And then we are to fay of God, that he is the caufe of all other beings; that they are made by him, and depend upon him; that he knows all things, and can do all things in the most perfect manner, by a glance of his mind, and by the mere beck and nod of his will, without long ftudy or deliberation, without laborious pains and endeavours, and confequently that nothing is exempted from his knowledge, and power, and providence, and that he adminifters all things in a way of goodnefs and wisdom, of justice and truth; and therefore all things are to be referred to him, as their last end. All these perfections, and all other that are poffible, we are to look upon the divine nature as fully and immutably poffeft of, and that in an higher and more excellent degree than our finite understandings are able to conceive or comprehend.

2. As we are to afcribe all imaginable poffible perfections to God, fo we are to feparate and remove all manner of imperfection from him. We must not obfcure or blemish the divine nature with the leaft fhadow or blot of imperfection. If we once admit of this, to afcribe any thing to God which argues imperfection, we strike at the foundation, and deftroy one of the clearest and most effential notions which men have of God. And therefore we find the fcripture very careful to remove all kinds of natural or moral imperfection from God. Gen. xviii. 25. That be far from thee to do after this manner, to flay the righteous with the wicked; and that the righteous fhould be as the wicked, that be far from thee: Shall not the judge of all the world do right? Deut. xxxii. 4. A God of truth, and without iniquity. Rom. ix. 14. What shall we say then, is there unrigh teousness with God & God forbid; far be it from him.

Hence it is that in fcripture holinefs is fo frequently afcribed to God, which fignifies the purity and freedom of the divine nature from that which we call fin; and God is very follicitous to give us fuch a notion of himself, as may remove fin and unrighte ousness at the greatest distance from him, because

that

that is the greatest of imperfections. Is it an imperfection to countenance fin? The fcripture acquits God of it, Pfal. v. 4, 5. Thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness, neither shall evil dwell with thee. Is it an imperfection to go from one's word, or to change one's mind? This likewife is removed from God, 1 Sam. xv. 29. The strength of Ifrael will not lie or repent: He is not a man, that - he should repent. Is it an imperfection to want any thing, to be liable to any thing, to depend upon any thing without one's felf for happinefs? This alfo is to be fet far from him. Job xxii. 2, 3. Can a man be profitable to God? Or is it a gain to him, that thou makeft thy way perfect? Job xxxv. 6, 7. If thou finneft, what dost thou against him? Or if thy tranfgreffions be multiplied, what dost thou unto him? If thou art righteous, what givest thou him, or what receiveth he of thine hand? Thy wickedness may hurt a man as thou art, and thy righteousness may profit the fon of man. Is it an imperfection to tempt, or to be tempted to fin? This is to be feparated from God; He cannot be tempted of evil, neither tempteth he any man, faith St. James, chap. i. 17. And to mention no more, is it an imperfection to be in any refpect mutable? This is denied of God. With him there is no variableness, or Shadow of turning. Thus you fee how we are to conceive of the perfections of God, by afcribing all imaginable and poffible perfections to him, and removing all fhadow of imperfection from him. I proceed in the

11. Place, to lay down fome rules by which we may rectify and govern our opinions concerning the attributes and perfections of God: The best I can think of are thefe following:

First, Let us begin with the most natural, and plain, and eafy perfections of God, and lay them for a foundation, and rectify all our other apprehenfions of God, and reafonings about him, by thefe; and thefe are his power, wifdom, and goodness, to which most of the rest may be reduced. Right apprehenfions, and a firm belief of thefe will make

it easily credible to us, that all things were made and are governed by him; for his goodness will difpofe and incline him to communicate being to o ther things, and to take care of them when they are made. And infinite power and wisdom render him able to do all this without any labour or difficulty, and without any disturbance of his eafe or happiness, as Epicurus would seem vainly to fear; who in truth did not believe a God, but pretended only to deny his providence, and that he either made or governed the world, because he was loth to lay fo much trouble upon him. Vain man! as if those things which are impoffible and difficult to our weakness and folly, might not be infinitely eafy to infinite power and wisdom.

