tecedent to all laws; then neither can any one law be better than another; nor any one thing whatever be more juftly established, and inforced by laws, than the contrary; nor can any reafon be given, why any laws fhould ever be made at all: but all laws equally will be either + arbitrary and tyrannical, or frivolous and needlefs; because the contrary might with equal reafon have been established, if, before the making of the laws, all things had been alike indifferent in their own nature. There is no poffible way to avoid this abfurdity, but by faying, that out of things in their own nature abfolutely indifferent, thofe are chofen by wife governors to be made obligatory by law, the practice of which they judge will tend to the public benefit of the community. But this is an express contradiction in the very terms. For if the practice of certain things tends to the public benefit of the world, and the contrary would tend to the public difadvantage; then thofe things are not in their own nature indifferent, but were good and reasonable to be practifed before any law was made, and can only for that very reason be wifely inforced by the authority of laws. Only here it is to be obferved, that by the public benefit muft ‡ not be understood the intereft of any one particular nation, to the plain injury or prejudice of the reft of mankind; any more than the intereft of one city or family, in oppofition to their neighbours of the fame country: but thofe things only are truly good in their own nature, which either. tend to the universal benefit and welfare of all men, or at least are not deftructive of it. The true state therefore of this cafe is plainly this fome things are in their own nature good and reasonable and fit to be done; fuch as keeping faith, and performing equitable compacts, and the like; and thefe receive not their obligatory power from any law or authority, but are only declared, confirmed, and inforced by penalties upon fuch as would not perhaps be governed by right reafon only. Other things are in their own nature abfolutely evil; fuch as breaking faith, refufing to perform equitable compacts, cruelly destroying those who have neither directly nor indirectly given any occafion for any fuch treatment, and the like; and thefe cannot, by any law or authority whatsoever, be made fit and reasonable, or excufable to be practifed. Laftly, other things are in their own nature indifferent; that is, (not abfolutely and ftrictly fo, as fuch trivial actions which have no way any tendency at all either to the public welfare or damage; for concerning fuch things, it would be childish and trifling to fuppofe any laws to be made at all; but they are) fuch things, whofe tendency to the public benefit or difadvantage is either fo fmall or fo remote, or fo obfcure and involved, that the generality of people are not able of

* "Manifeftum eft rationem nullam effe lege prohibenti moxas tales, nifi agnofcunt tales "actus, etiam antecedenter ad ullam legem, mala effe." Cumberl de Leg. Nat. p. 194. "Nam ftoliditas inveniri quæ inanior poteft, quam mala effe nulla contendere, & tanquam malos perdere & condemnare peccantes?" Arnob. adverf. Gentes, Lib. II. "Qui autem Civium rationem dicunt habendam, Externorum negant; dirimunt hi communem generis humani societatem; qua fublata, juftitia funditus tollitur." Cic. de Offic. Lib. III.

VOL. IV.

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themselves to difcern on which fide they ought to act: and thefe things are made obligatory by the authority of laws; though perhaps every one cannot diftinctly perceive the reafon and fitnefs of their being injoined; of which fort are many particular penal laws, in feveral countries and nations. But to proceed.

AN ANSWER TO THE OBJECTION DRAWN FROM THE VARIETY OF THE OPINIONS OF LEARNED MEN, AND THE LAWS OF DIFFERENT NATIONS CONCERNING RIGHT AND WRONG.

The principal thing that can, with any colour of reason, seem to countenance the opinion of thofe who deny the natural and eternal difference of good and evil (for Mr. Hobbes's false reasonings I fhall hereafter confider by themselves), is the difficulty there may fometimes be, to define exactly the bounds of right and wrong; the variety of opinions, that have obtained even among underftanding and learned men concerning certain queftions of just and unjuft, especially in political matters; and the many contrary laws that have been made in divers ages and in different countries concerning these matters. But as, in painting, two very different colours, by diluting each other very flowly and gradually, may from the highest intenseness in either extreme terminate in the midft infenfibly, and fo run one into the other, that it fhall not be poffible even for a skilful eye to determine exactly where the one ends, and the other begins; and yet the colours may really differ as much as can be, not in degree only, but entirely in kind, as red and blue, or white or black: fo, though it may perhaps be very difficult in fome nice and perplext cafes (which yet are very far from occurring frequently) to define exactly the bounds of right and wrong, juft and unjuft; and there may be fome latitude in the judgement of different men, and the laws of divers nations; yet right and wrong are nevertheless in themselves totally and effentially different; even -altogether as much as white and black, light and darkness. The Spartan law perhaps, which permitted their youth to fteal, may, as abfurd as it was, bear much difpute whether it was abfolutely unjust or no: because every man having an abfolute right in his own goods, it may feem that the members of any fociety may agree to transfer or alter their own properties upon what conditions they fhall think fit. But if it could be supposed that a law had been made at Sparta, or at Rome, or in India, or any other part of the world; whereby it had been commanded or allowed, that every man might rob by violence, and murther whomfoever he met with; or that no faith fhould be kept with any man, nor any equitable compacts performed; no man, with any tolerable use of his reason, whatever diverfity of judgement might be among them in other matters, would have thought that fuch a law could have authorized or excused, much lefs have justified such actions, and have made them

Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσάυλην έχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥςε δοκεῖν νόμῳ εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μὴ Ariftot. Ethic. lib. 1. cap. 1.

† Κλέπτειν γενόμενο τὰς ἐλευθέρας, παῖδας, ό, τι τις δύναιτο. Plutarch. Apophthegmata Laconica.

become

become good; because it is plainly not in men's power to make falfehood be truth, though they may alter the property of their goods as they please. Now if, in flagrant cafes, the natural and effential difference between good and evil, right and wrong, cannot but be confeffed to be plainly and undeniably evident; the difference between them must be alfo effential and unalterable in all even the fmallest and nicest and most intricate cafes, though it be not fo eafy to be difcerned and accurately diftinguished. For if, from the difficulty of determining exactly the bounds of right and wrong in many perplext cafes, it could truly be concluded that juft and unjuft were not effentially different by nature, but only by pofitive conftitution and cuftom; it would follow equally, that they were not really, effentially, and unalterably different, even in the moft flagrant cafes that can be fuppofed. Which is an affertion fo very abfurd, that Mr. Hobbes himself could hardly vent it without blushing, and discovering plainly, by his fhifting expreffions, his fecret felf-condemnation. There are therefore certain neceffary and eternal differences of things; and certain confequent fitneffes or unfitneffes of the application of different things or different relations one to another; not depending on any politive constitutions, but founded unchangeably in the nature and reafon of things, and unavoidably arifing from the differences of the things themselves. Which is the firft branch of the general propofition I proposed to prove.

2. THAT THE WILL OF GOD ALWAYS DETERMINES ITSELF TO ACT ACCORDING TO THE ETERNAL REASON OF THINGS.

Now what thefe eternal and unalterable relations, refpects, or proportions of things, with their confequent agreements or difagreements, fitneffes or unfitneffes, abfolutely and neceffarily are in themfelves; that alfo they appear to be, to the understandings of all intelligent beings, except thofe only, who understand things to be what they are not, that is, whofe understandings are either very imperfect, or very much depraved. And by this understanding or knowledge of the natural and neceffary relations, fitneffes, and propor tions of things, the wills likewife of all intelligent beings are conftantly directed, and muft needs be determined to act accordingly; excepting thofe only, who will things to be what they are not and cannot be; that is, whofe wills are corrupted by particular intereft or affection, or fwayed by fome unreasonable and prevailing paffion. Wherefore, fince the natural attributes of God, his infinite knowledge, wifdom, and power, fet him infinitely above all poffibility of being deceived by any error, or of being influenced by any wrong affection; it is manifeft his divine will cannot but always and neceffarily determine itself to choose to do what in the whole is abfolutely beft and fittest to be done; that is, to act conftantly according to the eternal rules of infinite goodnefs, juftice, and truth; as I have endeavoured to fhow diftinctly in a former difcourfe, in deducing feverally the moral attributes of God.

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3. THAT

3. THAT ALL RATIONAL CREATURES ARE OBLIGED TO GO

VERN THEMSELVES IN ALL THEIR ACTIONS BY THE SAME ETERNAL RULE OF REASON.

