abfurd, and fuperftitious practices of any of thofe philofophers; ought to be embraced and practifed by all rational and confidering Deifts, who will act confiftently, and fteadily pursue the confequences of their own principles; as at leaft the beft fcheme and fect of philofophy, that ever was fet up in the world; and highly probable, even though it had no external evidence to be of divine original.: XI. That the motives, by which the Chriftian religion inforcés the practice of thefe duties, are fuch as are most fuitable to the excellent wifdom of God, and moft anfwerable to the natural expecta'tions of men. XII. That the peculiar manner and circumftances with which it enjoins thefe duties, and urges thefe motives, are exactly confonant to the dictates of found reafon, or the unprejudiced light of nature, and moft wifely perfective of it." XIII. That all the [credenda, or] doctrines, which the true, fimple, and uncorrupted Chriftian religion teaches (that is, not only thofe plain doctrines, which it requires to be believed as fundamental and of neceflity to eternal falvation, but even all the doctrines which it teaches as matters of truth), are, though indeed many of them not difcoverable by bare reafon unaffifted with revelation, yet, when difcovered by revelation, apparently moft agreeable to found unprejudiced reafon; have every one of them a natural tendency, and a direct and powerful influence, to reform men's lives and correct their manners; and do together make up an infinitely more confiftent and rational scheme of belief, than any that the wifeit of the antient philofophers ever did, or the cunningeft of modern unbelievers can invent or contrive. XIV. That as this revelation, to the judgement of right and fober reafon, appears even of itfelf highly credible and probable; and abundantly recommends itfelf in its native fimplicity, merely by its own intrinfic goodness and excellency, to the practice of the most rational and confidering men, who are defirous in all their actions to have fatisfaction and comfort and good hope within themselves, from the confcience of what they do fo it is moreover pofitively and directly proved, to be actually and immediately fent to us from God, by the many infallible figns and miracles, which the author of it worked publicly as the evidence of his divine commiffion; by the exact completion both of the prophecies that went before concerning him, and of thofe that he hint felf delivered concerning things that were to happen after; and by the teftimony of his followers: which, in all its circumflances, was the most credible, certain, and convincing evidence, that was ever given to any matter of fact in the world. XV. And, laftly; that they who will not, by fuch arguments and proofs as thefe, be convinced of the truth and certainty of the Chriftian religion, and be perfuaded to make it the rule and guide of all their actions, would not be convinced (lo far as to influence their hearts, and reform their lives), by any other evidence what foever; foever; no, not though one fhould rife on purpofe from the dead, to endeavour to convince them. OF THE SEVERAL SORTS OF DEISTS. I might here, before I enter upon the particular proof of thefe feveral propofitions, juftly be allowed to premife, that having now to deal with another fort of men than those against whom my former difcourfe was directed; and being confequently in fome parts of this treatise to make ufe of fome other kinds of arguments than those which the nature of that difcourfe permitted and required; the fame demonstrative force of reasoning, and even mathematical certainty, which in the main argument was there eafy to be obtained, ought not here to be expected; but that fuch moral evidence, or mixt proofs from circumftances and teftimony, as moft matters of fact are only capable of, and wife and honeft men are always fatiffied with, ought to be accounted fufficient in the prefent cafe. Becaufe all the principles indeed upon which Atheists attempt to build their fchemes, are fuch as may by plain force of reafon, and undeniably demonstrative argumentations, be reduced to express and direct contradictions. But the Deifts pretend to own all the principles of reason, and would be thought to deny nothing but what depends entirely on teftimony and evidence of matter of fact, which they think they can easily evade. But, if we examine things to the bottom, we fhall find that the matter does not in reality lie here. For I believe there are in the world, at least in any part of the world where the Chriftian religion is in any tolerable purity profeffed, very few, if any, fuch Deifts as will truly ftand to all the principles of unprejudiced reason, and fincerely both in profeffion and practice own all the obligations of natural religion, and yet oppofe Chriftianity merely upon account of their not being fatisfied with the ftrength of the evidence of matter of fact. A conftant and fincere obfervance of all the laws of reason, and obligations of natural religion, will unavoidably lead a man to Chriftianity; if he has due opportunities of examining things, and will fteadily purfue the confequences of his own principles. And all others, who pretend to be Deifts without coming up to this, can have no fixt and fettled principles at all, upon which they can either argue or act confiftently; but