nor to my Baptist brethren to believe that there are many, very many of them who can feel no sympathy in such things. Their own spirit, their own style of writing, forbids the idea. Nothing of this kind have I ever seen in the writings of Professor Ripley, or Professor Chase, or President Sears. I do not, indeed, agree with them in opinion. But in any discussion with them I should confidently expect to find in them the honor and magnanimity of gentlemen, and the meekness and gentleness of Christ; and I rejoice to believe that those of the Baptists who sympathize with such men as these, are not few, and that their influence is not small; and until they disavow it, I will do them the honor to believe that their deep dislike of the spirit of Mr. Carson's reply, is the real reason that it was not republished in this country. When I hear them state that they approve the spirit of that work I will believe that they do, but never till then.

But the moral effects of Mr. Carson's reply, and of all his writings that I have seen, on another class of minds, I do fear. Novices, easily puffed up with pride, and predisposed to arrogant assumptions of superior intellectual power and to contempt of their opponents; and all violent and heated partisans will find Mr. Carson's rhetoric exactly to their taste. To use it requires no meekness, no forbearance, no humility, no aid of the Holy Spirit. The carnal mind will readily receive Mr. Carson's seed and bring forth an abundant crop. And partisan Christians, in whom the flesh is strong and the spirit weak, will come under its full power. Nor is this power small. It may be seen at this hour in the style of a certain class of Baptist writers in all parts of our land. There is in them a lofty tone, and a sprit of contemptuous invective and of fierce attack, that distinctly characterize the Carsonian school; and even in Christian newspapers we read of scalping their antagonists. This to be sure is an improvement on Mr. Carson's favorite figure of dissection, but the father of such a school must not be surprised if his children excel him: for the field opened is boundless; and such contemptuous expressions as "baby sprinklers," &c., will soon not be deemed sufficiently spirited and energetic to meet the exigencies of the case, and each new combatant will resort to the boundless stores of the Carsonian school.

If this were the first instance in which Mr. Carson had dealt in this style of rhetoric, I should regard it less, but it is not. It pervades all his writings that I have seen. Says an English author (Andrew Carmichael), "If they have not wholly and

to a point embraced his views, they are paradoxical, foolish, arrogant, untaught, impious, wicked, silly, presumptuous Protestant theologians; supporters of a very unholy cause; crude theorists, Pharisees and blasphemers. Yet, the person who can heap these epithets upon others, can venture to make this acknowledgment of himself:-My way is to endeavor to find what the Scriptures say, and to this I make every human dogma to bend. I will not allow philosophy herself to prate on the things of God." If Mr. Carson should plead that he was writing against Unitarianism, or loose views of inspiration, as his justification, I have only to ask: When was not the cloak of zeal for God and the truth thrown over a bad spirit? This is no way to check error. It will confirm twenty Unitarians or skeptics, where it convinces one. For they will ask: Can that be the truth that breeds such a spirit?

Nor can any denomination long tolerate such a spirit in its writers with impunity. It may assume the form of zeal for God and the truth. It may delude multitudes with the idea that they are especially designated by God for the great work of defending the gospel. But this fire is not from the altar of God. It is strange fire. And let those who offer it take heed lest fire go out from the Lord and devour them. And if the leaders of the Baptist denomination in this country have any regard to their own moral soundness, let them stand between the living and the dead, and pray that the plague may be stayed; and every where meet a spirit so unholy, with stern and emphatic rebuke. It may be of great use in rallying a party for a partisan warfare. It may for a time augment sectarian power. But it is no preparation for the coming of the Son of God. It is no preparation for the baptism of the Holy Ghost and of fire.

§. 45. Mr. Carson's logic. Preliminary remarks.

We have considered Mr. Carson's rhetoric. Let us now look at his logic. In doing this I meet with two embarrassments: 1. His work has not been republished in this country. Hence I shall direct my attention at present mainly to principles, as my readers can better comprehend these than details. 2. I have already virtually answered nearly all of it in my last two numbers, though not having seen the work itself, I did not aim to answer it, and hence the application of the various parts of my discussion to Mr. Carson's positions may need to be pointed

out. But as I have not room to attempt this, I shall trust to the intelligence of my readers to do that work.

All of Mr. Carson's reply may be considered as relating either-1, To principles; or, 2, To fundamental arguments; or, 3, To subordinate points; the truth or falsehood of which is of some consequence, but not essential to the main question. Mr. Carson seems to labor very hard to accumulate upon me errors of all sorts, for the purpose, it would seem, of destroying my reputation as a scholar, by repeated charges of folly, stupidity, nonsense, etc. Often the errors charged are upon minute points, not at all essential in the decision of the main question. But they give him a fine opportunity of setting forth my amazing want of perspicacity. Such charges of error are a kind of logical mosquitoes. They have a sting; they irritate; but they have no fatal power; and are so numerous and minute that there is no time to pursue them, and little is really gained by their destruction. In the refutation of such charges, I shall not waste the time of my readers. If the main points are decided in my favor, they will die a natural death. I shall therefore first consider the question of principle, and then look at the fundamental arguments in the case.

