<< But if death be only as it were a tranfmigration from hence "into another place, and thofe things, which are told us, be in"deed true, that thofe who are dead to us do all live there; then, &c." So likewife Cicero, fpeaking of the fame fubject: "I will endeavour," faith + he, "to explain what you defire; yet I would "not have you depend upon what I fhall fay as certain and in"fallible; but I may guefs, as other men do, at what shall seem "moft probable; and further than this, I cannot pretend to go." Again: "which of thofe two opinions," faith the, [that the foul is mortal, or that it is immortal], "be true, God only knows; "which of them is most probable, is a very great queftion." And again, in the fame difcourfe, having brought all thofe excellent arguments before-mentioned in proof of the immortality of the foul; "Yet we ought not," faith § he, " to be over-confident of it; for "it often happens that we are ftrongly affected at first with an "acute argument; and yet, a little while after, ftagger in our judge"ment and alter our opinion, even in clearer matters than these;

for these things muft be confeffed to have fome obfcurity in "them." And again: "I know not how," faith he , "when I "read the argumens in proof of the foul's immortality, methinks, "I am fully convinced; and yet, after I have laid afide the book, "and come to think and confider of the matter alone by myself, "prefently I find myfelf fallen again infenfibly into my old doubts." From all which it appears, that, notwithstanding all the bright arguments and acute conclufions, and brave fayings of the beft philofophers; yet life and immortality were not fully and fatiffactorily brought to light by bare natural reafon; but men ftill plainly ftood in need of fome farther and more compleat discovery. 4. AND THOSE THINGS WHICH THEY WERE INDEED CERTAIN

**

OF, YET THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO PROVE AND EXPLAIN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY ENOUGH.

Thofe things which the philofophers were indeed the most fully certain of, and did in good measure understand; fuch as the obligations of virtue, and the will of God in matters of morality; yet they were never able to prove and explain clearly and diftinctly

Εἰ δ ̓ αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαί ἐσιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐςι τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσει πάντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, &c. Plato in Apolog. Socrat.

+ "Ea, quæ vis, ut potero, explicabo; nec tamen quafi Pythius Apollo, certa ut fint " & fixa quæ dixero; fed ut homunculus unus e multis, probabilia conjectura fequens. "Ultra enim quo progrediar, quam ut verifimilia videam, non habeo." Cic. Tufc. Quæft. lib. I.

"Harum fententiarum quæ vera fit, Deus aliquis viderit; quæ verifimillima, magna "quæftio eft." Id. ibid.

"Eth nihil nimis oportet confidere. Movemur enim fæpe aliquo acutè conclufo ; "labamus mutamufque fententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his eft enim aliqua ob"fcuritas." Id. ibid.

"Nefcio quomodo, dum lego, affentior; cum pofui librum, & mecum ipfe de im"mortalitate animorum cæpi cogitare, affenfio omnis illa elabitur." Id. ibid.

**"Credebam facilè opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gratiffimam [animæ im"mortalitatem) promittentium magis quam probantium." Senec. Epift. 102. "Adeo omnis illa tunc fapientia Socratis, de induftria venerat confultæ æquanimitatis, "non de fiducia compertæ veritatis." Tertullian, de Anima,

04

enough,

enough, to perfons of all capacities, in order to their complete conviction and reformation. Firft, because most of their difcourfes upon these fubjects have been rather fpeculative and learned, nice and fubtle difputes, than practical and univerfally useful inftructions. They proved, by ftrict and nice argumentation, that the practice of virtue is wife and reasonable and fit to be chofen; rather than that it is of plain, neceflary, and indifpenfable obligation; and were able to deduce the will of God only by fuch abItract and fubtle reafonings as the generality of men had by no means either abilities or opportunities to understand or be duly affected by. Their very profeffion and manner of life led them to make their philofophy rather an entertainment of leisure time, a trial of wit and parts, an exercise of eloquence, and of the art and fkill of good fpeaking; than an endeavour to reform the manners of men, by fhewing them their plain and neceffary duty. And accordingly the ftudy of it was, as Cicero + himself obferves, unavoidably confined to a few, and by no means fitted for the bulk and common fort of mankind, who, as they cannot judge of the true ftrength of nice and abstract arguments, fo they will always be fufpicious of fome fallacy in them. None ‡ but men of parts and learning, of ftudy and liberal education, have been able to profit by the fublime doctrine of Plato, or by the fubtle difputations of other philofophers; whereas the doctrine of morality, which is the rule of life and manners, ought to be plain, eafy, and familiar, and fuited fully to the capacities of all men. Secondly, another reason why the philofophers were never able to prove and explain clearly and diftinctly enough, even those things of which they were the moft certain, to perfons of all capacities, in order to their complete conviction and reformation, was because they never were able to frame to themselves any complete, regular, and confiftent system or fcheme of things; but the truths which they taught, were $ fingle and scattered, accidental as it were, and hit upon by chance, rather than by any knowledge of the whole true ftate of things; and confequently lefs univerfally convictive. Nothing could be more certain (as they all well knew), than that virtue was unquestion

