a firm belief and expectation of a future ftate of rewards and punishments: in a word, could we fee a Deift, who with reverence and modefty, with fincerity and impartiality, with a true and hearty defire of finding out and fubmitting to reafon and truth, would inquire into the foundations of our belief, and examine thoroughly the pretenfions which pure and uncorrupt Chriftianity has to be received as a divine revelation; I think we could not doubt to affirm of fuch a perfon, as our Saviour did of the young man in the gospel, that he was "not far from the kingdom of God;" and that, being "willing to do his will, he should know of the doctrine, "whether it was of God." But, as I have faid, there is great reason to doubt, there are no fuch Deifts as these among the infidels of our days. This indeed is what they fometimes pretend, and feem to defire should be thought to be their cafe: But, alas! their trivial and vain cavils; their mocking and ridiculing, without and before examination; their directing the whole ftrefs of their objections against particular customs, or particular and perhaps uncertain opinions, or explications of opinions, without at all confidering the main body of religion; their loofe, vain, and frothy difcourfes; and, above all, their vicious and immoral lives; fhow plainly and undeniably, that they are not really Deifts but mere Atheists; and confequently not capable to judge of the truth of Christianity. If they were truly and in earneft fuch Deifts as they pretend and would fometimes be thought to be; those principles (as has been already fhown in part, and will more fully appear in the following difcourfe) would unavoidably lead them to Chriftianity. But, being fuch as they really are, they cannot poffibly avoid recurring to downright Atheism.

The fum is this. There is now * no fuch thing, as a confiftent fcheme of Deifm. That which alone was once fuch, namely, the fcheme of the beft heathen philofophers, ceafes now to be fo, after the appearance of revelation: becaufe (as I have already fhown, and fhall more largely prove in the fequel of this difcourfe) it directly conducts men to the belief of Chriftianity. All other pretences to Deifm may by unavoidable confequence be forced to terminate in abfolute Atheism. He that cannot prevail with himfelf to obey the Christian doctrine, and embrace thofe hopes of life and immortality, which our Saviour has brought to light through the gospel, cannot now be imagined to maintain with any firmnefs, fteadiness, and certainty, the belief of the immortality of the foul, and a future ftate of rewards and punishments after death; because all the main difficulties and objections lie equally against both. For the fame reafon, he who difbelieves the immortality of the foul, and a future ftate of rewards and punishments, cannot defend, to any effectual purpofe, or enforce with any fufficient ftrength, the obligations of morality and natural religion; notwithstanding that they are indeed incumbent upon men, from the very nature and reafon of the

* "Ita fit, ut fi ab illa rerum fumma. quam fuperius comprehendimus, abberraveris; " omnis ratio intereat, et ad nihilum omnia revertantur." Lactant. lib. VII,

things themselves. Then; he who gives up the obligations of morality and natural religion cannot poffibly have any juft and worthy notion of the moral attributes of God, or any true fenfe of the nature and neceflary differences of things. And he that once goes thus far has no foundation left, upon which he can be fure of the natural attributes or even of the exiftence of God: becaufe, to deny what unavoidably follows from the fuppofition of his existence and natural attributes, is in reality denying thofe natural attributes and that existence itself. On the contrary: he who believes the being and natural attributes of God muft of neceffity (as has been fhown in my former difcourfe) confefs his moral attributes alfo. Next: he who owns and has just notions of the moral attributes of God cannot avoid acknowledging the obligations of morality and natural religion. In like manner; he who owns the obligations of morality and natural religion muft needs, to fupport thofe obligations and make them effectual in practice, believe a future ftate of rewards and punishments. And, finally; he who believes both the obligations of natural religion, and the certainty of a future ftate of rewards and punishments, has no manner of reafon left, why he fhould reject the Chriftian revelation, when propofed to him in its original and genuine fimplicity. Wherefore fince thofe arguments which demonftrate to us the being and attributes of God are fo clofely connected with thofe which prove the reasonableness and certainty of the Chriftian revelation, that there is now no confiftent fcheme of Deifm left; all modern Deifts being forced to fhift from one cavil to another, and having no fixt and certain fet of principles to adhere to; I thought I could no way better prevent their ill defigns, and obviate all their different fhifts and objections, than, by endeavouring, in the fame method of reafoning by which I before demonftrated the being and attributes of God, to prove in like manner, by one direct and continued thread of arguing, the reafonableness and certainty of the Chriftian revelation alfo.

