ness as intimately connected with religion. Can it be supposed that they are all mistaken? Such is the opinion of some. "There is no doubt," remarks Buchholz, in his observations on the passage from the historian just cited, " that Polybius, in what he has said respecting the superstition of the Romans, and respecting their honesty, is altogether correct. Nevertheless, in regard to the causal connection into which he brings them, he may easily have erred; for, in nothing do men deceive themselves more readily than when they undertake to assign the causes of phenomena."* If then the admitted honesty of the early Romans did not grow out of their religion, if their conscientious performance of private contracts, their sacred regard for the solemnity of an oath, and their faithful discharge of the offices of the state, all of which indicate a high and unusual tone of moral feeling,-are not to be traced to the religious belief of the nation, in what manner are these facts to be accounted for? We need not, observes Buchholz, deny altogether to the popular superstition (for he will not, he says, dignify such a system with the name of religion,) any influence on morality; but we shall do well to search for the causes in more influential principles. And what are these? He suggests, in the first place, that it was for the interest of the patricians, who constituted a distinct order, and in whose hands the offices were, to prevent all abuses which would have injured their reputation, and weakened their influence. And besides this, after the institution of the tribuneship, detection (he thinks) was so certain to follow all abuses in the public offices that it is not strange that there were few or no breaches of trust, since publicity is the most dreadful scourge which men without conscience apprehend. It is hardly necessary to remark, that these reasons are wholly insufficient to account for the state of morals at Rome in the early periods of its history. Public and private virtue is not the natural offspring of party spirit. The esprit du corps leads to very different results. That the fear of detection is a very poor defence against crime, is proved by the history of the same people at a later period. But what shows conclusively, continues this writer, that Polybius was mistaken, is, that had he lived fifty years later he would have been altogether of another opinion. For then the superstition of the Romans remained, while their virtues no longer existed. In

Philosophische Untersuchungen Ueber die Römer, I. 35.

the seventh century from the building of the city, the Romans, he affirms, were as regardful of the gods as at any former period, and yet their morality was gone forever. This proves, he thinks, that the connection between the two was always loose, as is the fact at the present day with the inhabitants of modern Rome. This argument would indeed be conclusive if the premises were admitted. But while it is true that the morality of the Romans was corrupted, it is not true that their religious faith remained the same. That there was a change in the religion of the nation, and that this change exerted a powerful influence in debasing the public morals, we propose to show hereafter. A similar view of the moral tendency of the ancient religions is maintained by Meiners. Polytheistic and corrupt monotheistic religions, he thinks, are no more useful than ignorance and vice, anarchy and despotism. He supposes, therefore, that when Baily undertook to prove that superstition is more injurious than skepticism, the divines who regarded his proposition as a dangerous paradox, and maintained that even false religions are better than none, were much mistaken. "National religions will not become the friends of human virtue and happiness, until they teach that the Deity is not only an inconceivably powerful, but also an inconceivably wise and good being; that for this reason he gives way neither to anger nor revenge, and never punishes capriciously; that we owe to his favor alone all the good which we possess and enjoy; that even our sufferings contribute to our highest good, and death is a bitter but a salutary change; in fine, that the sacrifice most acceptable to God consists in a mind that seeks for truth, and a pure heart. Religions which announce these exalted truths offer to man the strongest preservatives from vice, and the strongest motives to virtue, exalt and ennoble his joys, console and guide him in all kinds of misfortunes, and inspire him with forbearance, patience, and active benevolence towards his brethren."* To this it may be replied in the words of this writer himself, that no religion as received by the people, consists of pure truth. It is manifest that in every religion of ancient and modern times, not excepting Christianity itself, as these religions have existed, or do exist, in the public mind, there is a mixture of truth and error. It is not necessary therefore to affirm with the opponents of Baily, that as truth itself

* Meiners Geschichte der Religionen, I. 78, 79. † Ib. I. 6.

is sometimes injurious, so also, under certain circumstances, falsehood may be useful. A religion is likely to be useful to society in proportion to the amount of important truth, which in connection with freedom from errors of injurious tendency, it inculcates. If, therefore, it can be shown that the religion of the early Romans contained truths of great importance and of salutary tendency, and that the most corrupt features of the later national superstition, together with the general skepticism, belong to a subsequent period, it is reasonable to believe that religion, as it existed at first, was favorable to morality. It has already been shown to be highly probable, that when the foundations of the national religion were laid, idolatry did not exist. The religious ceremonies were then fewer and more simple than they afterwards became, and whatever may have been the prevalent views in theology, it is certain that the religion as a whole diverged much less from a system of truth than at a later period.