muft of neceffity fink into downright Atheism (and confequently fall under the force of the former arguments); as may appear by confidering the feveral forts of them. 1. OF THE FIRST SORTS OF DEISTS; AND OF PROVIDENCE. Some men would be thought to be Deifts, because they pretend to believe the existence of an eternal, infinite, independent, intelligent being; and, to avoid the name of Epicurean Atheists, teach alfo that this fupreme being made the world: though at the fame time they agree with the Epicureans in this, that they fancy * God "Omnis enim per fe Divûm natura neceffe eft does "Nam does not at all concern him.felf in the government of the world, nor has any regard to, or care of, what is done therein. But, if we examine things duly, this opinion muft unavoidably terminate in abfolute Atheism. For although to imagine that God at the creation of the world, or at the formation of any particular part of it, could (if he had pleased) by his infinite wildom, forefight, and unerring defign, have originally fo ordered, difpofed, and adapted all the fprings and feries of future neceflary and unintelligent caufes, that, without the immediate interpofition of his almighty power upon every particular occafion, they fhould regularly by virtue of that original difpofition have produced effects worthy to proceed from the direction and government of infinite wifdom; though this, I fay, may poffibly by very nice and abftract reafoning be reconcileable with a firm belief both of the being and attributes of God, and alfo with a confiftent notion even of Providence itself: yet to fancy that God originally created a certain quantity of matter and mction, and left them to frame a world at adventures, without any determinate and particular view, defign or direction; this can no way be defended confiftently, but muft of neceffity recur to downright Atheism; as I fhall fhow presently, after I have made only this one obfervation, that as that opinion is impious in itself, fo the late improvements in mathematics and natural philofophy have difcovered, that, as things now are, that fcheme is plainly falfe and impoffible in fact. For, not to fay, that, feeing matter is utterly incapable of obeying any laws, the very original laws of motion themselves cannot continue to take place, but by fomething fuperior to matter, continually exerting on it a certain force or power according to fuch certain and determinate laws; it is now evident beyond queftion, that the bodies of all plants and animals, much the most confiderable parts of the world, could not poffibly have been formed by mere matter according to any general laws of motion. And not only fo; but that most univerfal principle of gravitation itfelf, the fpring of almost all the great and regular inanimate motions in the world, anfwering (as I hinted in my former difcourfe) not at all to the furfaces of bodies (by which alone they can act one upon another), but entirely to their felid content, cannot poffibly be the refult of any motion originally impreffed on matter, but muft of neceffity be caufed (either immediately or mediately) by fomething which penetrates the very folid fubftance of all bodies, and continually puts forth in them a force or power entirely different from that by which matter acts on matter. Which is, by the way, an evident demonftration, not only of the world's being made originally by a fupreme "Nam privata dolore omni, privata perîclis, Lucret. lib. I. Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαίον, ἔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα έχει, ὅτε ἄλλω παρέχει ατε ετε ἐργαῖο STE Xágio ovixa. Laert. in vita Epicuri. Nor is the doctrine of thofe modern philofophers much different, who afcribe every thing to matter and motion, exclufive of final caufes, and fpeak of God as an "intelligentia fupramundana;" which is the very cant of Epicurus and Lucretius. intelligent intelligent caufe; but moreover that it depends every moment on fome fuperior being, for the prefervation of its frame; and that all the great motions in it are caufed by fome immaterial power, not having originally impreffed a certain quantity of motion upen mat-/ ter, but perpetually and actually exerting itfelf every moment in every part of the world. Which preferving and governing power, whether it be immediately the power and action of the fame fupreme caufe that created the world, of him "without whom not a fparrow "falls to the ground, and with whom the very hairs of our head are "all numbered;" or whether it be the action of fome fubordinate inftruments appointed by him to direct and prefide respectively over certain parts thereof; does either way equally give us a very noble idea of providence. Thofe men indeed, who, merely through a certain vanity of philofophizing, have been tempted to embrace that other opinion, of all things being produced and continued only by a certain quantity of motion, originally impreffed on matter without any determinate defign or direction, and left to itself to form a world at adventures; thofe men, I fay, who, merely through a vanity of philofophizing, have been tempted to embrace that opinion, without attending whither it would lead them, ought not, indeed, to be directly charged with all the confequences of it. But it is certain, that many under that cover have really been