"the pale specter of a vital force could no more be seen." On higher matters, this great German physiologist held not only that consciousness cannot as yet be explained out of mechanism, but that it never will be so explained. For him ignorabimus was the word in this connection. Another German scientist whose work is inadequately appreciated amongst us is Helmholtz. Helmholtz was not only great as mathematician, physicist, and physiologist, but was a large and comprehensive spirit, to whom everything vital to the human spirit was of deep interest. Profoundly versed he also was in speculations rooted in the philosophy of Kant, and his investigations in the physiology and psychology of sense-perceptions were of great importance. He made noteworthy scientific advances in laying foundations for the branches of science known as physiological optics and musical acoustics. Associated his name remains with that of our own Lord Kelvin, in connection with the doctrine of the conservation of energy and the theory of vortex motions. In fine, we have in Helmholtz a rare and wonderful combination of intellectual powers of the first order. He was no votary of that blind worship of pure "fact," to which Du-Bois Reymond lent his great influence. Helmholtz thought that knowledge should be examined, its implicit elements analyzed and discovered, and the presuppositions which make it possible. investigated. So differs he-for the better-from Du-Bois Reymond, to whom there was nothing a priori in knowledge.

The British developments in scientific thought were, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, associated with such great names as the Herschels, Priestley, Cavendish, Davy, Young, Dalton, Faraday, Brewster, Rowan Hamilton, Lyell, and others. Practically over the whole course of nineteenthcentury thought, the influence of Dalton's atomic theory of

matter has been felt, even though, after various modifying tendencies, it can hardly yet be said to have reached perfectly stable equilibrium. The same thing is true of the influence of Dr. Thomas Young's undulatory theory of light, with the existence of ether. British scientific thought was too little an organized product-too much the result of scientific individualism. In the second half of the century, natural philosophy was as good as revolutionized under Lord Kelvin and the late Clerk Maxwell. Since 1860, the influence of Darwin has been particularly felt. Great was Darwin's caution of intellect, and enormous the mass of facts on which he rested his great induction-the law of natural selection. Its influence was far-reaching, and statical pre-Darwinian philosophies were almost immediately affected, in their powerlessness to appreciate development. It was felt that neither Comte, nor Hegel, nor Buckle, nor Mill, had done justice by the dynamic and kinetic elements of actual Nature. The full philosophic conception of evolution as a cosmical process has been set forth by Spencer with the varied splendor of a great cosmical law. In fact, the second half of the century was concerned with these three great scientific ideas: (1) Darwin's theory of descent, or the principle of evolution; (2) the law of the conservation of energy, associated with the names of Joule, Thomson, and Helmholtz; and (3) Faraday's conception of electrical phenomena, or the principles of electromagnetic induction and electrolysis. For the scientific man who is also a philosopher, the principles and canons of scientific thought have an interest beyond that of the sciences themselves. These have not lacked expounders in Sir John Herschel, Comte, Mill, Whewell, and the late Professor Jevons. Almost every leading idea in the scientific thought of the century had been long before anticipated, but such precise state

ment and correct analysis of them had not before been given. And an altogether new stimulus was given to thought, in the latter half of the century, by the doctrine of the persistence of matter and of force, and the enunciation of the law of natural selection. We have seen that the fundamental conception of Du-Bois Reymond was, that natural causes can be no other than mechanical causes. Of the mechanical interpretation of reality, the complement is found in the theory of evolution. Particular sciences have shown themselves, from their methods of procedure, unable to find a solution for many of the problems raised, and the need has grown more manifest that scientific thought become more deeply penetrated with the method and fundamental conceptions of critical philosophy. In fact, it is just such interpenetration which gives present-day scientific speculation whatever tendencies it has of a more vital character. It ought never to be forgotten that it is only the how of the universe which such scientific thought can give us, not its what. But that is precisely what both Huxleyan teaching and Spencerian doctrine have failed to understand. It was the merit of Huxley to feel the need of a theory of knowledge, but he did not have a clear consciousness of his own theory of the subject. To him truth easily became the private property of the scientific method; so forgetting that, though all knowledge is capable of scientific treatment, such treatment is by no means exhaustive of reality. A philosophy of reality is still necessary. For science has not the inner life and wealth of concrete reality for its aim and object. Huxley thought we can only understand spirit, if we view it as matter; so making the astonishing mistake of forgetting that the only thing of which we are certain, is spirit. So, too, Spencer failed, in his own way, to distinguish sufficiently between theory of knowledge and metaphysic; pouring,

in fact, a metaphysical signification into the former. Spencer's criterion is a more subjective one than Huxley's: the former speaks of "assuring ourselves," while the latter craves "demonstrability." Both in England and in Germany scientific thought, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, showed an increasing sense of the importance of these questions of epistemology, and the last word is far from having been said upon the subject. Not a little of the stimulus to thought in this direction has been given by Helmholtz, Professor Ostwald, St. George Mivart, and others. The latest scientific thought of our time seems to require always more the abandonment of the naturalistic method, and to call for some interpretation of reality such as may be found in some form of spiritualistic monism.

ARTICLE III.

PROFESSOR PARK'S THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM.1

BY THE REVEREND FRANK HUGH FOSTER, PH.D., D.D.

THE Bible having now been established as the means of the divine revelation, the doctrines peculiar to the Bible can be introduced. Of these the first examined is

THE TRINITY.

Park's treatment of this theme is determined by his historical situation. New England was not yet out of the period of the Unitarian controversy when he began his professional work, and the antithesis to Unitarianism remained throughout his entire career more distinctive of the theological condition of things than any other element. Hence Park devoted an unusual amount of space to the doctrine of the Trinity. But this did not lead him to go into such discussions as fill Augustine's treatise, or make up what Dr. Hodge would call the "protestant doctrine." The great portion of this unusual space was devoted to the central part of the Unitarian denial, to the divinity of Christ. As to the rest, Park followed historically, and for substance of teaching, Moses Stuart, who had met many of the Unitarian denials by abandoning indefensible positions and concentrating his forces on the central elements of the truth. Stuart had abandoned the word "person" as descriptive of the three elements of the Trinity, substituting for it the less objectionable word "distinction." With this had gone a great mass of pseudo-biblical and philosophically untenable theological barnacles,

1 Continued from Vol. 1x. p. 697.