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success. But the effort to class Edwards with the deliberate defenders of this shallow and profligate scheme, is one which we think ought never to pass unnoticed.

The Review" is divided into three parts. Of these, the first is a "statement of Edwards' system-the second, a reduction of that system to its logical consequences-and the third, an examination of his argument against self-determination." It is with the first and third of these, that we are at present more particularly concerned.

PART I. "Statement of Edwards' System.”

Prof. Tappan has here made a strenuous effort to identify the system of Edwards, with that which affirms the most rigid and unavoidable necessity of volition. This design is accomplished by the exhibition of certain important passages of the Inquiry, accompanied with explanations which the reviewer hopes "will serve to make Edwards better understood." Our opinion of these explanations has not been formed without all that respectful and patient consideration, which is due to the high standing and acknowledged abilities of Prof. Tappan; but we cannot agree with him. We are constrained to believe that his anxiety to reduce the various statements of Edwards to a correspondence with his view of Edwards' scheme, has led him to look beyond their obvious and real meaning, and to attach to them ideas which they by no means authorize, and to which they are in some instances decidedly opposed. We express this opinion with the less diffidence, because we find our views of the most important of those passages of the Inquiry, in the interpretation of which we differ from Prof. T., sanctioned by the high authority of President Day, in his recent interesting and valuable work upon Edwards.

The first point with which the Reviewer endeavors to connect his theory of fatalism, is Edwards' alleged identification of will and desire; which we are told differ in the system of the Inquiry, only as genus and species. The same idea is more fully developed in some subsequent remarks upon "the proper use of the term-most agreeable ;" which the Reviewer says "is identified by Edwards in express terms with volition."

We notice these remarks, not to deny their correctness, but to say that Professor Tappan has scarcely, we think,

paid sufficient attention to the cautious hesitancy with which Edwards always expresses himself on these points. Of the first, he says, "I do not suppose that will and desire are words of precisely the same signification;" "but yet, I cannot think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be said to run counter." In concluding the discussion of the topic, he says, "not to dwell any longer on this, whether will and desire be precisely the same things, or no, yet I trust it will be admitted," &c.-language which, we think, plainly indicates, that though he was inclined to the view here imputed to him, the precise mutual relation of these two things was by no means settled in his mind. Of the latter, he says, "they seem, hardly, to be properly, and perfectly distinct," which scarcely amounts to the express identification claimed in the review.

While, however, it must be confessed, that Edwards has affirmed the identity alleged, we deem the guarded phraseology of the affirmation worthy of some attention. Its importance arises from the fact, that Edwards does, in many instances, depart from this view, and with equal explicitness, authorize the opposite one. For example, in Part I., Sec. IV., he says, that moral necessity sometimes arises "from such moral causes as the strength of inclination or motive;" where inclination or desire, is obviously distinguished from volition, and classed with motive, as the cause of volition. The same idea is, we think, conveyed in all his language about volition " caused by antecedent bias"-about the "will following the last dictate of the understanding," under which he includes the mind's sense of the pleasure to be derived from the choice-about "the strongest appetite," which, he says, "it is agreeable to have gratified." This inconsistency would seem to have escaped the notice of our critic, who repeatedly states, that in the system of Edwards, volition, and the strongest desire, are identical; and then, as we shall hereafter show, charges him with making one the antecedent of the other, and argues with equal earnestness against this

view also.

We notice next, the Reviewer's observations on the meaning of the phrase, "determination of the will." By this, Edwards informs us that he means, "causing that the act of will should be thus, and not otherwise;" "as by the determination of motion, we mean causing it to be in such a di

rection rather than in another." Upon this, Professor Tappan argues, that Edwards intends to distinguish the determination of choice, from its causation, no more than the determination of motion can be distinguished from its causation; that in the instance of motion, there is only one cause, which both produces the motion, and determines its direction, and that therefore, in the case of choice, there is but a single cause, which both produces volition, and determines its particular character; and as Edwards maintains that it is motive which determines, he must be understood to maintain, that motive produces volition. Thus is the conclusion attained, that, in the philosophy of Edwards, motive is, and the mind is not, the efficient cause of choice. This, Professor Tappan imputes, throughout the review, as the cardinal principle of the scheme of his author. Every where he alleges, that determination of volition, means the causation of it; and as it is motive which determines, motive is also, the efficient, producing, and sole, cause of volition: a conclusion which, we suspect, will be regarded by the disciples of Edwards, generally, with very great surprise.

