he would renounce God, and curfe him to his face : but the event proved how groundless and malicious this fuggeftion was. But there is a far greater dif ficulty in this matter, from the paffages of fome Divines concerning the Devil's immediate accefs to the minds of men, and his power to caft wicked thoughts into them; which feems by confequence to grant him fome knowledge of mens hearts; for by the fame reafon that he can imprint thoughts upon mens minds, he may fee those that are imprinted there. That the Devil is a very fagacious fpirit, and can make very fhrewd conjectures at the bent and inclinations of mens minds, and the probable workings of our thoughts, from a general knowledge and obfervation of our tempers and paffions, of our interefts and defigns, and from the general tenour of our actions in publick and private, and from our prayers and confeffions to God, (if he permit him at any time to be fo near good men) I think there is no doubt: But this is far from a knowledge of our hearts; all this is but conjecture, and fuch as men may make of one another in a lower degree. But as to the bufinefs of cafting blafphemous and' defpairing thoughts into the minds of men; to this I would fay these three things: 1. That there are few of thefe cafes which may not more probably be refolved into the wickedness and infidelity of mens hearts, or into the darkness and melancholy of our tempers, which are apt to raise and fuggeft ftrange thoughts to men, and fuch as we may be apt to think have no rife from ourfelves, not confidering what an odd and ftrange influence the diforder of our bodily humours may have upon our minds, as we fee in violent fevers, and feveral other diseases; and melancholy, though the workings of it are more ftill and quiet, is as truly a difeafe as any other; fo that I chufe rather to afcribe as much of these to a bodily distemper as may be, because it is a very uncomfortable confideration, to think that the Devil hath fuch an immedia ate power upon the minds of men... Ee. 3 2. I 2. I do not fee how by any means it can be grant ed, without prejudice to this prerogative of God, which the fcripture plainly gives, him, of being the only knower of the heart, that the Devil can have fo immediate an access to our minds, as to put wicked thoughts into them; nor can I think, that when it is faid, 1 Chron. xxi. 1. that Satan provoked David to number the people, and Luke xxii. 3. that the Devil entered into Judas, and A&ts v. 3. that Satan had filled the heart of Ananias, to lie unto the Holy Gheft, and Eph. ii. 2. that the Devil is the Spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience; I fay, I cannot think that any, or all of thefe expreffions do amount to fuch an immediate power of putting wicked thoughts into mens minds; but they only fignify that the Devil hath a greater hand in fome fins than others, and that a heart wickedly bent and inclined, gives him a great advantage to tempt men more powerfully by prefenting the occafions of fuch wicked thoughts and actions to them; for it is ufual in fcripture phrafe, as to afcribe all good motions to God's Spirit, fo all evil thoughts and actions to the Devil, not that he is the immedi ate caufe of them, but becaufe he is always ready to tempt men to them, and one way or other to promote them. 3. I fee no reason to grant (as many have done) an immediate power to the Devil over the fancies and imaginations of men, and that he may know the workings of them, though not the fecret thoughts of mens minds; for this feems to me to be in effect to grant him the knowledge of mens hearts, and to give him a key to that clofet which God hath referved to himself; for it is a very nice diftinction which is here made between the thoughts of mens minds, and the images of their fancies; and if thefe fhould happen to be but words that fignify the fame thing, we fhall unawares intrench upon the prerogative of God. Therefore becaufe the fcripture is a stranger to these nice and fubtile diftinctions between the imaginations of the fancy, and the thoughts of the heart, I think it is much fafer to affert the preroga 331 tive of God in that latitude that the scripture useth the word heart, for all the inward motions of the mind, for the thoughts and intentions of the heart, and roundly to affirm that all the inward motions of our fouls are totally exempted from the immediate cognizance of any other fpirit but God's alone; and that neither Angel nor Devil hath any further knowledge of them, than may be collected and inferred in a way of probable conjecture from the particular knowledge of mens tempers, and habits, and defigns, and the course of their actions. I proceed to the III. Particular; God's knowledge of future events. This God propofes as the way to discern the true God from idols, Ifai. xli. 21, &c. Produce your caufe, faith the Lord, bring forth your frong reafons, faith the King of Jacob; that is, let them bring fome argument that may convince us that they are gods; and he