uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter, neither shalt thou take her son's daughter, nor her daughter's daughter," to uncover her nakedness, for they are her near kinswomen: it is wickedness”—obviously to common sense, and upon the clearest principles of sound interpretation, has the opposite effect. For when the lawgiver explicitly specifies the wife's kinswomen, that are prohibited, his not mentioning her sister, is conclusive that he does not mean to comprehend her in the prohibition. The case excludes the supposition of inadvertence. But is the sister omitted? Examining the paragraph (Lev. 18: 6-18), we perceive that the lawgiver being very explicit in his prohibitions, and having accurately specified the kinswomen of the men, and the kinswomen and wives of his kinsmen, within them, in the verses preceding verse 17, proceeds in like manner to specify the kinswomen of his wife, also within them, and uses for this purpose the language in verses 17 and 18: the prohibition being of her daughter, her son's daughter, and her daughter's daughter absolutely, because "it is wickedness," and of her sister during her life, because it would vex her. The verses are connected in language, forming one simple passage. This is the plain sense of the passage; and it carries in itself no slight evidence of the correctness of our English translation. Is not this the best translation that has ever been made of any book; has it not been the more approved the more it has been scrutinized with a view to make a better; and has not every attempt to improve it been consummated in versions universally pronounced to be inferior? Why then prove its correctness? Simply, because to find what must be found in the xviiith Levit. in order to sustain the position quoted from the Confession of Faith, it is necessary to change the 18th verse of that chapter. For however slightly those insisting upon the unlawfulness of marriage with a deceased wife's sister may speak of the effect of that verse, while it stands as in our translation it is impossible to maintain their point: the prohibition is limited expressly to the wife's life, and therefore expressly after her decease there is no prohibition. The translation is of the highest credit; there is strong internal evidence specially supporting that of the 18th verse: on what ground can a different translation be substituted? The substitute proposed is, "Neither shalt thou take a wife to another;" using the word another instead of "sister." The first objection to this substituted translation is, one of the best Hebrew scholars of our country says, it is not correct;

that upon principles of just Biblical criticism, our present translation is accurate. The second objection is, the verse in this substituted translation is not homogeneous with the passage in which it stands. The general import of the passage is prohibition of sexual intercourse in certain relationships: in our translation the 18th verse expresses a prohibition of that kind, in correspondence with the preceding verses: in the proposed substitute, it expresses no such prohibition :-the matter of relationship, the vital principle pervading the whole, is utterly abandoned. Besides, we know, the division into verses was wholly arbitrary no principle governed in it. Verses 17 and 18 are connected in language; evidently forming a simple passage in the first part three relatives of the wife, her daughter, son's daughter, daughter's daughter, and in the last another relative her sister, are mentioned. In the substitute no relation is mentioned. The third objection is, according to the proposed translation, verse 18 expressly prohibits polygamy, and is inserted for that purpose alone. Now we know that the laws of Moses expressly allowed and regulated polygamy, Deut. 21: 15, Exod. 21: 10. It was practised by the men most distinguished for piety and by blessing, and is never reproved : Gideon, the parents of Samuel, David, Solomon, also 2 Chron. 24: 3. Can we take verse 18, from its proper connection, divert it from the leading subject of that connection, and make it an isolated clause transformed into a law against polygamy, which was allowed and regulated by the same code of laws, and practised without an intimation of reproof by the holiest men ? The answer to this question is obvious: it admits no other.

We ought to take a further view of verse 16, against sexual intercourse with a brother's wife. Without some examination, it may be deemed clear that this verse prohibits marriage with a brother's widow. In the preceding argument, this verse has been taken in this sense; for it has been considered clear, that either phrase," brother's wife" or "brother's widow," must signify a relative of the brother, and could not be construed to mean a relative of the wife, although no relative of her had been mentioned in the chapter. The proposition, that the prohibition of marriage with a brother's widow directly forbids marriage with a deceased wife's sister, has been so solemnly advanced as to conceal, even from those who advance it, its absurdity: it is nevertheless absurd. For upon the plain principles of interpreting language, departure from which would bring again the con

fusion of Babel, we must understand a particular expression as used for the very purpose of conveying its particular meaning. When a lawgiver composing and publishing laws, under a sense of the importance that they should be readily and rightly understood, uses the term "brother's," it must be held, that it was his intention to confine himself to "brother's," and that if it had been his intention to comprehend a relative of the wife also, he would have used some word to signify that intention. When, further, in the same chapter, relatives of the wife are mentioned, the argument, if its force is susceptible of increase, is corroborated; because there is a violent presumption, that when mentioning the relatives of the wife, he will mention all he intends and when, still further, the wife's sister is named, no one can hesitate to receive that as the clause governing this question, entirely excluding the other.