The validity of this reasoning depends upon the validity of the principle, that the cause which sets a body in motion, is the same cause which determines the direction of that motion; a position which we cannot regard as by any means unquestionable. On the contrary, it strikes us that the fact, and the direction, of motion, when either of them is distinctly specified, are always regarded as distinct effects, and assigned to distinct causes. For example:-What causes the motion of a balloon? Its own buoyancy. What now causes that motion to be "thus, and not otherwise”—east, and not west? Plainly, a very different cause-the wind. Are we not right in supposing, that men invariably distinguish thus between the cause of motion, and the determiner of its direction, and assign in answer one, or the other, as the inquiry respects one or the other of the two effects? The same reasoning applies to every instance of motion. The motion of a locomotive is due to the steam, its direction, to the track on which it moves. The motion of a planet was derived from Omnipotence; its elliptical direction from gravitation. That all common usage recognizes this distinction, is undeniable; that Edwards has appealed to it for illustration of his doctrine, is, we think, obvious. Of course, Professor Tappan

cannot, with propriety, deprive him of the benefit of this appeal.

Nor does it aid the Reviewer's argument to say, as he does, that when there are several causes, they constitute together one complex whole, which determines both the extent, and the direction, of the motion. This is perfectly true; they are very often, and very properly, so considered; but the remark does not apply to the present instance. Edwards inquires not generally for the complex whole, but specifically for one of the component parts; for that which determines the motion to be in one direction, recognizing, palpably, the distinction we have alleged. It would appear then, that determination, and causation, are not the same, either in themselves, or in their causes, in the instance either of motion, or of choice. Of course it follows, that the Reviewer's decision that they are, is unsustained by correct usage; and that the interpretation which this decision puts upon the language of Edwards, is unauthorized and unsatisfactory.

On pp. 50, 51, the Reviewer proceeds to consider Edwards' remarks on moral necessity. The language of the Inquiry is quoted thus:-"No opposition or contrary will and endeavor, is supposable in the case of moral necessity, which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself." "For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself in its present act, or the present choice to be opposite to, and resisting, present choice; as absurd as to talk of two contrary motions of the same moving body at the same time."*

On this passage, which the Professor says "is clear and full," he remarks as follows: "The cause of volition does not lie within the sphere of volition itself; if any opposition; therefore, were made to the production of a volition, it could not be made by a volition." "Choice cannot exist before its cause, and so there can be no choice in the act of its causation. It comes into existence, THEREFORE, by no necessity relating to voluntary endeavor, but by a philosophical and absolute necessity of cause and effect. It is necessary as the

*The necessary limits of our article require us to abbreviate somewhat our quotations, both from Edwards, and from his Reviewer. We shall endeavor, in doing so, to be guilty of no injustice to either party.

falling of a stone which is thrown into the air-as the freezing or boiling of water at given temperatures.

It is worthy of observation, that Professor Tappan is here using, as he himself informs us, the peculiar language of Edwards, of course, in the sense which Edwards gave it. But explained by the usage of Edwards, his conclusion. amounts only to this-that volitions come into existence by an absolute certainty. For philosophical necessity is defined to be "nothing different from certainty," and the addition of the epithet "absolute," makes the phrase express simply absolute certainty. The same observation applies to the phrase "sure and perfect," as applied to philosophical necessity-it qualifies the idea of certainty alone. But it is most manifest, from the illustrations of the falling of a stone, &c., that these terms are employed by the Reviewer, to convey the idea of a necessity precisely similar to that by which physical phenomena take place; a use of thein which we have always regarded as strongly indicative of a serious misapprehension of the whole phraseology of Edwards in reference to volition. The Reviewer attaches to all this language, ideas which the definitions of Edwards, we think, forbid, and against which the Inquiry contains repeated warning. "Philosophical and absolute necessity, as sure and perfect as natural necessity," means in the usage of Edwards, if definitions can convey meaning, only perfect and absolute CERTAINTY; in that of the Reviewer, it means something more, viz. certainty, with that absolute impossibility of the contrary, which constitutes necessity of the most rigid character,

Whether the conclusion introduced by the word "therefore" in this extract, was designed as a statement of the reasoning of Edwards, or as an inference of the Reviewer from the admissions of the passage, we find it difficult to decide. The former, which would perhaps be the more natural supposition, we cannot think the correct one. Edwards does not announce any such conclusion-he does not say that volition comes into existence by the same kind of necessity by which water freezes-he does not say that moral necessity has no relation to voluntary endeavor. We think, therefore, that we should wrong Prof. T. by saying that he presents this idea as the formal and designed conclusion of his author. It must be regarded as an inference of his own, from the passage in question-a conclusion which

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