fufficiently provided for anfwering all the ends that were intended by it, even tho' a war had broke out between the two nations; for even in that cafe, it would have been ridiculous in us to have expended our strength, and put ourselves to a great charge, in attacking any of the Spanish dominions in Europe, where we could do them but little prejudice, and could reap no great advantage to ourfelves. That fleet, therefore, could only be defigned for protecting our own poffeffions and trade in that part of the world, for intercepting any Spanifh fhips that fhould happen to escape our fleet in the West-Indies, and for preventing any fupplies being fent from Old Spain to any of their colonies or plantations in America; and for anfwering all thefe purposes, the fleet that was fent to the coats of Spain, was fufficiently provided with every thing that was neceffary. The Weft-Indies, my Lords, is the part of the world, where, in cafe of a war, we could do the moft harm to Spain, and the most good to ourselves; and there, if we can but prevent any supplies being fent from Old Spain, we shall stand in need of no land forces being fent from hence. Our own colonies, upon the continent and in the islands of America, would foon furnish us with land forces fufficient for attacking Spain by land in that quarter, if we fend a fquadron of men of war fufficient to protect them at fea. But fuppofe it fhould be neceffary for us to fend land forces from hence; it would not be proper, because of the climate, to fend them thither, till we were just ready to enter upon a&tion; which could not be our cafe the beginning of laft fummer, because his Majefty was to try what could be done by peaceable means, before commencing hoftilities, either in the Weft-Indies or in Europe. For this reafon, it was neceffary to fend a squadron to the WeftIndies for protecting our trade in the mean time, and in order to take land forces on board, as foon as any could be raised in our colonies, in cafe a war had become neceffary; but it would have been contrary to the plan that was picfcribed by parliament, to have im mediately begun hoftilities; and here fore it was wrong to feize the Spah register fhip, which the Noble Lord was pleased to mention, and it was right n our Commodore to order her being stored. My Lords, as the court of Spain could not be ignorant of the advice that was given to his Majesty by his parliament laft feffion; and as his Majesty, to our happiness and his own honour, has always made the advice of his parliament the rule of his actions; they could not but fuppofe, that the fquadrons we fent out were inftructed not to begin hoftilities, till further orders: but fuch or ders, they knew, might foon be fent; fuch orders, they knew, would be fent immediately, upon their refufing togive ear to a friendly accommodation of thofe difputes that fubfifted between the two nations. This they were fenfible of, and therefore, they not only appeared willing to do us juftice, but have granted all that we could expect by a fuccefsful war; for even in cafe of a fuccessful war, we must at last have agreed to preliminaries, before peace could be reftored, and by thofe preliminaries we could expect no more than a full fatisfaction for our loffes, and an agreement to have all other disputes adjusted by a definitive treaty. in; But, my Lords, before I enter into the confideration of what we have got by peace, I must examine a little into what we could expect, or might have loft, by war; for tho' I have as great a confidence in the strength and courage of my country, as any man ought to have, yet I am not fo fanguine, as to think, that we have victory chained to our chariot-wheel, or that we must be fuccessful in every war we engage and, therefore, in all queftions relating to war or peace, I think we ought to confider what we may lofe, as well as what we may get, by a war. By a war with Spain, my Lords, we could not expect to make much by privateering, or by taking and making prize of their fhips at fea. In case of a war with this nation, they would fend no fhips to fea, but fmall, light frigates, by way of pri vateers, vateers, for intercepting fuch of our merchant fhips, as they found without, or ftraggling too far from a convoy; and tho' by taking fuch, we might prevent a lofs and interruption in our trade, yet we could not expect to reap any great benefit. Some people may, perhaps, imagine, that great advantages might be made by our intercepting their plate fleets, or the ships that are employed in their trade with their fettlements in America, because none but Spanish fhips can be employed in that trade: but even this would be precarious, and might, in feveral fhapes, be entirely prevented; For if they fhould open that trade to the French and Dutch, it is what those two tations would be glad to accept of; and we could not pretend to make prize of a French or Dutch fhip, on account of her being bound to or from the Spanish settlements in America, no more than we could make prize of her on account of her being bound to or from any port in Spain: we could not fo much as pretend to feize any treasure or goods (except