To proceed therefore to the proof of the propofitions themselves.

I. The fame neceffary and eternal different relations, that dif ferent things bear one to another; and the fame confequent fitnefs or unfitnefs of the application of different things or different relations one to another; with regard to which, the will of God always and neceffarily does determine itself, to choose to act only what is agreeable to juftice, equity, goodness, and truth, in order to the welfare of the whole univerfe; ought likewife conftantly to determine the wills of all fubordinate rational beings, to govern all their actions by the fame rules, for the good of the public, in their refpective stations. That is; thefe eternal and neceffary differences of things make it fit and reafonable for creatures fo to act; they cause it to be their duty, or lay an obligation upon them, fo to do; even feparate from the confideration of thefe rules being the pofitive will or command of God; and alfo antecedent to any refpect or regard, expectation or apprehenfion, of any particular-private and

2

perfonal

perfonal advantage or difadvantage, reward or punishment, either prefent or future; annexed either by natural confequence, or by pofitive appointment, to the practifing or neglecting of those rules.

The feveral parts of this propolition may be proved diftinctly in the following manner.

1. THAT THERE ARE ETERNAL AND NECESSARY DIFFERENCES OF THINGS.

That there are differences of things, and different relations, refpects or proportions, of fome things towards others, is as evident and undeniable as that one magnitude or number is greater, equal to, or fmaller than another. That from thefe different telations of different things, there neceflarily arifes an agreement or difagreement of fome things with others, or a fitnefs or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another, is likewife as plain, as that there is any fuch thing as proportion or difproportion in geometry and arithmetic, or uniformity or difformity in comparing together the refpective figures of bodies. Further, that there is a fitnefs or fuitablenets of certain circumftances to certain perfons, and an unfuitableness of others; founded in the nature of things and the qualifications of perfons, antecedent to all pofitive appointment whatfoever; alfo that from the different relations of different perfons one to another, there neceffarily arifes a fitness or unfitness of certain manners of behaviour of fome perfons towards ethers; is as manifeft, as that the properties which flow from the effences of different mathematical figures have different congruities or incongruities between themfelves; or that, in mechanics, certain weights or powers have very different forces, and different effects one upon another, according to their different diftances, or different pofitions and fituations in refpect of each other. For inftance: that God is infinitely fuperior to men, is as clear, as that infinity is larger than a point, or eternity longer than a moment. And it is as certainly fit, that men fhould honour and worship, obey and imitate God, rather than on the contrary in all their actions endeavour to difhonour and difobey him; as it is certainly true, that they have an entire dependence on him, and he on the contrary can in no refpect receive any advantage from them; and not only fo, but alfo that his will is as certainly and unalterably just and equitable in giving his commands, as his power is irrefiftible in requiring fubmiflion to it. Again: it is a thing abfolutely and neceffarily fitter in itfelf, that the fupreme author or creator of the univerfe thould govern, order, and direct all things to certain conftant and regular ends; than that every thing fhould be permitted to go on at adventures, and produce uncertain effects merely by chance and in the utmoft confufion, without any determinate view or defign at all. It is a thing manifeftly fitter in itself, that the all-powerful governor of the world fhould do always what is beft in the whole, and what tends most to the univerfal good of the whole creation; than that he fhould make the whole continually miferable; or that, to fatisfy the unreasonable defires of any particular depraved natures, he should

at

at any time fuffer the order of the whole to be altered and perverted. Laftly, it is a thing evidently and infinitely more fit, that any one particular innocent and good being fhould by the fupreme ruler and difpofer of all things be placed and preferved in an easy and happy eftate; than that, without any fault or demerit of its own, it fhould be made extremely, remedilcisly, and endlessly miferable. In like manner; in men's dealing and converfing one with another, it is undeniably more fit, abfolutely and in the nature of the thing itself, that all men fhould endeavour to promote the univerfal good and welfare of all, than that all men fhould be continually contriving the ruin and destruction of all. It is evidently more fit, even before all pofitive bargains and compacts, that men fhould deal one with another according to the known rules of juftice and equity; than that every man for his own prefent advantage, fhould without fcruple difappoint the most reasonable and equitable expectations of his neighbours, and cheat and defraud, or spoil by violence, all others without reftraint. Laftly, it is without difpute more fit and reasonable in itfelf, that I fhould preferve the life of an innocent man, that happens at any time to be in my power; or deliver him from any imminent danger, though I have never made any promife fo to do; than that I fhould fuffer him to perish, or take away his life, without any reafon or provocation at all.

