed the conditions of a draft treaty which he had sketched. The unmolested withdrawal, not only of the force at Cabul, but also of all the British troops in Affghanistan; their supply with food, fodder, and means of transport; the return from India of Dost Mahomed and every Affghan in exile; that Shah Shuja