contraband) fhe had on board, unless we could prove, that thofe goods, or that treasure, actually belonged to the King or fubjects of Spain, which it would be impoffible to do. By this method, the Spaniards might render it impoffible for us to feize any of their treafure or effects, in its paffage between New and Old Spain; and even without opening a trade to their fettlements, they might almost as effectually do the fame, by means of the Dutch island of Curaffa, and the French fettlements in Hifpaniola, or their island of Martinique: for thefe places lie fo near the Spanish fettlements in America, that it would be eafy for the Spaniards to carry their treasure and effects, in their own fhips, to one or other of thefe places, and to take from thence, what goods or merchandize they had occafion for, without running any great risk of being intercepted by our men of war, or privateers; and from these places the Spanish treasure and effects might be fafely brought to Spain, in French or Dutch bottoms, and in the name of French or Dutch merchants Thus it appears, my Lords, that in cafe of a war with Spain, we could not expect any great advantage by privateering, or by any prizes we could take at fea; and at land we could make no conquefts. No man will pretend that, if it were in our power, it would be our intereft to conquer any of the Spanish dominions in Europe; at least, I am fure, it would not be our intereft to keep them, nor would it be our intereft to give them to any other power in Europe. And as to their dominions in America, or the Weft-Indies, we have exprefly promifed, by the treaty of Utrecht, that they shall be preferved whole and entire to the prefent King of Spain, and his fucceffors: fo that by endeavouring to conquer any of them, we should not only commit a breach of that treaty, but likewife we should probably raise up a confederacy in Europe against us; for none of the powers of Europe would chufe to fee us mafters of the whole, or any part of the Spanish West-Indies. Therefore, my Lords, the only method by which we could propofe to get any advantage, by a war with Spain, would be by making inroads upon, and plundering their fettlements in America; and this we should find much more difficult, than it was formerly. Their fea-ports, and inland towns in that part of the world, are now better fortified, and better provided with every thing neceffary for making a ftout defence, than ever they were heretofore; and yet, during the last war, I believe it cannot be faid, that the nation got much by any inroads that were made upon them. The truth is, we never attempted to make any confiderable inroads, or any conquefts, in that part of the world, because of the difficulty and expence of tranfporting a land army thither, and becaufe we knew the climate to be very unwholfome for any land army we could fend thither. Having thus fhewn, my Lords, that we cannot expect any great advantage from a war with Spain, let us next confider the dangers we would be expofed to. I fhall be far from faying, upon this occafion, or upon any occafion, that we 4 C 2 muft must not vindicate our rights, or our honour, against France or Spain, for fear of their joining together against us; but this I may venture to fay, that when there is a probability of their joining together against us, at a time when the affairs of Europe are in fuch a fituation, that we can form no confederacy against them; at a time when, if we engage in war, we must ftand fingle and alone against these two powerful nations: I fay, my Lords, at fuch a time it would be prudent in us to fufpend our vengeance, if poflible, till a more proper opportunity fhould offer; and this, I am afraid, is our cafe at prefent. If France fhould join with Spain against us, we would be expofed to many dangers, and it would be difficult to guard against them all. We are, it is true, at prefent, fuperior to both at fea; but as France has great numbers of feamen, they would foon get fhips of war, if they were to be at no expence in defending themselves at land; fo that they might foon rig out a powerful fquadron. On the other hand, as we are liable to be attack'd in feveral parts of the world, we must divide our naval force: we must send squadrons to different points of the compafs, and every one of these fquadrons must be fuperior to any that France and Spain can jointly fit out against us. As we have the misfortune to have a party amongst ourfelves difaffected to our prefent eftablishment, a party much more confiderable than fome people feem willing to believe, we must keep a very powerful fquadron at home, for preventing its being in the power of our enemies to invade us. As we have a great trade and valuable poffeffions in the Mediterranean, we must keep a powerful fquadron in that fea, for protecting our trade and our poffeffions in that part of the world. And as our plantations, especially our fugar iflands, are of great confequence to our trade, and lie much expofed to be invaded, and perhaps deftroyed, we must keep a powerful fquadron in the American feas for their protection. To which I must add, that, confidering the alliance lately formed between