But there is no substantial ground for maintaining that this verse (16th) does mean a brother's widow. The expression is, "thy brother's wife." It is admitted, that the term wife may signify either wife of the living or deceased-wife or widow. What the signification is in this verse, must be gathered from the manner of its use, and the circumstances applying. To the argument that "wife" in this verse cannot mean wife of a living brother, because the offence then would be adultery, and adultery was punished with death under this law, there is a full answer, which not only satisfies this argument, but also evinces, that we are very incompetent expositors of this old law, given more than thirty-three hundred years ago, for a people in a state of society of which we have no proper knowledge or understanding. For example, it is believed that the most impressive part of Dr. Breckinridge's very able and ingenious argument was that, by which he showed that by determining verse 18 to prohibit taking the sister of the wife in her lifetime, they would establish the principle that a man might lawfully have two wives. This was a startling proposition, felt as a reductio ad absurdum, and the interpretation involving it shrunk from, because the hearers were under the influence of our present condition of society, and their sentiments were at once formed, without entering upon the investigation leading back to the people for whom this law was made, and disclosing that among this people the same law in another part provided for the case of a man's having two wives: even the priest to whom the administration of the law belonged, took two wives.

for a king under guardianship, (2 Chron. 24: 3); and those most competent to communicate information say, that this verse (18) had direct allusion to the eminent patriarch and servant of the Most High-the ancestor of this people-who had two wives that were sisters. To return to the position, that verse 16 may signify wife of a living brother, and still the offence not be adultery. Marriage among the Jews was extremely loose; divorce at the arbitrary will of the husband (Deut. 24: 1-4). It is to be presumed, a wife might leave her husband (1 Cor. 7: 15). If the husband who had sent away a wife, took her again, it was abomination before the Lord (Deut. 24: 4). She might marry again; but for his brother to marry her, would be worse than for him to take her again: the thought to us is vile; it would obviously be a root of bitterness between the brothers. The brother's taking or cohabiting with her is not forbidden, except in this 16th verse. Besides, there was an allowed state of concubinage. The curse was upon Reuben, for an offence with his father's concubine. The threatening in respect to David's wives, was fulfilled with his concubines (2 Sam. 12: 11; 16: 21). In the case in the New Testament, of à condemnation by John the Baptist under this prohibition, Herodias the wife had left her husband Philip, and afterward in his lifetime, his brother Herod married her. We thus find, that the manners of the Israelites and their condition of society, rendered this prohibition with respect to the wife of a living husband, proper and expedient; and that the only case on record in the Bible of its application, is to a wife so circumstanced. There are objections, believed insuperable, to holding the prohibition applicable to a brother's widow. The reason given for the prohibition, " it is thy brother's nakedness," is incompatible with such application. If the brother be dead, the wife" loosed from the law of her husband," how can this reason be true? It is true of the living brother, not of the dead. The character of the offence (Lev. 20: 21)" it is an unclean thing," connected with the law (Deut. 25: 5-10) requiring, in case of a married brother dying childless, his surviving brother to take his widow, makes it manifest, that the prohibition is confined to the wife of the brother while living. Can we adinit, that the God of truth and righteousness, whose language to his people is, " ye shall be holy; for I the Lord your God am holy," would "ye enjoin by law" an unclean thing?"

The passage (Lev. 18: 6-18) is very plain upon common,

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well-established principles of interpretation. No principle is more clearly established nor obviously just, than that a general clause followed by specific cases, becomes special-limited by the specifications. The reason is apparent to common sense,indeed, grows out of it. It is the lawgiver puts the cases, that you may understand his application. Upon this ground, as the general prohibition in verse 6, is followed by sixteen specific prohibitions, and as the sister of a deceased wife is not within either of them, there is no prohibition with respect to her. The article in the Princeton Review admits this conclusion: "If the cases therein mentioned are to be taken as specific instances which exclude all others, then this marriage is not prohibited." But the article proceeds: "But if those cases are given only as examples of the degrees within which marriage should not take place, then this connection is forbidden. As every thing at last turns upon this point, it is obvious, that we must have better authority than our own, to decide upon the rule of interpretation." The ground on which we are willing to stand with the reviewer, is described by the inquiry," whether the cases therein mentioned are to be taken as specific instances, or are given only as examples of the degrees within which marriage should not take place." We agree that the rule which we have stated does not apply, unless specific cases follow the general clause; when examples are given merely to illustrate the clause, they are not specific cases within our meaning. it must be easy to determine, whether matter is set forth by way of example to illustrate a prohibitory clause, or to express direct prohibitions of particular things. In the present case, it is certainly very easy. Who ever heard of sixteen specific, carefully defined cases, each the distinct subject of a full, positive prohibition, being put as examples to illustrate a general preceding rohibition? No one can read Levit. 18: 7-18, without seeing, that here is a series of special prohibitions, each clearly defined, and full in itself, in which care has been used to express plainly each case. In each case, there is explicit particularity. When such care has been used, and so much explicitness and particularity to express clearly each case, is it not strange construction to add something wholly omitted, not alluded to in any thing expressed, because in certain tables devised by men, according to certain rules of computation established by them, it is to be found in the same degree with something expressed, totally distinct and different? As if the

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