everything he did, and consequently sinned with him.' Alas! that men, that rational and immortal beings, should resort to such dark and desperate absurdities, rather than relinquish their hold on the hypothesis of the great Augustine! as great, surely, in the magnitude of his errors, as in the magnificence of his powers. How truly has it been said, that ' God has written on his works, as plainly as in his word, the great lesson—Cease ye from manP Augustine truly was a great man; but Time is greater than Augustine. For Time, says the Master of Wisdom, is ' the great author of authors and of all authority.' At this moment, at this last' syllable of recorded time', the very least in the kingdom of heaven is, in knowledge of Christian doctrine, immeasurably greater, in many respects, than was Augustine himself.

The Second Hypothesis.

'Others', says Dr. Knapp,"' endeavor to vindicate the divine justice by a reference to the scientia media of God, or from foreknowledge of what is conditionally possible. The sin of Adam, they say, is imputed to us, because God foresaw that each of us would have committed it, if he had been in Adam's stead, or placed in his circumstances'.6 It is well added, that' it is a new sort of justice, that would allow us to be punished for sins which we never committed, or never designed to commit, but only7 might possibly have committed under certain circumstances.' Such a view of the divine justice can never satisfy the human reason; it necessarily leads to the most monstrous consequences. If we were placed in any one of ten thousand situations, in which others have sinned, we might have committed sin; God would have foreseen that we would commit it; and if his justice could punish us for such imaginary offences, then he might justly cause us'to suffer for a greater amount of transgression, than any created being could possibly commit. Yet this theory, wild as it is, has been maintained by eminent theologians. 'Even Augustine,'according to Dr. Knapp, contends,' that the sin of Adam is imputed propter consensionem, or consensum prasumtum.'' But this hypo

thesis, instead of vindicating the divine justice, only augments the difficulties it was designed to remove.

Though an arbitrary hypothesis may be adopted, because it is demanded by the exigencies of an untenable system; yet the human mind can never find complete repose in it. On the contrary, it will frequently depart from such an hypothesis, and even embrace views inconsistent with it, in order to sustain, the same system. The truth of tin's remark is illustrated by the course pursued by Augustine. If he had felt that the first hypothesis above mentioned was sufficient for the purpose of its adoption, he would have had no occasion for the second; but, as it was, ho favored both of these contradictory suppositions or theories. If all men sinned in Adam, this would have been a sufficient justification of this dogma, that all men are punished for his transgression. But whatever force the mind may put upon itself, and however desperately it may struggle to break down and demolish its fundamental convictions, it cannot train itself to rest completely satisfied in so monstrous a dogma as that the first act of rebellion was actually common to Adam and all his posterity. Hence, although Augustine embraced this dogma, he sometimes had recourse to the other hypothesis, which is inconsistent with it: that is to say, instead of continuing to maintain that all mankind were present in Adam and sinned in him, he resorted to the supposition that if they had l>etn in his placs theij would have committed the same sin! Such unsteadiness in one's position, such fluctuation in one's views, is the necessary consequence of subjugating the mind to the dominion of arbitrary dogmas, instead of keeping it free and open to the clear and steady light of truth.

Thk Third Hypothesis.

It has also been contended, that the moral qualities of Adam have been transferred to his descendants; and hence God is just in the punishment of them. The sin of the first man, it has been supposed, has been actually tranferred to the mind of others; and, consequently, the goodness of God is not violated, since it is just to hold them responsible for it; as if it were as easy to tranfer a moral quality, or act, from one person to another, as it is to transfer an account from one book to another. This theory has had its day. It took its rise in the dim twilight of philosophy, when the human mind was filled with dark and confused notions with respect to the nature of moral agency, and the true grounds of responsibility. It is now universally rejected. It is repudiated by Edwards as well as by Dwight; by Dr. Wilson no less than by Dr. Beecher; and by the Theological Seminary at Princeton as earnestly as by that at New Haven. It may, therefore, be considered as perfectly effete. We have mentioned it here, merely with a view to illustrate the desperate straits to which the mind of man has been reduced, in its hopeless efforts to find a platform on which to justify the doctrine that infants are justly punishable, and are actually punished by the Father of Mercies.

The Fourth Hypothesis.