France and Sweden, we might, perhaps, find ourselves under a neceffity of fending a powerful fquadron into the Baltick, for the defence of our allies, or for preventing an invafion from that quarter. And notwithstanding the great opinion we juftly have of our naval force, and of the bravery of our feamen, I hope, I fhall be excufed, if I even exprefs fome diffidence of our being able to fend a fquadron to each of these places, fufficient for encountering the united force of France and Spain, perhaps the united force of France, Spain and Sweden. But fuppofe, my Lords, that France fhould remain quiet, and no way interfere openly in the war between Spain and us; fuppofe no power in Europe fhould affift Spain in the war against us: yet we could not immediately reduce Spain to a neceffity of complying with our juft demands. The war between us might laft for feveral years; and while it lafted, the French would have a great advantage over us in every branch of trade we are, or can be, concerned in. Though the Spaniards have not many feamen of their own, yet, in cafe of a war with this nation, they would be in no want of feamen for fitting out a great number of privateers against us: French, Dutch, and perhaps fome of our own feamen, would engage in their service for that purpofe; to that the Mediterranean, the American, the British, and, in fhort, all the feas where we have any trade, would be full of privateers under Spanish colours. This would raife the price of infurance upon British ships higher than upon the fhips of any other nation in Europe; and our merchant fhips would be often put to a great expence and delay, by being obliged to wait for a convoy; which would confiderably enhance the charge upon all manufactures, or merchandize, fent by our own fhipping to foreign markets. Let us confider, my Lords, that the French already underfell us in moft of the manufactures we deal in, and that the freight of Hamburg fhips, and fome others, is now cheaper than that of Britifh: if we confider this, we fhall eafily fee the confequence, if we should add a new charge to the price of our manufa. Etures Aures at foreign markets, and make it more unfafe, or more expenfive, to employ British ships, than those of any other nation, by engaging in war, when all the other trading nations of Europe are at peace: we fhould export no manufactures, no merchandize, at least we fhould export none in our own shipping; and what would then become of our trade and navigation? This, my Lords, would be the confequence of a long war between the two nations, with respect to ourselves; and with respect to Spain, it would probably be entirely ruined. We might, perhaps, at last, force them to do us all the justice in their power; but they would be fo exhausted, with the loffes and expences of the war, that it would not be in their power to make any fatisfaction for the damage they have already done us, or might do, during the war; and much lefs for the expences we have been, or might be, put to. Now, my Lords, tho' we have, at prefent, good reason to be offended with Spain; tho' we have good reason to infift upon fatisfaction and fecurity: yet it is not our intereft to weaken the power of that nation; we ought rather to fupport it, as a balance against the power of France: for tho' the court of Spain may, perhaps, be at prefent too much swayed by French counfels, it will not always, it cannot long be fo. The interests of France and Spain are as incompatible, as the interefts of France and this kingdom; and therefore, as foon as the court of Spain begins to be fwayed by true Spanish counfels, which fome accidents may foon bring about, we may reasonably expect to have that nation for one of our best and firmeft allies; and whenever that happens, they will gladly give us all the fatisfaction and fecurity we can defire, in order to gain our friendship, and to restore a mutual confidence between the two nations. Both the circumftances of Europe, and the circumstances of Spain, are now, my Lords, very different from what they were either in the reign of Q. Elizabeth, or in the time of Oliver Cromwel. In Q. Elizabeth's reign, Spain was the only formidable power in Europe, and we had as much reafon as any other of her neighbours, to endeavour to reduce her power. For this purpofe, Q. Elizabeth took the wifeft course that could be taken, by encouraging and fupporting the civil war in the Netherlands; by which means she at last enabled the feven United Provinces to throw off the yoak of Spain. And the whole power of Spain being applied towards fupporting their dominion over the Netherlands, they could neither fpare money for fortifying their fettlements in America, nor could they fend any regular troops thither for defending them; fo that even our private adventurers had great fuccefs, and often got rich booties by privateering, and by incurfions upon thofe fettlements: for, as there was no good correspondence between France and Spain, and an open war between Spain and Holland, the Spaniards could not make ufe either of Dutch or French veffels for carrying on their trade with their fettlements in America; and befide, as the