inftance:h in foretelling future events, ver. 22. Let them shew the former things, what they be, that we may confider them, and know the latter end of them; or declare us things for to come. Shew the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods. God puts it upon this iffue, if they can foretel future things, then they are gods; if not, they are vanity, and a work of naught, and he is an abomination that choofeth them, ver. 24. By things to come, I understand fuch effects as do not depend upon any neceffary caufe, but upon the will of free agents, and fo may be, or may not be; from whence it is plain, that it is the prerogative of God, proper and peculiar to him, to know future events. And here I fhall confider these two things: 1. That God knows future events. 2. That he only knows them. 1. God knows future events; which will appear from the dictates of natural light, and from scripture. (1.) From the dictates of natural light, as it is a perfection, and that which among men is accounted the best part of wisdom; and unless this did belong to God, how could he govern the world? The Hea thens thens, except only the Epicureans, generally granted this, as appears in thofe wife counfels, which we frequently meet with in them to this purpose, that we fhould not be anxious for the future; but having done our endeavour, leave the events of things to God, who only knows them and difpofeth them. Permittes ipfis expendere numinibus, quid And afterward faith he, We are importunate with God for wife and children: -At illis Notum, qui pueri, qualifque futura fit uxor. And that this was their opinion,appears yet more clearly from thofe apprehenfions which they had of divination. Tully lays down this for a principle, Deos poffe nobis figna futurarum rerum oftendere; de legibus. And in his book de divin. he tells us, that there was fuch a thing as divination; for it was an old opinion, Fam ufque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque pop. Rom. & omnium gentium firmata confenfu and afterward that this divination was not, fine instinctu afflatúque divino. : I know they did varioufly explain this, according to their feveral opinions about fate and contingency, and their apprehenfions about the providence of God. One fect of them, the Stoicks, held that there was a fatal chain of caufes from firft to last, and things did neceflarily follow one another; and by this means they made fore-knowledge eafy and explicable; and though in their difputes they feem to grant no fuch things as events and contingencies, yet they are agreed in the thing, that thofe things which we call events, though they would not call them fa, were fore-known to God. And for this I fhall only cite one teftimony of Seneca, fpeaking of God's fore-knowledge of the most contingent things, the difpofitions of men long before they are born; he adds, nota eft enim illis aperis fui feries, omniúmque illis rerum per manus fuas iturarum fcientia in aperto femper eft nobis ex abdito fubit; & que repentina putamus, illis provifa veniunt & familiara; and how perem: peremptory foever this fect is in their difputes about fate, yet when they speak of the Ta e' uir, and generally in their moral difcourfes, they feem plainly to me to exempt the will of man from this fatal neceffity. And thofe other fects of the Philofophers that denied fate, did generally grant God's fore-knowledge of contingent things. I grant indeed, that they did rather make God's fore-knowledge an arbitrary and voluntary, than a neceffary perfection, that is, that God, when he pleased to apply himself to it, could fore-know all future events: but their general opinion was, that as his providence did not extend to fmall and inconfiderable things, fo neither his foreknowledge. But Tully feems to attribute a very perfect providence to, and a fore-knowledge of the leaft things, Quis non timeat omnia providentem, cogitantem, animadvertentem, & omnia ad fe pertinere putantem, curiofum & negotii plenum Deum? But I cannot fay he is conftant to himfelf: but they all agree in granting to him this perfection of knowing all future things, if he be pleafed to trouble himfelf with it, and had they not in this mistaken the nature of God, they might eafily have apprehended that it is no trouble nor wearinefs to an infinite understanding, that is always in act, to know the leaft things how many foever they be. 2. From fcripture, which gives us teftimonies and arguments of it. (1.) Teftimonies, Ifa. xlviii. 3, &c. Acts xv. 18: Known unto God are all his works, from the beginning of the world, an' div, from everlasting; which by the way I cannot but compare with the forecited place of Seneca, Nota enim illis operis fui series, &c. (2.) By arguments from fcripture, I will mention but one; the clear and particular predictions of future events long before they happened, Gen. xv. 13. God foretells the children of Ifrael's deliverance after 430 years, which he punctually accomplished, Exod. xii. 40, 41. The Prophet that prophe |