xiii. 2.

fied against the altar at Bethel, named the man that fhould do it, Jofias, 350 years before-hand, 1 Kings The deliverance of the children of Ifrael from the Babylonifh captivity was foretold an hundred before, to be done particularly by Cyrus ; which is fo ftrange, that the Prophet brings it in with a preface of God's wifdom and power, Ifa. xliv. 24. &c. which was afterward precifely fulfilled, when the feventy years were expired. How are the life and death of the Meffias, with many particular circumftances foretold and did not he foretel the deftruction of Jerufalem forty years before?

But because there may be no contingency in good things, God himself may be refolved to effect them, or excite men to do them, when he hath foretold them; you fhall find that the worst things have been foretold; the apoftacy of the children of Ifrael, Deut. xxxi. 16. and their infidelity in times of the gofpel, Ifa. liii, 1, 5, 9. 26. Our Saviour foretold the treachery of Judas and Peter's denial of him; now thefe are fo evil, that it were blafphemy to fuppofe the holy God to have any hand in them; and therefore are foretold by him merely by virtue of his fore-knowledge, and the infiniteners of his understanding, which reacheth things at the greatest distance, that are most contingent.

SER

SERMON CXXXV.

Of the knowledge of God.

I SAM. ii. 3.

The Lord is a God of knowledge.

I

The fecond fermon on this text.

Have confidered this perfection of God, in fome of the greatest and most difficult inftances of it, his knowledge of the moft fecret things, the hearts of men, and future events; against the last of which there are fome objections, which I come now briefly to confider, and pafs on to what remains.

Objection the firft; The impoffibility of the thing. The certainty of all knowledge depends upon the certainty of the object; therefore there cannot be a certain and determinate knowledge of any thing, but what is certainly and determinately true: but future events, which may, or may not be, have no certain and determinate truth, that is, it is not certain either that they will or will not be; because they have no certain caufe: therefore there can be no infallible knowledge concerning them.

Anf. This I confefs is the grand difficulty; I shall not be fo folicitous to take it away, as to give fatisfaction to it.

1. I might fay, with a very fair probability, that the certainty of knowledge doth not depend upon the certainty of the caufe, but of the object, which may be certain, though the caufe be contingent. Which I prove thus; whatever event hath actually happened, as because now it is past, it is certainly true, that it was; fo because it once was, it was

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certainly true before it was, that it would be, as in Peter's denying of Chrift. If it be now true, that he hath denied him, it was true before, that he would deny him; and it being determinately true; God faw it as it was; fo that here is an object of a certain knowledge.

2. Though we could not explain the poffibility of God's knowing future contingencies, much lefs the manner how; yet we are fufficiently affured that God doth know them. I will give but one inftance for the proof this. Nothing more evident than the fin of Adam; yet God foreknew this, how elfe was Chrift decreed before the foundation of the world? Chrift was a remedy upon the occafion of fin; now the remedy could not be defigned before the fin was foreseen: and this being certain, cùm conftat de re, fruftra inquiritur de modo; when we are certain of the thing, 'tis not neceffary to know the manner. We are fatisfied of many things, the manner whereof we do not know: we believe the union of the foul and body, though no man can explain how a fpirit can be united to matter; we believe the continuity of matter, that is, that the parts of it hang together, of which whofoever faith he can give an account, doth but betray his own ignorance. And fo in many other things; that man doth not know himself, nor the measure of his own understanding, nor the nature and obfcurity of things, that will not confefs himself pofed in many things, that doth not acknowledge that there are many palasa, many things, the manner whereof is unimaginable, and of which our beft reafon and understanding can give no account.

3. It is very unreasonable to expect we should know all the ways which infinite knowledge hath of knowing things. We have but finite faculties and measures, which bear no proportion to infinite powers and objects. Could we explain the manner how infinite knowledge knows things, we fhould be like God in knowledge, our underftandings would be infinite like his; and in this cafe efpe

efpecially it becomes us to put on the modesty of creatures, and to remember that we are finite and limited. Some arrogant fpirits take it for an affront to their understandings, that any one fhould expect they fhould believe any thing, though they have the highest affurance of it, if they cannot explain the particular manner of it; they make nothing to deny God's knowledge of future events, unless they may be fatisfied of the particular way how he knows them.

I know there are those who undertake to explain the particular manner. Some fay, that God fees future events in fpeculo voluntatis; others fay, that the eternity of God is actually commenfurate to all duration, as his immenfity to all space, and fo God doth not fo properly forefee and foreknow as fee and know future things by the prefentiality and co-exiftence of all things in all eternity; for they fay, that future things are actually prefent and exifting to God, though not in menfura propriâ, yet in menfurâ aliena. The fchoolmen have much more of this jargon and canting language; and I envy no man the understanding these phrafes; but to me they feem to fignify nothing, but to have been words in vented by idle and conceited men, which a great many ever fince, left they should feem to be ignorant, would seem to understand; but I wonder most, that men, when they have amufed and puzzled themfelves and others with hard words, fhould call this explaining things.

The fum of the answer is this; that when we have done all we can, God's foreknowledge of future events may feem contradictious and impoffible to us; much lefs do I expect ever to be able to give a particular account of the manner of it but we have fufficient affurance of the thing, and unlefs we had infinite understandings, it were vanity to pretend to explain all the ways of infinite knowledge.

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Secondly, It is objected, That if we can admit fuch a knowledge in God as feems contradictious and impoffible to our reafon, why may we not allow and VOL. VI.

Ff

frame

frame fuch notions of his goodness and justice?

To this I answer, There is a great difference between thofe perfections of God which are imitable, and those which are not. Knowledge of future events is a perfection wherein we are not bound to be like God; and if we are affured of the thing that he doth know them, it is not neceffary that we fhould know the manner of it, and difentangle it from contradiction and impoffibility: But it is otherwife in God's goodness and juftice, which are imitable; he that imitates, endeavours to be like fomething that he knows, and we must have a clear idea and notion of that which we would bring ourfelves to the likeness of; these perfections of God we are capable of knowing, and therefore the knowJedge of thefe perfections is chiefly recommended to us in fcripture, Jer. ix. 24. By thefe God reveals himself, and declares his name, and makes himself known to us, even by those attributes which declare his goodnefs, and mercy, and juftice, Exod. xxxiv. 6. 7. Pfal. lxxxvi. 15. Deut. xxxii. 3, 4, 5. When God would give a defcription of himfelf to Mofes, he promises to caufe his goodness to pass before him. So that it doth not follow, that becaufe God's knowledge of future events is to be admitted, notwithstanding the feeming contradiction and impoffibility of it, therefore we are to admit of any notion of God's juftice or goodnefs that seems contradictious or impoffible. The

Third Objection is made up of feveral inconveniencies that would follow from God's knowledge of future events.

1. It would prejudice the liberty of the creature. For if God have an infallible knowledge of what we will do, then we cannot but do what he infallibly forefees we will do; for otherwife his knowledge would be fallible.

Anfw. God's foreknowledge lays no neceffity upon the event; in every event we may confider the effect in itself, or with relation to the cause, and the manner how it comes to pafs: confidered in itself, it is future; with relation to its caufes, it is contingent,