Atheists; and the opinion itself (as I before said) leads neceffarily and by unavoidable confequence to plain Atheism. For if God be an all-powerful, omniprefent, intelligent, wife, and free being (as it hath been before demonftrated that he neceffarily is), he cannot poffibly but know, at all times and in all places, every thing that is; and foreknow what at all times and in all places it is fitteft and wifeft fhould be; and have perfect power, without the leaft labour, difficulty, or oppofition, to order and bring to pafs what he fo judges fit to be accomplished: and confequently it is impoffible but he muft actually direct and appoint every particular thing and circumftance that is in the world, or ever fhall be, excepting only what by his own pleasure he puts under the power and choice of fubordinate free agents. If therefore God does not concern himself in the government of the world, nor has any regard to what is done therein; it will follow that he is not an omniprefent, all-powerful, intelligent, and wife being; and confequently, that he is not at all. Wherefore the opinion of this fort of Deifts ftands not upon any certain confiftent principles. but leads unavoidably to downright Atheism; and, however in words they may confefs a God, yet in reality and in truth they deny him t HUMAN AFFAIRS NOT BENEATH VIDENCE. THE REGARD OF PRO If, to avoid this, they will own God's government and providence over the greater and more confiderable parts of the world, but deny Quo confefTo, confitendum eft eorum confilio mundum adminiftrari." Cic. De Nat. Deor. lib. It. "Epicurum verbis reliquiffe Deos, re fuftuliffe." Cic. De nat. Deor. lib. II. I 3 his his inspection and regard to human affairs here upon earth, as being too minute and fmall for the fupreme governor of all things to concern himself in*; this ftill amounts to the fame. For if God be omniprefent, all-knowing, and all-powerful; he cannot but equally know, and with equal ease be able to direct and govern, † all things as any, and the minuteft things as the greateft. So that if he has no regard nor concern for thefe things, his attributes muft, as before, be denied; and confequently his being. But, befides: human affairs are by no means the minutest and most inconfiderable part of the creation, For (not to confider now, that excellency of human nature which Chriftianity difcovers to us), let a Deift fuppofe the univerfe as large as the wideft hypothelis of aftronomy will give him leave to imagine; or let him fuppofe it as immenfe as he himfelf pleafes, and filled with as great numbers of rational creatures as his own fancy can fuggeft; yet the fyftem wherein we are placed will, at leaft for aught he can reasonably fuppofe, be as confiderable as any other fingle fyftem; and the earth whereon we dwell, as confiderable as most of the other planets in this fyftem; and mankind manifeftly the only confiderable inhabitants on this globe of earth, Man therefore has manifestly a better claim to the particular regard and concern of Providence, than any thing elfe in this globe of ours; and this our globe of earth, as juft a pretence to it, as most other planets in the fyftem; and this fyftem, as just an one, as far as we can judge, as any fyftem in the univerfe. If therefore there be any providence at all, and God has any concern for any part of the world; Mankind, even feparate from the confideration of that excellency of human nature which the Chriftian doctrine difcovers to us, may as reafonably be supposed to be under its particular care and government, as any other part of the univerfe. 2. OF THE SECOND SORT OF DEISTS. Some others there are, that call themselves Deifts, because they believe, not only the being, but alfo the providence of God; that is, that every natural thing that is done in the world is produced by the power, appointed by the wifdom, and directed by the government of God; though, not allowing any difference between moral good and evil, they fuppofe that God takes no notice of the morally good or evil actions of men; these things depending, as they imagine, merely on the arbitrary conftitution of human laws. But how handfomely foever thefe men may feem to fpeak of the natural attributes of God, of his knowledge, wifdom, and power; Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἱ νομίζεσιν εἶναι τὰ θεῖα, καὶ τοιαῦτα διάπες ὁ λόγων αὐτὰ ἐξέφηνεν, ἀγαθὰ, καὶ δύναμιν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀκροβάτην, καὶ γνῶσιν τὴν τελειοτάτην τῶν μέντοι ανθρωπίνων καλαφονεῖν, ὡς μικρῶν καὶ εὐτελῶν ὄντων, καὶ αναξίων τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐπιμελείας. Simplic. in Epictet. t "Deorum providentia mundus adminiftratur iidemque confulunt rebus humanis ; neque folum univerfis, verum etiam fingulis." Cic, de Divinat. lib. I. · Αλλ' εδεν τάχ ̓ ἂν ἴσως εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τῦτόγε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσι θεοί, ἐκ ἦταν ἡ τῶν μεγέθει διαφερόντων. Lib X Εἰ δὲ τῷ ὅλο κόσμο ὁ θεὸς ἐπιμελῖται, ανάγκη και τῶν μερῶν αὐτῷ προνοεῖν; ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ τέχναι ποιᾶσι. Καὶ γὰς ἰατρὸς τῷ ὅλα σώματα ἐπιμεληθῆναι προθέμενον, ἐκ ἂν αμελήσεις τῶν μερῶν ἐδὲ σφατηγές, ἐδ' οἰκονόμο», ἡ πολιτικὸς ἀνὴρ τῶν γὰρ μερῶν ἐμελομένων, ἀνάγκη χειρόνως τὸ ὅλον διατίθεσθαι, simplic. in Epictet. yet |