'Many have inferred the justice of imputation from the supposition, that Adam was not only the natural or seminal, but also the moral head of the human race,—or even its federal head.'8 This theory is set forth in the Westminster Confession of Faith; and it is still believed by many learned and pious divines, though some of the most enlightened ministers of the Presbyterian denomination do not hesitate to declare their dissent from that portion of the confession which teaches this doctrine. In relation to this doctrine, The Christian Spectator says,—1 Mr. Barnes frankly acknowledges that as he understands that formulary, he has departed from the confession of faith.'9 And again, it says,' The Larger Catechism declares, that " all men Sinned in him (Adam) and Feli, with him in that first transgression." This is the doctrine of imputation as held by the old Calvinists. The meaning of the passage is perfectly plain. No language can declare more expressly, that Adam's act with its ill-descent, were truly and properly that of his descendants.'10 From the manner iu which the Spectator has spoken of this part of the formulary of the Presbyterian Church, and especially from the manner in which it has emphasised its words, it seems that it considered that formulary as teaching the first

(Ibid. ,J The Christian Spectator, for June, 1831. !»II id.

theory above mentioned, or that which maintains the actual presence of Adam’s posterity in him, and truly sinning in him. Indeed, where hypotheses are so arbitrary, and so destitute ot any clearly defined boundaries in the nature of things, it is very diiiicult to keep them from running together in our thoughts and language. According to this hypothesis, the posterity of Adam are made to participate in his sin, to become liable to the punishment denounced against it, in consequence of a divine constitution by which he was appointed the federal head of the human race. According to the theologians who hold this hypothesis, Adam was appointed ‘to stand as the moral head of his posterity ’, and so they were ‘ treated as one with him, as standing or falling with him.’ “ This ‘arbitrary constitution ’, says Edwards, was ‘not injurious’ to Adam’s posterity; but, on the contrary, it ‘truly expresses the goodness of its Author towards thcm.’ 1’ Let us see how this is attempted to be shown. It expresses the goodness of its Author to men, says Edwards, ‘ because there was a greater tencleneg to a happy issue in such an appointment, than if everyone had been appointed to stand for himself; especially on two accounts. (1.) That Adam had stronger motives to watchfulness than his posterity would have had; in that not only his own eternal welfare lay at stake, but also that of all his posterity. (2.) Adam was in a. state of complete manhood when his trial began.’ 1” First, the constitution for which Edwards contends, is an expression of the divine goodness; because it ])re.<`ented stronger motives to obedience, than if it had merely suspended the eternal destiny of Adam alone on his conduct. The eternal welfare of all his posterity was staked on his obedience; and, having this stupendous motive before him, he would be more likely to preserve his allegiance to his Maker, than if the motive had been less powerful. The magnitude of the motive, says Edwards, is one grand circumstance which evinces the goodness of God in the establishment of such a constitution. If this be true, it is very easy to see how the Almighty might have made a vast improvement in his own constitution. He might have

U Edwards on Original Sin. Part IV., Chap. III. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid.

made the motive to obedience still stronger, and thereby made the appointment or covenant still better. Instead of suspending merely the eternal destiny of the human race on the conduct of the first man, he might also have staked the eternal tate of the universe upon it. According to the principle of Edwards, what a vast, what a wonderful improvement would this have been in the divine constitution for the government of the world ! Again, the scheme which Edwards advocates, is condemned out of his own mouth. If this scheme was better than another, because its motives are stronger, why did not God make it still more worthy of his goodness, by rendering its motives still more powerful and efficacious? Edwards admits, nay, he insists, that God might easily have rendered these motives perfectly efficacious and successful. He repeatedly declares, that if God had pleased, he could have prevented sin from rising in the breast of the first man, ‘ by giving such influence of his Spirit, as would have been absolutely eflectual to hinder it.’ If the goodness of a constitution, then, is to be determined by the strength of its motives, as the argument in question says it is, then are we bound to pronounce that for which Edwards contends radically defective, and, as such, unworthy of the benevolence of the Deity. And if we are not to judge ot' its goodness, according to the strength of its motives, then the argument of Edwards is false. In one word, the followers of Edwards must either condemn the constitution he advocates,or they must cease to advocate it on the ground of the superior strength of its motives. The same thing may be very clearly shown from another point of view. Let us suppose that God had established such a constitution, that if Adam persevered in obedience, then all his posterity should be coniirmed in holiness and happiness, and it' he fell,he should fall only for himself. \Vould not such an appointment, we ask, have been ‘more likely’ to have been attended with a happy issue ’, than that for which Edwards contends? Let us suppose again, that such a constitution had been established, as to secure the obedience of Adam and all his posterity, which Edwards admits might very easily have