* “Profecto omnis iftorum difputatio, quanquam uberrimos fontes virtutis & fcientie <contineat, tamen collata cum horum [qui rempublicam gubernant] actis perfectisque rebus, vereor ne non tantum videatur attuliffe negotiis hominum utilitatis, quantum oblectationem quandam otii." Cic. de Repub. fragm.

"Eft, inquit Cicero, philofophia paucis contenta judicibus, multitudinem confult ipfa fugiens.Maximum itaque argumentum eft, philofophiam neque ad fapientiam tendere, neque ipfam effe fapientiam; quod myfterium ejus, barba tantum celebratur & "pallio. Lactant. lib. III.

† Ολίγες μὲν ὤνησεν ἡ περικαλλὴς καὶ ἐπιτεληδευμένη Πλάτωνος λέξις αγείονας δὲ ἡ τῶν εὐτελέσερον ἅμα καὶ πραγματικῶς καὶ ἐςοχασμένως τῶν πολλῶν διδαξάντων καὶ γραψάντων ἔσι γῦν ἰδεῖν, τὸν μὲν Πλάτωνα ἐν χερσὶ τῶν δοκέντων εἶναι φιλολόγων μόνων. Orig. adverf. Celf.

lib. VI.

̓Αγροικότερον εἰπῶν ὁ Ἰησᾶς, Τῷ θέλοντι τὸν χιτῶνά σε λαβεῖν, ἄφες καὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον, βιωφε λέςερον κεκίνηκε τὸν λόγον καὶ παρέςησεν ὕτως εἰπὼν, ἢ ὡς ἐν τῶ Κρίτων. Πλάτων, ὦ μηδ' ἀκύειν ἰδιῶται δύνανται, ἀλλὰ μόγις οἱ τὰ ἐγκύκλια πρὸς τῆς σεμνῆς Ἑλλήνων φιλοσοφίας μεμαθηκότες.

Id. lib. VII.

§ Ουκ ὅτι ἀλλότρια ἐσι τὰ Πλάτωνος διδάγματα τα Χρισῦ· ἀλλ ̓ ὅτι ἐκ ἔςι πάντη ὅμοια, ὥσπερ ἐδὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων.-ἕκαςος γὰρ τὶς, ἀπὸ μέρος το σπερματικά θεία λόγω τὸ συγγενές ὁρῶν, καλῶς ἐφθέγξατο. Οἱ δὲ ταναντία αὐτοῖς ἐν κυριωτέροις εἰρηκότες, ἂν ἐπισήμην τὴν ἄπιπλου αὶ γνῶσιν τὴν ἀνέλεγον φαίνονται ἐσχηκέναι. Juftin. Apolog. I.

ably

ably to be chofen, and the practice of it to be recommended neceffarily above all things; and yet they could never clearly and fatiffactorily make out, upon what principles originally, and for what end ultimately, this choice was to be made, and upon what grounds it was univerfally to be fupported. Hence they perpetually * difagreed, opposed, and contradicted one another in all their difputations to fuch a degree, that St. Austin somewhere out of Varro reckons up no lefs than 280 opinions concerning that one question, what was the chief good or final happiness of man. The effect of all which differences could not, without doubt, but be a mighty hindrance to that conviction and general influence which that great truth, in the certainty whereof they all clearly agreed (namely, that the practice of virtue was neceflary and indifpenfable), ought to have had upon the minds and lives of men. This whole matter is excellently fet forth by Lactantius: "The philofophers," faith + he "take them altogether, did indeed difcover all the particular "doctrines of true religion; but, because each one endeavoured to "confute what the others afferted, and no one's fingle scheme was "in all its parts confiftent, and agreeable to reafon and truth; "and none of them were able to collect into one whole and entire "fcheme the feveral truths difperfed among them all, therefore "they were not able to maintain and defend what they had dif"covered." And again; having fet down a brief fummary of the whole doctrine and defign of true religion, from the original to the confummation of all things; "this entire fcheme,' fays he, "because the philofophers were ignorant of, therefore they were "not able to comprehend the truth; notwithstanding that they

faw and difcovered fingly almost all the particulars of which the "whole scheme confifts. But this was done by different men and "at different times, and in different manners;" (with various mixtures of different errors, in what every one discovered of truth fingly;) and without finding the connexion of the causes, and confequences and reafons of things; from the mutual dependencies of which the compleatnefs and perfection of the whole fcheme arifes. Whereas, had there been any man, who could have collected and put together in order all the feveral truths which were taught fingly and scatteredly by philofophers of all the different fects, and have