And now, that the fame reafon of things, with regard to which the will of God always and neceffarily does determine itself to act in conftant conformity to the eternal rules of juftice, equity, goodnefs, and truth, ought alfo conftantly to determine the wills of all fubordinate rational beings, to govern all their actions by the fame rules is very evident. For, as it is abfolutely impoffible in nature, that God fhould be deceived by any error, or influenced by any wrong affection; fo it is very unreafonable and blame-worthy in practice, that any intelligent creatures, whom God has made fo far like unto himself, as to endue them with thofe excellent faculties of reafon and will, whereby they are enabled to diftinguish good from evil, and to chufe the one and refufe the other, fhould either negligently fuffer themfelves to be imposed upon and deceived in matters of good and evil, right and wrong, or wilfully and perverfely allow themfelves to be over-ruled by abfurd paffions and co rupt or partial affections, to act contrary to what they know is fit to be done. Which two things, viz. negligent mifunderstanding or wilful paffions and lufts, are, as I faid, the only caufes which can make a reasonable creature act contrary to reafon, that is, contrary to the eternal rules of justice, equity, righteoufnefs, and truth, For, was it not for thefe inexcufable corruptions and depravations, it is impoffible but the fame proportions and fitneffes of things, which have fo much weight and fo much excellency and beauty in them, that the all-powerful creator and governor of the universe (who has the abfolute and uncontroulable dominion of all things in his own hands, and is accountable to none for what he does, yet) thinks it no diminution of his power to make this reafon of things the unalterable rule and law of all his own actions in the government of the world, and does nothing by mere will and arbitrarinefs; it is impoffible, (I fay) if it was not for inexcufable corruption and depravation, but the fame eternal reafon of things must much more have weight enough to determine conftantly the wills and actions of all fubordinate, finite, dependent, and accountable beings.

PROVED FROM THE ORIGINAL NATURE OF THINGS.

For originally, and in reality, it is as natural and (morally fpeaking) neceffary, that the will fhould be determined in every action by the reason of the thing, and the right of the cafe; as it is natural and (abfolutely fpeaking) neceffary, that the understanding should fubmit to a demonftrated truth. And it is as abfurd and blameworthy, to mistake negligently plain right and wrong, that is, to understand the proportions of things in morality to be what they are not; or wilfully to act contrary to known juftice and equity, that is, to will things to be what they are not and cannot be; as it would be abfurd and ridiculous for a man in arithmetical matters, ignorantly to believe that twice two is not equal to four; or wil

fully

fully and obftinately to contend, againft his own clear knowledge, that the whole is not equal to all its parts. The only difference is, that affent to a plain fpeculative truth is not in a man's power to with-hold; but to act according to the plain right and reafon of things, this he may, by the natural liberty of his will, forbear. But the one he ought to do, and it is as much his plain and indifpenfable duty; as the other he cannot but do, and it is the neceffity of his nature to do it. He that wilfully refuses to honour and obey God, from whom he received his being, and to whom he continually owes his prefervation, is really guilty of an equal abfurdity and inconfiftency in practice; as he that in fpeculation denies the effect to owe any thing to its caufe, or the whole to be bigger than its part. He that refuses to deal with all men equitably, and with every man as he defires they fhould deal with him, is guilty of the very fame unreasonableness and contradiction in one cafe; as he that in another cafe fhould affirm one number or quantity to be equal to another, and yet that other at the fame time not to be equal to the firft. Laftly, he that acknowledges himself obliged to the practice of certain duties both towards God and towards men, and yet takes no care either to preferve his own being, or at least not to preferve himself in such a state and temper of mind and body as may best enable him to perform thofe duties, is altogether as inexcufable and ridiculous, as he that in any other matter fhould affirm one thing at the fame time that he denies another, without which the former could not poffibly be true; or undertake one thing, at the fame time that he obftinately omits another, without which the former is by no means practicable. Wherefore all rational creatures, whofe wills are not conftantly and regularly determined, and their actions governed, by right reafon and the neceffary differences of good and evil, according to the eternal and invariable rules of juftice, equity, goodness, and truth; but fuffer themselves to be fwayed by unaccountable arbitrary humours, and rafh paffions, by lufts, vanity and pride, by private intereft, or prefent fenfual pleafures, thefe, fetting up their own unreasonable felf-will in oppofition to the nature and reafon of things, endeavour (as much as in them lies) to make things be what they are not, and cannot be; which is the highest prefumption and greatest infolence, as well as the greatest abfurdity, imaginable. It is acting contrary to that underftanding, reafon, and judgement, which God has implanted in their natures; on purpose to enable them to difcern the difference between good and evil. It is attempting to deftroy that order, by which the univerfe fubfifts. It is offering the highest affront imaginable to the creator of all things, who made things to be what they are, and governs every thing himself according to the laws of their feveral natures. In a word; all wilful wickednefs and perverfion of right, is the very fame infolence and abfurdity in moral matters; as it would be in natural things, for a man to pretend to alter the certain proportions of numbers, to take away the demonftrable relations and properties of mathematical figures; to make

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