French were then involv'd in civil wars, they durft not venture to difoblige England, by affifting Spain, either openly, or by underhand dealings. In Oliver Cromwel's time, my Lords, we know that the Spaniards were engag'd in a heavy war with France, which rendered them unable to provide for the fecurity of their trade and poffeffions in America: and tho', by our taking part with France in that war, we got the ifland of Jamaica, which was a valuable acquifition; yet I must think, it would have been lucky for this nation, if Oliver had join'd with Spain against France, inftead of joining with France against Spain: for it was his fatal union with France that laid the foundation of the exceffive power of that kingdom, which has fince coft this nation fo much blood, and fo many millions. And now, my Lords, with regard to both thefe wars, I must observe, that notwithstanding our great fucceffes against Spain in Q Elizabeth's reign, notwithstanding our great fucceffes against Spain in Oliver's time, yet that nation was not easily or foon reduced to comply with fuch terms as we thought reafonable; for both Q 1 Elizabeth and Oliver Cromwel left the war to be put an end to by their fucceffors. Confidering therefore, my Lords, the little advantage we can reap, and the great dangers we may be exposed to by a war with Spain, I must think it would be not only unchriftian, but impolitick in us to do them any real injuries, or to infift upon unreasonable terms for accommodating those differences, that muft unavoidably, fome times, arise between the two nations. I fhall not fay, that either the precepts of Chriftianity, or the maxims of found politicks, oblige us to heap coals of fire upon their heads, by returning good for evil; but this I will fay, that we ought at all times, and especially the prefent, to be more ready to forgive Spain than any other nation in Europe; and, confequently, we ought to infift lefs upon the point of honour, and accept of a lefs ample fatisfaction, with regard to any injuries that may be done us by the Spaniards, than with regard to the injuries we may receive from any other nation in the world. Even in private life, a man would fooner and more eafily pardon an injury done him by a relation, or old friend, than an injury done him by an utter ftranger, or by one with whom he never had, nor ever expected to have, any cordial friendship. This, my Lords, leads me of courfe to confider, what we have got by the convention now under our confideration. And here, my Lords, I muft fay, I am furprised to hear it affirmed, that we have got no more by this convention, than what the King of Spain had before allowed to be due. To fupport this affertion we have been told, that the Spaniards had not one fhilling to demand of us; and that the 95,000 1. was not to be paid by them, unless our S. S. company first paid them, or made them a prefent, as it was called, of 68,000l. But both thefe facts must appear to have been very much mifreprefented. The Spaniards certainly made a very great demand upon us a demand that far exceeded 60,000 1. They demanded full reparation for all the da mage we did them in the year 1718, which, according to their way of reckoning, would have amounted to more than ten times 60,000 1. for they faid that, though his Catholick Majefty had agreed, by the treaty in 1721, to accept of reftitution of the fhips we had acti ally taken from him; yet he had not by that, or any other treaty, given up his claim for the other damages we had done him; and that, if he had, he was not obliged to stand to it, because we had not complied with the reftitution ftipulated by that treaty. Whether this demand was just or not, is what I fhall ka not take upon me to determine; but it was certainly made, and strongly infifted on by Spain; and if we got them to agree to reduce it to 60,000l. I must think it was prudent in us to allow them, by way of a friendly accommodation, to deduct that fum out of what was due to our merchants on account of the depredations committed by their fubjects in the American feas. 'Tis true, we do not receive this fum in ready money: but, I think, it is more beneficial to us than if we did; because, by allowing it to be deducted, we get free of a demand which amounted to a great deal more, and which would have been a perpetual bone of contention between us and a people with whom we ought, if poffible, to cultivate a good correfpondence. Now, my Lords, with regard to the 68,000 l. claimed by Spain from our S. S. company, I cannot comprehend how any one can imagine, that the court of Spain is refolv'd not to pay the 95,000! ftipulated by this convention, unless this 68,000 1. be firft paid to them by our company. I am fure there is no fuch condition in the convention. Our S. S. company have nothing to do with the convention, all accounts and differences between them and the crown of Spain being exprefly excepted, in that very ar ticle by which the 95,000 1. is ftipulated, and the company not fo much as once mention'd in any other part of the treaty. Even his Catholick Majefty's declaration, or proteftation, does not fubject the payment of the 95,000l. to any |