"Nec, quid defendere debeant, fcientes; nec quid refutare. Incurfantque paffim fine "delectu omnia quæ afferunt, quicunque diffentiunt." Lactant. lib VII.

+ "Totam igitur veritatem, & omne divi æ religionis arcanum philofophi attigerunt. "Sed aliis refellentibus, defendere id, quod invenerant, nequiverunt; quia fingulis ratio non quadravit; nec ea, quæ vera fenferant, in fummam redigere potuerunt." Lactant. lib. VII.

"Quam fummam, quia philofophi non comprehenderunt; nec veritatem comprehen"dere potuerunt; quamvis ea ferè, quibus fumma ipfa, conftat, & viderint & explicaverint. "Sed diverfi ac diverfè illa omnia protulerunt, non annectentes nec caufas rerum, nec con "fequentias, nec rationes; ut fummam illam, quæ continet univerfa, & compingerent & "complerent." Lactant. lib. VII.

"Quod fi extitiffet aliquis qui veritatem fparfam per fingulos, per fectafque diffufam, "colligeret in unum, ac redigeret in corpus ; is profecto non diffentiret a nobis. Sed hoc nemo facere, nifi veri peritus ac fciens, poteft. Verum autem non nifi ejus fcire eft, qui #fit dectus a Deo," Id. ibid,

made

made up out of them one entire confiftent fcheme; truly he would not have differed much from us Chriftians; but this, it was not poffible for any man to do, without having the true fyftem of things firft revealed to him.

5. AND THOSE THINGS WHICH THEY WERE ABLE TO PROVE AND EXPLAIN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY ENOUGH, YET THEY HAD NOT SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE IN PRACTICE.

Laftly even thofe things, which the philofophers were not only themselves certain of, but which they have alfo been able to prove and explain to others, with fufficient clearnefs and plainnefs; fuch as are the most obvious and neceflary duties of, life; they have not yet had authority enough to enforce and inculcate upon men's minds with fo ftrong an impreffion as to influence and govern the general practice of the world. The truths which they proved by fpeculative reafon wanted ftill fome more fenfible authority to back them, and make them of more force and efficacy in practice; and the precepts which they laid down, however evidently reafonable and fit to be obeyed, feemed ftill to want weight, and to be but the precepts of men. Hence none of the philofophers, even of those who taught the clearest and certaineft truths, and offered the best and wifeft inftructions, and enforced them with the strongeft motives that could be, were yet ever able to work any remarkable change in the minds and lives of any confiderable part of mankind; as the preaching of Chrift and his apoftles undeniably did. Nor does it appear in hiftory, that § any number of Socrates's or Plato's followers were convinced of the excellency of true virtue, or the certainty of its final reward, in fuch a manner as to be willing to lay down their lives for its fake; as innumerable of the difciples of Chrift are known to have done. In fpeculation, indeed, it may perhaps feem poffible, that, notwithstanding it must be confefied philofophy cannot difcover any complete and fatisfactory remedy for paft mifcarriages, yet the precepts and motives offered by the best philofophers might at least be fufficient to amend and reform men's manners for the future. But in experience and prac

* “ Platonis documenta, quamvis ad rem multum conferant, tamen parum habent fir"mitatis ad probandam & implendam veritatem." Lactant lib. VII."

+ Quid ergo? nihilne illi [philofophi] fimile præcipiunt? Imo permulta, & ad verum frequenter accedunc. Sed nihil ponderis habent ilia præcepta, quia funt humana; " & auctoritate major, id eft, divina illa, carent. Nemo igitur credit; quia tam fe ho"minem putat effe qui audit, quam eft ille qui præcipit." Lactant. lib. III.

