father. As did the father, so does the son maintain, that unless the strongest motive determine the volition to be thus rather than otherwise, there is no cause for the volition. Having adopted the definition of motive given by the Elder Edwards, he says: "Now if any act of choice be without motive in this sense, it is absolutely without a cause," p. 372. It is not necessary to enlarge on this point, since Edwards, and all his defenders, are ready to grant it in the fullest degree.

2. He farther asserts, that motives comprehend the entire and whole cause of volition; not only that they have influence, but all the influence in the way of cause, which is concerned in the production of volition. This is no misrepresentation of the ground which he assumes and endorses in at least one passage: "An act of choice, without a motive in the large sense of motive, as defined by President Edwards, is an event without a cause. For every cause of volition is included in President Edwards's definition of motive. By motive,' says he,' I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether it be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly.' Accordingly in his further explanation of his idea of motive, he mentions all agreeable objects and views, all reasons and arguments, and all internal biases and tempers which have a tendency to volition; i. e. every cause or occasion of volition. And if an immediate divine influence, or any other extrinsic influence be the cause of volition, it may be called a motive in the same sense that a bias is," p. 372. Now it will be observed, that in " every cause or occasion of volition," Dr. Edwards does not include the volition itself, for this is the effect; neither does he include the mind, for this he denies. "The whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, comprehends the whole idea of motive; the whole idea of motive comprehends every cause of volition, so that if volition be without motive, it is without any cause. This is plain English. Had Dr. Edwards dropped his pen at this point, we should infer that he never supposed any other cause. But let us hear him still farther.

3. He states, defines and defends the doctrine of "the infallible connection between motive and volition." He says-" By infallible connection between motive and volition, we mean that volition never takes place without some motive, reason, or cause of its existence, either in the views of the mind of him who is the subject of the volition, in the disposition, bias or appetite of

his mind or body, or from the influence of some extrinsic agent," p. 344. The infallible connection here spoken of, is a connection between one thing and another, without which the first never exists:-this is its distinctive characteristic. This con

nection as applied to the subject under discussion is between "volition and "some motive, reason or cause "-all these three terms being used synonymously. The theatre where this "motive, reason or cause" is to be sought, lies in "the views of the mind," or " its disposition, bias, or appetite" or "the influence of some extrinsic agent." In arguing this point on page 346, he asks, if this connection be not " a connection just as infallible as that between cause and effect ?" It is not only as infallible, but upon his own showing it is the very connection itself, and the only connection as an effect, which volition ever has, so far as we have yet presented the views of Dr. Edwards. In every specific volition he maintained that the connection is between that volition and the strongest "motive, reason or cause."

A full exposition of this doctrine must be postponed until I examine another part of his scheme, the introduction of which now would confuse the order of discussion. In passing, I wish the reader specially to notice a particular view, that is very common among writers on the side of necessity; viz. that when one thing will not exist without another thing, the relation of cause and effect exists between these two things. Had Dr. Edwards simply said, that the infallible connection is between volition and some cause, without defining the cause, his opponents could not have disagreed with him. But his argument is, that motive is that without which volition will not exist by the concession of his opponents and the verdict of common sense; -hence he infers the truth of moral necessity, or the infallible connection between motive as the cause, and volition as its effect. This reasoning assumes, that when one thing will not exist without another, the two are related as cause and effect. Let us try this assumption for a moment. Space is that without which body will not exist; therefore space is a cause of its existence. The position of a body in the line of another moving body is that without which the first will not move; therefore the position, simple vis inertia is a cause of the motion. The existence of an agent is that without which he cannot sin; therefore the existence is a cause of sin. The reality of moral distinctions is that without which wrong cannot be; therefore the reality is a cause of the wrong. These enthymemes might

be multiplied to any extent. President Day saw the difficulty of this assumption. He says "Every material substance must occupy a certain portion of But space. space has nothing to do in bringing matter into existence. It is not in the proper sense the cause of matter. A body cannot move except in space. But space though a condition of the motion is not the cause. See his Examination of Edwards, p. 33. Who must not feel the unsoundness of the assumption in view of these illustrations? To confound a condition, even though it be infallible, a sine qua non, with cause, is a great mistake in philosophy; it has done much to embarrass this discussion, and give an air of triumph to one side of the question.

If it be said that cause is to be taken in this general sense, and that it is so used by the advocates of necessity, I reply, that some things must then be included under the idea, which have not, and cannot have the nature of cause. Whatever space

may be, let any man invest it with the idea of cause if he can. Non-existence of a thing is the logical condition of its creation, —that without which its creation cannot be. Is non-existence therefore a cause of its creation? Those who would use cause in so large a sense, cannot have explored their own consciousness on this subject. It is a serious error in classification by which the same term is appropriated to two ideas, between which there is nothing in common. No one can complete the idea of cause without that of power; and the idea of power is not possible without the idea of a subject in which it inheres. Remove these conceptions, and you have no cause--that which does not exist, and which has no power, certainly cannot be cause. How different these conceptions from that without which some other thing will not be!