The great object which the religious institutions were designed to accomplish was, according to Plutarch and Dionysius, to soften the roughness of the national temper, to cherish a reverence for sacred things, and to promote the observance of public and private faith. In addition to the characteristics which have been already mentioned, another important feature of the religion of the early Romans is worthy of notice.

3. In the first ages of the state, the Romans believed themselves the subjects of a moral government administered by superhuman power. It is obvious that next after the existence of a Supreme Being, the question whether the affairs of this world are under his control, is of the highest practical importance. That the heathen philosophers were fully aware of this is proved by the remarks of Cicero on the subject. Speaking of the notions on this point prevalent among the philosophers of his own day, he says: "There have been and are philosophers, who maintain that the gods exercise no supervision over human affairs. If their opinion be correct, how can there be any piety, any devotion, any religious reverence? For these sacred and pure acts of homage are due to the majesty of the gods, if they are taken notice of by them, and if any thing has been bestowed by the immortal gods on the race of men. But if the gods neither can nor will assist us, nor exercise any care over us, nor perceive what we do; and if no influence from them can pervade the lives of men,-why should we offer to

the immortal gods any worship, honors, or prayers? But piety, like other virtues, cannot exist in mere hypocritical forms. Along with piety, devotion and religious reverence must also be removed; and the consequence would be great disorder and confusion. And I am not sure that if piety towards the gods were taken away, fidelity and the ties which bind society together, and justice, that pre-eminent virtue, would not also be overthrown."* In his treatise De Legibus also, the same writer expresses similar sentiments respecting the influence of a belief in the reality of a divine government. "But who can deny that this belief is useful, when he sees how many things may be confirmed by an oath, how salutary are the religious rites of covenants, how many have been withheld from crime by the fear of divine vengeance, and how sacred is the union which binds citizens together, when the immortal gods are invoked, not only as judges, but as witnesses."+ It has been affirmed by those who do not regard it as a compliment, that in the early ages the Roman government was almost entirely religious. "Perhaps," says Buchholz, "the assertion is not too bold, that the Romans in the first centuries of the republic, were governed entirely by a theocracy." "But here, where the discourse respects the constitution and law, it should not remain unobserved, that while the religious institutions formed the keystone of the constitution, the Romans were governed far more by influences drawn from religion than from temporal authority." There is no doubt that religion was made use of at Rome to a considerable extent as a political engine. But whatever may be thought of the use to which it was applied, there can be no doubt that the religious belief of the people had a large share in the formation of the national character. "These religiones which Numa instituted, were his way and means of governing the state. He himself, as Pontifex Maximus, was neither more nor less than a ruler of the state, who, because a public sentiment was yet as much wanting as a public authority, could rule only by stepping forth as the servant of the gods. What was useful to him was followed by the most important consequences in relation to the development of the Romans." "It was a distinguished benefit that he

* De Natura Deorum, I. 2. † De Legibus, II. 7. Bei weitem mehr theokratisch als kosmokratisch. Ueber die Römer, I. 49, 52.

gave opportunity to this gloomy, misanthropic people to form connections with each other, to lay aside their old roughness, to learn to feel new wants, etc. What was done in the middle ages for the Germans, and other barbarous nations by the spread of the Christian church, this Numa did for the rude Romans of his time, who could much more easily be divided into parties than united."*

66

The manner in which Dionysius accounts for the prevalence of public and private faith among the early Romans, is worthy of notice. 66 Numa," he says, “made use of a means unknown to the founders of other celebrated constitutions. He built a temple and instituted religious ceremonies, for the purpose of consecrating fidelity in the eyes of the people as a divine quality." This measure he thinks was followed by the most beneficial consequences. A pledge was therefore considered as a thing so sacred and inviolable, that a man's word was equivalent to the greatest oath, and stronger than all testimony; and whenever any doubt arose about a contract which had been made between two individuals without witnesses, the word of one or the other of the parties settled the dispute, and permitted the lawsuit to proceed no further. The magistrates and the tribunals adjudged most controversies by means of oaths of fidelity. These things affording indeed encouragement to integrity, and giving efficiency to justice, were devised at that time by Numa, and rendered the civil polity of the Romans more perfect than the best regulated family."+ There is a remarkable sentiment of Cicero respecting the religious character of his countrymen, and its results. The Romans, he says, were the most religious of all people, and excelled other nations in this one particular, that they acted under the firm conviction that all things are under the supreme control of a divine providence. By this single piece of practical wisdom, he affirms, they conquered the world. "We may think of ourselves, Conscript Fathers, as highly as we please; yet we have neither surpassed the Spaniards in number, nor the Gauls in strength, nor the Carthaginians in cunning, nor the Greeks in the arts, nor, in short, even the Italians and Latins themselves, in the native and peculiar characteristics of this nation and country; but we have excelled all nations in piety and religious reverence; and in this one proof of discernment, that we have