repentance of sin while continuing in the wilful practise of it ; unless indeed abstaining, for a period, from the communion of the church, have transforming, moral efficacy upon guilt, so that what was incest at the beginning of this period, shall cease to be so at the end of it.

As, therefore, in this country the church cannot exercise effectual jurisdiction over marriage, and its proceeding in spiritual cognisance of it upon any rule distinct from the law of the land must involve itself and the parties in difficulty, it ought to pay deference to the Civil Power, whose jurisdiction upon the subject is complete. Indeed, to this power jurisdiction over this matter is appropriate. Municipal regulations, according to the nature of things, proceed from the civil power: the law of marriage is a municipal regulation: the xviiith Leviticus is so. True, that law was given to the children of Israel by God; but it was because of their government being a Theocracy; he, their lawgiver, prescribing all their laws. In the council of Trent it was stated and admitted, that jurisdiction over marriage had come to the church from the secular power partly by commission, and partly through negligence of the civil magistrates. Under the Theodosian code, compiled toward the close of the fourth century, and the Justinian about the middle of the sixth, this jurisdiction was in the secular authority. Chancellor Kent, after his usual thoroughness and ability of research in the case before mentioned, says: "All matrimonial and other causes of ecclesiastical cognisance belonged originally to the temporal courts." In Scotland the General Assembly of the church by soliciting and obtaining from Parliament a statute ratifying the Confession of Faith, as we have seen, acknowledged the paramount authority of the law of the land, and their proceedings in marriage cases according to the Confession of Faith, are grounded upon it as law enacted by the civil power. In England the Westminster Assembly presented the Confession of Faith to the Parliament of that kingdom, not as having any binding force, but as their advice for the legislative action of that body to make it obligatory. This was no common Parliament. It was elected in troublesome times, the most perilous and interesting period of English history, when, under well grounded apprehension of the despotic disposition of the king and the arbitrary tendency of his measures, there was a general cry for reformation. The occasion was felt by the nation as involving its liberties and happiness; and men of the highest

and most trustworthy character were sought out to represent the people in the House of Commons. Even Clarendon, an adherent of the royal family through close alliance, allows, that "there were many great and worthy patriots in the house, and as eminent as any age had ever produced: men of gravity and wisdom, of great and plentiful fortunes, all members of the established church, and almost to a man for Episcopal government." In this house, so constituted, the Confession of Faith was presented, December 11, 1646; came up for discussion, May 19th, 1647; and afterwards, from October 2d, to the following 22d of March, was debated every Wednesday. Upon this debate the greater part of the chapter of Marriage and Divorce, including all in controversy in this case, was referred to the law of the land. We have thus the deliberate, solemn judgment of such a body, upon such examination, that the laws of the land are the proper rule upon this subject.

We have seen, that in this country the law of marriage must proceed from the civil power, the state legislatures and the state judiciaries; the first enacting, the last pronouncing and administering it that this is an essential result of our institutions for the maintenance and preservation of civil and religious liberty. We not only see this as matter of fact, but on examination we find, that it is correct in principle according to the wisest codes of antiquity, of Theodosius the Great and Justinian, held in reverence at this day. This argument is rendered more forcible by the circumstance, that the latter emperor made theology his study, so that it became a prominent feature in his character, was disposed in all things to favor the clergy, by his code, especially his Novels, confirming and enlarging their privileges, and in all disputes between them and laymen seemed to regard it as a settled point, that truth, innocence and justice, were always on the side of the church. That this result of our institutions is correct in principle, is further sustained by the judgment of the very Parliament under whose appointment the Confession of Faith was prepared, and to whom it was presented for ratification, and is corroborated by the fact, that jurisdiction exercised by the church came to it by partly commission from the civil power, and partly through the negligence of its magistrates.

In any light it would appear extraordinary for the church, in deciding a question upon marriage, to refuse to receive the laws of the state of which the parties were citizens as the rule

of decision but the view that has been presented, shows that there is not a pretence to countenance such a course. Now, whatever may be claimed for the church as a voluntary society, making rules for its own regulation, binding only those who choose to be in its communion, it is utterly incompatible with the essential character of civil authority, that any Body, lay or ecclesiastic, within the pale of our institutions should have rules derogatory or opposed to the laws. Allow this, and the principle is settled, through which carried out in its legitimate consequences, men may be absolved from allegiance to their government. The church in the proper discharge of its functions may instruct, enlighten and persuade, in order to produce a change of laws by the constituted authorities; but it cannot impair or infringe the duties, rights, or immunities which its members owe or hold, as citizens, under subsisting laws. For the church to impugn by its discipline the laws enacted, declared and administered by the constituted authorities, reproaches the gospel, and disregards propriety. When, therefore, the article referred to, in view of the solemn, legal enactments, it is believed of all but one, certainly of more than twothirds, of the States in this Union, in order to maintain the decision of the General Assembly, advances the position,-" Men may legalize such marriages, but they never can cease to be violations of the laws of nature, that is, to be inconsistent with the order and constitution of nature as established by God;"-the church is placed upon a ground and in an attitude from which all who desire to see its ordinances crowned with salvation, should unite to remove it.