Careful reasoners are wont to examine principles, and state definitions clearly at the outset. Mr. Carson ought to have done this. I stated clearly and fully my principles at the outset, presented definitely the point to be proved, and the nature of the proof required. Does Mr. Carson carefully examine this part of my argument? Not at all. He merely alludes to it for the sake of saying that he has no objection to much of it, and that I borrowed all the truth of it from him; and then passes on to his attack upon my examples. Does he anywhere fairly and fully meet and discuss my principles? Not at all. Let me then begin by considering both his principles and mine.

§. 46. Mr. Carson's system, and canons.

I will therefore now endeavor to do what Mr. Carson has nowhere done, to collect the scattered fragments of his system, and to present them in one view; for, above all things, it is essential to have clear views of the points actually in debate. Mr. Carson's system then involves four parts.

1. To establish clearly that Barrio actually has the sense immerse in many instances. 2. To assume a canon of proof as to a secondary sense. 3. To provide a set of principles for

SECOND SERIES, VOL. IX. NO. I.

6

testing all alleged secondary senses, to see if they cannot possibly be reduced to the primary sense. 4. If it is possible, then to overrule all probabilities of a secondary sense, by what he calls the testimony of the word Barrio, of which the primary sense has been established. With the results of this process he is remarkably well satisfied. In his preface, he says, "My dissertation on the import of the word ßantico I submit with confidence to the truly learned. If I have not settled that controversy, there is not truth in axioms." Mr. Carson has chosen to disregard the advice of an ancient king: "Let not him that girdeth on his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off.” Whether he has done wisely in so doing, the result will show. Let us examine his process a little more in detail.

In establishing the first point, Mr. Carson has laid out much needless labor. No one, so far as I know, ever denied it. Yet Mr. Carson, in his work on baptism, has accumulated passage on passage as if the whole world denied that ẞanzio ever means to immerse, till he thinks his position impregnable. Having thus firmly established what no one denies, Mr. Carson next lays down his canon as to proving a secondary sense. P. 106, "I will here reduce my observations on this point to the form of a canon. When a thing is proved by sufficient evidence, no objection from difficulties can be admitted as decisive, except they involve an impossibility." The "thing" in this case is of course the primary sense of ßantico. For though the canon is general in form, yet it is made for a specific case. But the canon in its general form looks plausible, because it includes unlike cases, and is true of some and not of others. If a particular fact is proved by sufficient evidence, as for example, the being of a God, or the inspiration of the Scriptures, we are not to reject that fact on account of difficulties. So if the meaning of a word in a particular passage is fairly proved, we are not to reject it in that passage, because of difficulties. But proof of the meaning of a word in one passage, is not of course proof of its meaning in another; because the meanings of all words are liable to change. Now, in all places where the meaning immerse has been proved by Mr. Carson to belong to Barrio, I do not deny that it so belongs. But this is not proof of its meaning in all other cases. Its meaning in each case must be decided for itself. Mr. Carson's canon then, so far as it applies to the case in hand, is merely this: where one meaning of a word has been proved in certain cases, no difficulties can be admitted as decisive against retaining it in

other cases, unless they involve an impossibility. Here it is then in all its nakedness. He attempts, indeed, to put this alongside of the impropriety of rejecting proof of the being of a God, and the inspiration of the Scriptures on the ground of difficulties. But who cannot see that the cases are totally unlike? If we admit a new meaning to the word Bantico, on the ground of difficulties, we do not reject the old meaning in cases where it has been proved to exist; we merely prove that in other cases another meaning coexists with it. If, on the ground of difficulties, we reject the being of a God, or the inspiration of the Scriptures, we reject the identical thing which we had before proved true. Mr. Carson's canon then is in brief this we cannot admit a secondary sense of Banrico, unless we can prove that the primary sense is impossible; and it is in this form that he everywhere reduces it to practise. Mr. Carson next proceeds to lay down canons of trial by which to test alleged secondary senses, in order to discover whether the impossibility of the primary sense which he claims as essential, actually exists. Of these the most important are these:

1. P. 139, "I assert that in no language under heaven can one word designate two modes;" e. g., pánzo cannot signify both dip and sprinkle. This he avowedly asserts," without reference to the practise of language on the authority of selfevident truth." Another form in which he states it is this: "A word that applies to two modes can designate neither. The same word cannot express different modes, though a word not significant of mode may apply to all modes;" e. g., wash, stain, wet, purify, are effects which may be produced by pouring, dipping, or sprinkling. "But modes are essentially different from each other, and can have nothing in common. One word then cannot possibly distinguish them. The name of a mode is the word which expresses it, as distinguished from other modes. But it is impossible for the same word to express the distinction of two modes. It might more reasonably be supposed, that the word black, may also be employed to signify the idea denoted by white, as well as the idea which it is employed to designate, because black and white admit of degrees: but there are no degrees in mode," p. 139. All this is avowedly a priori reasoning, not deduced from facts, but resting on the assumption. that it is impossible so to use a word, or at least absurd, and therefore no word is in fact so used.

2. In certain situations, two words, or even SEVERAL WORDS,