THE ABSURDITY OF THOSE WHO DENY THE ETERNAL AND NECESSARY DIFFERENCES OF THINGS.

These things are fo notorioufly plain and felf-evident, that nothing but the extremeft ftupidity of mind, corruption of manners, or perverseness of fpirit, can poffibly make any man entertain the leaft doubt concerning them. For a man, endued with reafon, to deny the truth of these things, is the very fame thing, as if a man that has the use of his fight fhould, at the fame time that he beholds the fun, deny that there is any fuch thing as light in the world; or as if a man that understands geometry or arithmetic, fhould deny the most obvious and known proportions of lines or numbers, and perverfely contend that the whole is not equal to all its parts, or that a fquare is not double to a triangle of equal bafe and height. Any man of ordinary capacity, and unbiaffed judgement, plainnefs and fimplicity, who had never read, and had never been told, that there were men and philofophers, who had in earneft aflerted and attempted to prove, that there is no natural and unalterable difference between good and evil, would at the first hearing be as hardly perTuaded to believe that it could ever really enter into the heart of any intelligent man, to deny all natural difference between right and wrong, as he would be to believe, that ever there could be any geometer who would ferioufly and in good earneft lay it down as a firft principle, that a crooked line is as ftrait as a right one. So that indeed it might juftly feem altogether a needlefs undertaking, to attempt to prove and establish the eternal difference of good and evil; had there not appeared certain men, as Mr. Hobbes and fome few others, who have prefumed, contrary to the plaineft and most obvious

3

reason

reafon of mankind, to affert, and not without fome fubtilty endea voured to prove, that there is no such real difference originally, neceffarily, and abfolutely in the nature of things; but that all obligation of duty to God arifes merely from his abfolutely irresistible power; and all duty towards men, merely from pofitive compact; and have founded their whole fcheme of politics upon that opinion. Wherein as they have contradicted the judgement of all the wifeft and fobereft part of mankind, fo they have not been able to avoid contradicting themselves alfo. For (not to mention now, that they have no way to fhew how compacts themselves come to be obligatory, but by inconfiftently owning an eternal original fitnefs in the thing itfelf, which I fhall have occafion to obferve hereafter; befides this, I fay) if there be naturally and abfolutely in things themselves no difference between good and evil, just and unjust; then in the ftate of nature, before any compact be made, it is equally as good, juft, and reasonable, for one man to deftroy the life of another, not only when it is neceffary for his own prefervation, but alfo arbitrarily and without any provocation at all, or any appearance of advantage to himfelf; as to preferve or fave another man's life, when he may do it without any hazard of his own. The confequence of which is, that not only the first and most obvious way for every particular man to fecure himself effectually, would be (as Mr. Hobbes teaches) to endeavour to prevent and cut off all others; but also that men might deftroy one another upon every foolish and peevish or arbitrary humour, even when they did not think any fuch thing neceflary for their own prefervation. And the effect of this practice muft needs be, that it would terminate in the deftruction of all mankind. Which being undeniably a great and unfufferable evil, Mr. Hobbes himfelf confefies it reafonable, that, to prevent this evil, men fhould enter into certain compacts to preferve one another. Now if the deftruction of mankind by each other's hands be fuch an evil, that, to prevent it, it was fit and reasonable that men fhould enter into compacts to preferve each other; then, before any fuch compacts, it was manifeftly a thing unfit and unreasonable in itself, that mankind fhould all deftroy one another. And if fo, then for the fame reafon it was alfo unfit and unreafonable, antecedent to all compacts, that any one man fhould destroy another arbitrarily and without any provocation, or at any time when it was not abfolutely and immediately neceffary for the prefervation of himfelf. Which is directly contradictory to Mr. Hobbes's first fuppofition, of † there being no natural and abfolute difference been good and evil, just and unjuft, antecedent to pofitive compact. And in like manner all others, who upon any pretence whatfoever teach that good and evil depend originally on the conftitution of pofitive laws, whether divine or human, muft unavoidably run into the fame abfurdity. For if there be no fuch thing as good and evil in the nature of things, an

See Hobbes de Cive, c. 3. § 4.

"Fx his fequitur injuriam nemini fieri poffe, nifi ei quocum initur pactum." De Cive, c. 3. 4. where fee more to the fame purpose,

tecedent