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the sole mistress of language, and to ascertain the precise import and extent of these her essential attributes, reputable, national, and present, and to give the directions proper to be observed in searching for the laws of this empress. In truth, grammar and criticism are but her ministers; and though, like other ministers, they would sometimes impose the dictates of their own humour upon the people as the commands of their sovereign, they are not so often successful in such attempts as to encourage the frequent repetition of them.

CHAPTER II.

THE NATURE AND USE OF VERBAL CRITICISM, WITH ITS PRINCIPAL CANONS.

THE first thing in elocution that claims our attention is purity; all its other qualities have their foundation in this. The great standard of purity is use, whose essential properties, as regarding language, have been considered and explained in the preceding chapter. But before I proceed to illustrate and specify the various offences against purity, or the different ways in which it may be violated, it will be proper to inquire so much farther into the nature of the subject as will enable us to fix on some general rules or canons by which, in all our particular decisions, we ought to be directed. This I have judged the more necessary, as many of the verbal criticisms which have been made on English authors since the beginning of the present century (for in this island we had little or nothing of the kind before) seem to have proceeded either from no settled principles at all, or from such as will not bear a near examination. There is this farther advantage in beginning with establishing certain canons, that if they shall be found reasonable, they will tend to make what remains of our road both shorter and clearer than it would otherwise have been. Much in the way of illustration and eviction may be saved on the particular remarks. And if, on the contrary, they should not be reasonable, and, consequently, the remarks raised on them should not be well founded, no way that I can think of bids fairer for detecting the fallacy, and preventing every reader from being misled. A fluent and specious, but superficial manner of criticising, is very apt to take at first, even with readers whom a deliberate examination into the principles on which the whole is built would quickly undeceive.

"But," it may be said, "if custom, which is so capricious and unaccountable, is everything in language, of what signifi

cance is either the grammarian or the critic?" Of considerable significance notwithstanding; and of most, then, when they confine themselves to their legal departments, and do not usurp an authority that doth not belong to them. The man who, in a country like ours, should compile a succinct, perspicuous, and faithful digest of the laws, though no lawgiver, would be universally acknowledged to be a public benefactor. How easy would that important branch of knowledge be rendered by such a work, in comparison of what it must be when we have nothing to have recourse to but a labyrinth of statutes, reports, and opinions. That man, also, would be of considerable use, though not in the same degree, who should vigilantly attend to every illegal practice that were beginning to prevail, and evince its danger by exposing its contrariety to law. Of similar benefit, though in a different sphere, are grammar and criticism. In language, the grammarian is properly the compiler of the digest; and the verbal critic, the man who seasonably notifies the abuses that are creeping in. Both tend to facilitate the study of the tongue to strangers, and to render natives more perfect in the knowledge of it, to advance general use into universal, and to give a greater stability, at least, if not a permanency, to custom, the most mutable thing in nature. These are advantages which, with a moderate share of attention, may be discovered from what hath been already said on the subject; but they are not the only advantages. From what I shall have occasion to observe afterward, it will probably appear that these arts, by assisting to suppress every unlicensed term, and to stigmatize every improper idiom, tend to give greater precision, and, consequently, more perspicuity and beauty to our style.

The observations made in the preceding chapter might easily be converted into so many canons of criticism, by which whatever is repugnant to reputable, to national, or to present use, in the sense wherein these epithets have been explained, would be condemned as a transgression of the radical laws of the language. But on this subject of use there arise two eminent questions, the determination of which may lead to the establishment of other canons not less important. The first question is this: "Is reputable, national, and present use, which, for brevity's sake, I shall hereafter simply denominate good use, always uniform in her decisions?" The second is, "As no term, idiom, or application that is totally unsupported by her can be admitted to be good, is every term, idiom, and application that is countenanced by her to be esteemed good, and therefore worthy to be retained?"

SECTION I.

GOOD USE NOT ALWAYS UNIFORM IN HER DECISIONS.

In answer to the former of these questions, I acknowledge that in every case there is not a perfect uniformity in the determinations even of such use as may justly be denominated good. Wherever a considerable number of authorities can be produced in support of two different, though resembling modes of expression for the same thing, there is always a divided use, and one cannot be said to speak barbarously, or to oppose the usage of the language, who conforms to either side.* This divided use hath place sometimes in single words, sometimes in construction, and sometimes in arrangement. In all such cases there is scope for choice; and it belongs, without question, to the critical art to lay down the principles by which, in doubtful cases, our choice should be directed.

There are, indeed, some differences in single words, which ought still to be retained. They are a kind of synonymas, and afford a little variety, without occasioning any inconvenience whatever. In arrangement, too, it certainly holds, that various manners suit various styles, as various styles suit various subjects, and various sorts of composition. For this reason, unless when some obscurity, ambiguity, or inelegance is created, no disposition of words which hath obtained the public approbation ought to be altogether rejected. In construction the case is somewhat different. Purity, perspicuity, and elegance generally require that in this there be the strictest uniformity. Yet differences, here, are not only allowable, but even convenient, when attended with correspondent differences in the application. Thus the verb to found, when used literally, is more properly followed by the preposition on, as, "The house was founded on a rock;" in the metaphorical application, it is often better with in, as in this

*The words nowise, noway, and noways, afford a proper instance of this divided use. Yet our learned and ingenious lexicographer hath denominated all those who either write or pronounce the word noways ignorant barbarians. These ignorant barbarians (but he hath surely not adverted to this circumstance) are only Pope, and Swift, and Addison, and Locke, and several others of our most celebrated writers. This censure is the more astonishing, that even in this form which he has thought fit to repudiate, the meaning assigned to it is strictly conformable to that which etymology, according to his own explication, would suggest.-See Johnson's Dictionary on the words nowise and way, particularly the senses of way, marked with these numbers, 15, 16, 18, and 19.