† Εἴποιμι δ' ἂν ἀληθεύειν τὰς δυνηθέντας διαθεῖναι τὰς ἀκροαλὰς τῶν λεγομένων ὕτω βιοῦνίας, ὡς τάτων ὕτως ἐχόντων. Διατίθενται Ἰνδαῖοι καὶ Χρισιανοὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀπ' αὐτῶν καλυμένω μέλλοντος αἰῶνος. — δεικνύτω ὧν καὶ Κέλσος ἢ ὁ βελόμενος, τίνες διετέθησαν περὶ αἰωνίων κολάσεων, ὑπὸ τῶν τελειῶν καὶ μυςαΓωγών. Origen. Celf. lib. VIII.

Παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἰς τις Φαίδων, καὶ ἐκ οἴδα εἰ δεύτερος· καὶ εἰς Πολέμων, μεταβαλόντες ἀπὸ ἀσώτου και μοχθηροτάτε βία ἐφιλοσόφησαν παρὰ δὲ τῷ Ἰησοῦ, εἰ μόνον τότε οἱ δώδεκα, ἀλλ ̓ αἰεὶ καὶ στολλαπλασίες οἵτινες γενόμενοι σωφρόνων χορός. Idem. lib. 111.

"Da mihi virum qui fit iracundus, &c. Numquis hæc philofophorum, &c." Lactant. Jib. III. See this paffage cited above, p. 192.

§ Σωκράτει μὲν γὰρ ἐδεὶς ἐπιςεύθη ὑπερ τούτε το δόγμαῖος ἀποθνήσκειν. Χρισῷ δὲ τῷ καὶ ἀπὸ Σωκράτες από μέρες γνωσθέντι ἐ φιλόσοφοι οὐδὲ φιλολόγοι μόνον ἐπείσθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παντελῶς ἰδιῶται καὶ δόξης καὶ φόβω καὶ θανάτω καταφρονήσαντες. Juftin. Apolog. 1,

tice it hath on the contrary appeared to be altogether impoffible, for philofophy and bare reafon to reform mankind effectually, without the affiftance of fome higher principle. For, though the bare natural poffibility of the thing cannot indeed eafily be denied; yet in this cafe (as Cicero excellently expreffes* it), in like manner as in phyfic, it matters nothing, whether a disease be such as that no man does, or no man can recover from it; fo neither does it make any difference, whether by philofophy no man is, or no man can be made wife and good. So that, without fome greater help and affiftance, mankind is plainly left in a very bad state. Indeed, in the original uncorrupted ftate of human nature, before the mind of man was depraved with prejudicate opinions, corrupt affections, and vitious inclinations, cuftoms and habits; right reafon may juftly be fuppofed to have been a fufficient guide, and a principle powerful enough to preferve men in the conftant practice of their duty. But, in the prefent circumstances and condition of mankind, the wifeft and moft fenfible of the philofophers themselves have not been backward to complain, that they found the understandings of men fo dark and cloudy, their wills fo biaffed and inclined to evil, their paffions fo outragious and rebelling against reason, that they looked upon the rules and laws of right reafon as very hardly practicable, and which they had very little hopes of ever being able to perfuade the world to fubmit to. In a word, they confefied that human nature was ftrangely corrupted; and they acknowledged this corruption to be a difeafe whereof they knew not the true caufe, and could not find out a fufficient remedy. So that the great duties of religion were laid down by them as matters of fpeculation and dispute, rather than as the rules of action; and not fo much urged upon the hearts and lives of men, as propofed to the admiration of thofe, who thought them hardly poffible to be effectually practifed by the generality of men, To remedy all thefe diforders, and conquer all thefe corruptions, there was plainly wanting fome extraordinary and fupernatural affiftance; which was above the reach of bare reafon and philofophy to procure, and yet without which the philofophers themselves were fenfible there + could never be any truly great men.

VII. For these reasons, there was plainly wanting a divine Revelation, to recover mankind out of their univerfally degenerate eftate, into a ftate fuitable to the original excellency of their nature. Which divine Revelation, both the neceffities of men, and their natural notions of God, gave them reasonable ground to expect and hope for, as appears from the acknowledgments which the beft and wifeft of the Heathen philofophers themselves have made of their fense of the neceffity and want of fuch a revelation; and from their

* "Nam fi, confenfu omnium philofophorum, fapientiam nemo affequitur; in fummis "malis omnes fumus, quibus vos optimè confultum a Diis immortalibus dicitis. Nam ut "nihil intereft utrum nemo valeat, an nemo poffit valere; fic non intelligo quid interfit, ❝ utrum nemo fit fapiens, an nemo effe poffit." Cic. de Natura Deor. lib. III. "Nemo unquam vir magnus, fine divino afflatu fuit." Cicero.

expreffions