The article of the Princeton Review, before referred to, places its justification of the decision of the General Assembly upon two grounds :-it is against (1st,) the law of nature, (2d,) the word of God, for a man to marry the sister of his deceased wife. The position is laid down,-" A parent and child, a brother-in-law and sister-in-law cannot intermarry without doing violence to the feelings which, of right and necessity, belong to the relations, and without undermining the foundations of Christian Society." Is there fairness in joining, as in this position, brother-in-law and sister-in-law with parents and child? The tendency in common reading is to carry the judgment formed upon one part of the same sentence over the other, especially when in immediate, intimate connection; and as in this sentence there can be no necessity in respect to parents

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and child, most persons will pass along with the sentiment thus. produced without stopping to inquire how far brother-in-law and sister-in-law are within the same reason. The phraseology, too, a legal fiction expressing in sound what does not exist in fact, and which seems to have been brought into use in the case we are considering, favors this fallacy, the name of the nearest kindred, brother and sister, being used, because allowed by usage as descriptive of a condition into which kindred does not at all enter. There is certainly no similarity or analogy between the relationships of parent and child, and brother-inlaw and sister-in-law, to lead to their being associated. Is not the effect of the association, to connect the feeling which revolts at marriage between parent and child with that between brotherin-law and sister-in-law? The article strongly asserts the impropriety of marriage with a sister-in-law, the sister of a deceased wife, or the widow of a deceased brother: supposing probably the last the clearest case, and as in another sophism, 'juncta juvant." Metaphysical morality easily forms reasons; but common capacities require something substantial and intelligible as ground for opinion. When the article says, "All experience teaches, that habitual, familiar, confidential intercourse, such as must exist among members of the same family, between young persons of different sexes who are allowed to intermarry, is, among the mass of men inconsistent with the preservation of purity," the proposition is not disputed; but what application has it to marriage with a brother's widow or a wife's sister? When a man marries, he forms his own separate family his wife does not become a member of the family of his brother, nor does he become a member of the family of his wife's sisters. Neither case presents the "habitual, familiar, confidential intercourse, such as must and should exist among young persons of different sexes, members of the same family." Besides, the married ones have reached a time and condition of life, when this principle guarding young persons, brothers and sisters, in their free intercourse by a sentiment shrinking with abhorrence from a thought of impurity, has no place, but is superseded by other principles adapted to a more advanced stage of mind and morals. For the reviewer is mistaken, if he supposes that there are not other principles besides this law of incest, sufficient to render the intercourse of the sexes safe and decent. The article adds, "If a wife's sister is not to look upon her brother-in-law as a brother, then she cannot allow

him a brother's rights, nor receive a sister's privileges. She will shrink from him as from every other man. She will become a stranger in her sister's house and to her sister's children."-" Is she to have all the rights and privileges of a sister, without a sister's protection? Is she to be a sister in all the relations but one, and as to that one, a stranger ?" The natural inquiry upon these quotations is, What is the practical answer of society to the suggestions? It is believed, that every state of the Union but one, it is certain that in eighteen of them, comprehending a large proportion of the oldest and most popu lous, the law sanctions marriage with the sister of a deceased wife. This law has been enacted and approved by those intrusted with legislative power; it was prescribed, and it has been sustained by public opinion. These states will certainly bear advantageous comparison with any other people of modern or ancient time with respect to morals and religion, and decency, refinement and intelligence. Is it found, that a wife's sister shrinks from her sister's husband? that she becomes a stranger in her sister's house, and to her sister's children? that she suffers through want of protection? These questions answer themselves, affording a practical and complete refutation of the reviewer's doctrine. The makers of these laws were more competent for their office, than the reviewer. Not only did the institutions of the country commit this subject to then, making their action conclusive; but they were selected from the walks of men, where intercourse with society and practical knowledge acquired among the experiences of life naturally would qualify them for the proper discharge of their duty. The reviewer's notions pushing even prudery to extravagance, might suit oriental customs, immuring females to save them from pollution, but they do not correspond to the manners of Christian communities, where men and women freely associate in full reliance upon the common proprieties of decorum, never surmising that there is peril or indelicacy in their intercourse." She will shrink from him as from every other man."-Certainly; for it is not discernible by common sense, how with propriety she can associate with him in any other way than with every man worthy of her acquaintance. The suggestion, however, is, that "she will shrink from every other man:" an idea that cannot have been formed in the world, among its people and their ways, for nothing can be found there of which it is the image. Indeed, prohibition of marriage, if there were no other