Such are subterranean and subterraneous, homogeneal and homogeneous, authentic and authentical, isle and island, mount and mountain, clime and climate, near and nigh, betwixt and between, amongst and among, amidst and amid. Nor do I see any hurt that would ensue from adding nowise and noway to the number.

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sentence, They maintained that dominion is founded in grace." Both sentences would be badly expressed if these prepositions were transposed, though there are perhaps cases wherein either would be good. In those instances, therefore, of divided use, which give scope for option, the following canons are humbly proposed, in order to assist us in assigning the preference. Let it, in the mean time, be remembered, as a point always presupposed, that the authorities on the opposite sides are equal, or nearly so. When those on

one side greatly preponderate, it is in vain to oppose the prevailing usage. Custom, when wavering, may be swayed, but when reluctant will not be forced; and in this department a person never effects so little as when he attempts too much.*

CANON THE FIRST.

The first canon, then, shall be, When use is divided as to any particular word or phrase, and the expression used by one part hath been preoccupied, or is in any instance susceptible of a different signification, and the expression employed by the other part never admits a different sense, both perspicuity and variety require that the form of expression which is in every instance strictly univocal be preferred.

For this reason, aught, signifying anything, is preferable to ought, which is one of our defective verbs; by consequence, meaning consequently, is preferable to of consequence, as this expression is often employed to denote momentous or important. In the preposition toward and towards, and the adverbs forward and forwards, backward and backwards, the two forms are used indiscriminately. But as the first form in alı these is also an adjective, it is better to confine the particles to the second. Custom, too, seems at present to lean this way. Besides and beside serve both as conjunctions and as prepositions. There appears some tendency at present to assign to each a separate province. This tendency ought to

* For this reason, it is to no purpose, with Johnson, to pronounce the word news as a plural (whatever it might have been in the days of Sydney and Raleigh), since custom hath evidently determined otherwise. Nor is the observation on the letter [s] in his Dictionary well founded, that "it seems to be established as a rule that no noun singular should end with [s] single;" the words alms, amends, summons, sous, genus, species, genius, chorus, and several others, show the contrary. For the same reason, the words averse and aversion are more properly construed with to than with from. The examples in favour of the latter preposition are beyond comparison outnumbered by those in favour of the former. The argument from etymology is here of no value, being taken from the use of another language. If by the same rule we were to regulate all nouns and verbs of Latin original, our present syntax would be overturned. It is more conformable to English analogy with to; the words dislike and hatred, nearly synonymous, are thus construed.

These nearly correspond to the conjunction præteria, and the preposition præter in Latin.

be humoured by employing only the former as the conjunction, the latter as the preposition.

This principle likewise leads me to prefer extemporary, as an adjective, to extempore, which is properly an adverb, and ought, for the sake of precision, to be restrained to that use. It is only of late that this last term begins to be employed adjectively. Thus we say, with equal propriety, an extemporary prayer, an extemporary sermon, and he prays extempore, he preaches extempore. I know not how Dr. Priestley hath happened to mention the term extemporary in a way which would make one think he considered it as a word peculiar to Mr. Hume. The word hath evidently been in good use for a longer time than one thinks of searching back in quest of authorities, and remains in good use to this day. By the same rule, we ought to prefer scarcely, as an adverb, to scarce, which is an adjective, and exceedingly, as an adverb, to exceeding, which is a participle. For the same reason, also, I am inclined to prefer that use which makes ye invariably the nominative plural of the personal pronoun thou, and you the accusative, when applied to an actual plurality. When used for the singular number, custom hath determined that it shall be you in both cases. This renders the distinction rather more important, as for the most part it would show directly whether one or more were addressed; a point in which we are often liable to mistake in all modern languages. From the like principle, in those verbs which have for the participle passive both the preterit form and one peculiar, the peculiar form ought to have the preference. Thus, I have gotten, I have hidden, I have spoken, are better than I have got, I have hid, I have spoke.* From the same principle, I think ate is preferable in the preterit tense, and eaten in the participle, to eat, which is the constant form of the present, though soinetimes, also, used for both the others.

But though, in this judgment concerning the participles, I agree entirely with all our approved modern grammarians, I can by no means concur with some of them in their manner of supporting it. "We should be immediately shocked," says one of the best of them,f "at I have knew, I have saw, I have gave, &c., but our ears are grown familiar with I have wrote, I have drank, I have bore, &c., which are altogether as barbarous." Nothing can be more inconsistent, in my opinion, with the very first principles of grammar, than what is here advanced. This ingenious gentleman surely will not pretend that there is a barbarism in every word which serves for preterit and participle both, else the far

* Yet I should prefer "I have held, helped, melted," to "I have holden, holpen, molten," these last participles being now obsolete. Holpen is, indeed, still used when we speak formally of courts or public meetings.

+ Lowth's Introduction to English Grammar.

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