Particularly the goodness and justice of God are not fo difficult to apprehend, as the difputes and controverfies about them have rendered them to many. When we confider infinite knowledge and power, we may easily lose ourselves, and go out of our depth, by wading too far into them. There is fomething concerning thefe, that is unimaginable, and unaccountable to our reafon; we may not be able to understand how fomething may be produced from nothing, because it argues fuch an excess of power, as we cannot comprehend: but yet we are forced to acknowledge, that either the world must be produced from nothing, or that matter was eternally of itself, which is every whit as hard to imagine, as that infinite power fhould be able to produce it from nothing. So likewise we are not able to conceive, how God can certainly know future events, which depend upon voluntary and uncertain caufes, because we cannot comprehend infinite knowledge; but this we may easily be fatisfied in, that infinite power and knowledge may be able to do, and know many things, which we cannot conceive how they can be known or done, no more than a child can imagine how a great Mathematician can demonftrate his propofitions. Only this we are fure of, as we can be of any thing, that no power can do that

which is evidently impoffible, and implies a plain. contradiction.

We are not able perhaps to reconcile the particular providences of God with his univerfal goodness, juftice and wisdom; because we cannot fee to the end of his ways and works at one view, and fee every part with relation to the whole; which would appear very wife, if we knew the whole feries of things, and faw the entire defign together, as God himself does, to whom (as Solomon tells us) all his ways are known from the beginning.

For

So that however we may be at a lofs in our conceptions of God's infinite knowledge and power, yet goodness, and juftice, and truth, are notions easy and familiar; and if we could not understand thefe, the whole Bible would be infignificant to us. all revelation from God fuppofeth us to know what is meant by goodness, juftice and truth: And therefore no man can entertain any notion of God, which plainly contradicts thefe. And it is foolish for any man to pretend, that he cannot know what goodness, and justice, and truth in God are: For if we do not know this, it is all one to us, whether God be good or not: nor could we imitate his goodnefs; for he that imitates, endeavours to make himfelt like fomething that he knows, and muft of neceffity have fome idea of that to which he aims to be like: So that if we had no certain and fettled notion of the goodness, and juftice, and truth of God, he would be altogether an unintelligible being; and religion, which confifts in the imitation of him, would be utterly impoffible.

Now thefe being the most eafy and intelligible perfections of God, by which he is faid in fcripture to declare his name, that is, to make himself known to us, we fhould govern all our reafonings about God (as concerning his decrees, and his concurrence with the free actions of men, and his particular providence, which are things more dark and obfcure ) by what is more clear; and we fhall find in fcripture, that in all thefe points holy men do conftantly appeal to thefe unquestionable and intelligible perfe

tions of God. Wilt thou deftroy the righteous with the wicked? (faith Abraham) that be far from thee:. Shall not the Judge of all the world do right? We may be mistaken; but God certainly knows who are wicked, and who are righteous; and he knows how to punish the wicked, and fave the righteous: But we cannot be mistaken in this principle, that the Fudge of all the world will do right. Thus Mofes fatisfies himself and others concerning the particular. providences of God towards the people of Ifrael, Deut. xxxii. 3, 4. I will publish the name of the Lord: All his ways are judgment; a God of truth, and without iniquity, juft and right is he. This we: certainly know of God. So St. Paul, Rom. ii. 2. Thou art inexcufable, O man! Whatsoever excufe men may pretend for their faults, he lays down this for a principle, We are fure the judgment of God is according to truth.

Secondly, Let us always confider the perfections of God in conjunction, and fo as to reconcile them with one another. Do not confider God as mere. power and fovereignty, as mere mercy and goodness, as mere juftice and feverity; but as all thefe together, and in fuch a measure and degree, as may make them confiftent with one another. The greatest mistakes in religion are certainly sprung from this root, from feparating the perfections of God, and confidering them fingly, and framing fuch wide and large notions of one as to exclude another; whereas the perfections of God agree together, and that is not a divine perfection which contradicts any other perfection. Among men indeed an eminent degree of any one excellency does ufually fhut out fome other; and therefore it is obferved, that power and moderation, love and difcretion, do not often meet together; that a great memory and a fmáll judgment, a good wit and an ill nature, are many times found in conjunction. But in infinite perfection all, perfections do eminently meet and confift together; and it is not neceffary that one excellency fhould be raised upon the ruins of another.

And