4. But let us proceed with the work of interpretation :Dr. Edwards denies that the mind is the efficient cause of volition; and we now propose to show that he makes the same denial in regard to motive. Hear what he says:-"I do not pretend that motives are the efficient causes of volition."—" When we assert, that volition is determined by motive, we mean not that motive is the efficient cause of it,” p. 344.- "For moral necessity is a mere previous certainty of a moral action; and this is no more the efficient cause of the action, than the persuasive motive, which is the occasion of an action," p. 375."If it should be said, that motive in this case is not the efficient cause of the action or doing, this is granted," p. 381.

The reader who recurs to the ground over which we have already passed, is hardly prepared to expect such concessions from the pen of Dr. Edwards. As yet we have no efficient cause of volition. Mind is not; and he now tells us, that motive is not. Does he mean to leave the ground without such a cause? At the proper time we shall see.

66

Now"

It is very manifest, that Dr. Edwards contradicts himself, in the positions which he takes in regard to motive. But little skill in dialectics will be needed to convict him of self-contradiction. Standing on the platform raised by the Elder Edwards, he tells us, that " every cause of volition is included in President Edwards's definition of motive;" and yet he says, that motives are not the efficient causes of volition. every cause of volition "must mean all cause. The term is fully distributed. What follows, when we compare his two positions? That in "every cause" of an event, the efficient cause is not implied. Surely Dr. Edwards could not have thought of one passage when he wrote the other; they make a palpable contradiction, not the less real, because they are found in separate parts of his work. What is an efficient cause, if it be not found under the

category of " every cause " of an event? It may be said that

Dr. Edwards uses the word motive in two senses in the different passages, which seem to contradict each other; that when speaking of motive as inclusive of "every cause," he meant the efficient cause also; but when denying the efficiency of motive, he uses the term in a more limited sense. My reply is, that Dr. Edwards has not said a word to indicate any such intention, and no man, in the absence of all evidence, has a right to assume it for him.

Again, these positions are not consistent, in view of the definition of cause which he adopts. That definition is intended to be so broad as to include all cause; it is the only one given in his dissertation; it is substantially the one adopted by every writer on the side of necessity. It is "any antecedent, with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason, why the proposition which affirms that event, is true; whether it has any positive influence or not." Motive he holds to be such an antecedent, and therefore it is a cause of volition. The phrase, infallible connection between motive and volition, is but another form of asserting this very doctrine of antecedence, as stated in the definition of cause. Now observe, that the doctrine of such antecedence contains the necessarian

doctrine of cause; infallible connection is but another mode of stating this doctrine of antecedence; and yet Dr. Edwards says, that motives are not efficient causes of volition, although he maintains the fact of infallible connection, and although this connection exhausts the whole necessarian idea of cause. The result is, that efficient cause is not included in the only definition he gives of cause; or the word efficient has no meaning; or infallible connection is the relation of efficient causation, which Dr. Edwards denies, by having said that motives are not efficient causes, although infallibly connected with volitions. Neither horn of this dilemma will be sufficient to save his consistency; he does not agree with himself at all times any more really than with his opponents.

His positions, when thus brought together, make out a system of incongruous and repellant elements. At one time, motive exhausts the whole cause; at another, it does not. Both cannot be true; motive cannot be the whole cause, without being the efficient cause. For the purposes of this review, it is not necessary to go into a full account of the relation between motive and volition; my design having been to show that Dr. Edwards's account of the matter is not satisfactory, and prepare the way for introducing another of his positions, which closes up the whole question of the causation of volition. The reviewer agrees with the reviewed in the denial, that motive is the efficient cause of volition. What is the true nature of the relation of motive in the sense of an antecedent, whether subjective or objective, to the resulting act of an agent, presents one of the gravest and most difficult questions in philosophy. It is no place for hasty assumptions, for vague and doubtful terminology. All agree that the relation is not identical with that of the mind. The advocate of necessity describes the two relations under the epithet "determines ;" but he does not after all identify the relations, for in one case he means that motive determines in the sense of causing, and in the other, that the mind determines in the sense of being the subject of a change, not caused by itself. His opponent uses the word "determines" in a more definite sense; by it he means that the mind causes the volition, and in this sense he denies that motive determines. Both agree that the relation of motive to volition, and that of the mind to it are not the same: they disagree in the account which they give of the difference; here hinges the subject matter of the whole controversy.

The advocate of necessity seems to me to have lost