centuries they had pursued towards each other, and all the humiliations and resentments of France were apparently forgot.

At this point Mr. Kinglake makes a statement in regard to the temper of his countrymen, which it would be wise. for those Americans to consider, who think that the good feeling, the kindly sympathies of England, may be relied upon hereafter, if only soothing, friendly words are used by us, or who hope that such men as Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright can stay the tide of British violence and passion when once the cry is war. After showing that the war was brought on by France, and that England was easily induced to join her, he says:

"Welcome or unwelcome, the truth must be told. A "large obstacle to the maintenance of peace in Europe was "the temper of the English people. In public, men still "used forms of expression implying that they would be ❝content for England to lead a quiet life among the nations, "and they still classed expectations of peace among their "hopes, and declared in joyous tones that the prospects of "war were glaring and painful; but these phrases were the "time-honored canticles of a doctrine already discarded. "The English people desired war; and perhaps it ought to "be acknowledged that there were many to whom war, for "the sake of war, was no longer a hateful thought." Again he says: "All whose volitions were governed by the ima "gined freeing of Poland, or destroying Cronstadt and "lording it with our flag in the Baltie; or taking command "of the Euxine, and sinking the Russian fleet under the "guns of Sebastopol; all who meant to raise Circassia, and "cut off the Muscovite from the glowing South, by holding "the Dariel Pass, and those also who dwelt in fancy upon "the deeds to be done on the shores of the Caspian; all "these and many more saw plainly enough that separation "from the German Powers, and alliance with the new "Bonaparte, was the only road to adventure." The English people were eager for war, for the sake of war, for the sake of adventure eager to strike down a power that had helped

to save her from Napoleon, a power that had not harmed her, and that meditated no attack.

Connect this statement with the late picture of that same English people furious with passion over the affair of the Trent, shouting with joy over the flames of our vessels fired by pirates fitted out in their own harbors, and it may easily be seen what safety there is in depending upon the kind feeling of England-even of the English people. In dealing with England, our iron clads and Parrott rifles, and fifteeninch guns, will be found more convincing arguments than the most good natured and eloquent words.

But the French Emperor and English statesmen were not moved by passion in forming the Alliance, or in the Crimean war. What then were the true reasons by which the two nations were governed? To answer this question, it is necessary to study the condition of France, England, Russia and America, at the time when the Alliance was formed, and the attack on Russia was made.

At the close of the war in 1815, when the Allied armies entering Paris, England occupied the proudest position in Europe. Both in India and America she had stripped France of vast colonial possessions; in fact, to quote the words of Alison, "During the course of this long struggle, "the colonies of all the European States successively fell "into the hands of England."

She had utterly destroyed the French maritime power, and with it her commerce, and Wellington at Waterloo crushed the military idol of France and with him her army. The navy of England was supreme every where, and with her immense colonial territories, her navy, and her moral power, she was well prepared to rule for a time the world. She saw very clearly the necessities of her position. She understood both her strength and her weakness. She knew that she could not remain permanently the chief military power of Europe, and that she must rule the nations, if at all, through her capital, her machinery, and her ships. If she could draw from all countries the raw material for her work-shops and her looms, and sell in all markets her

manufactured fabrics, securing for herself the profits of her labor, her capital and machinery, and the carrying trade to her ships, then indeed all nations would become tributary to her. She pressed this scheme of aggrandizement in all lands to the full extent of her power, and far and near, her policy was crowned with a success that was equal to her ambition.

Her policy was to repress and destroy all commerce and manufactures except her own, and she found the South ready to aid her in any free trade scheme which would prevent the growth of manufactures or commerce in the free States, while many of the smaller States of Europe were merely factors of the merchants and mill owners of England, so that the wealth of the world flowed towards that small island as the rivers to the ocean.

In the meantime, as has been stated, France was recovering from defeat and exhaustion, and when Louis Napoleon seized the throne, grave apprehensions began to fill the English mind-nor was this anxiety without sufficient cause.

No sooner did the new monarch feel himself secure, than it was apparent that the one purpose which guided all his movements was to make France, in the shortest possible time, the leading military and naval power of Europe. The attention which was given to the enlargement, organization and discipline of the army, the artillery studies of the Emperor-and above all, the gigantic scale of his naval preparations, showed very clearly the intentions of the new ruler of France. Europe at first looked on puzzled and amazed. That France should become powerful, a European leader under such a man as Louis Napoleon, was deemed an impossible thing.

But as proofs of consummate ability in the guidance of French affairs began to multiply, and her military and naval power assumed grander proportions, as immense navy yards and fortifications began to menace the coast of Britain, English statesmen, in view of the past, had good reason for anxiety, if not for alarm.

It certainly was quite possible that France was preparing

to avenge herself for the humiliations of centuries. It was certain that a Bonaparte was on her throne, an ardent admirer of that uncle who had made the conquest or humbling of England one of the chief purposes of his life, and that uncle had not only been defeated by England, but she had mercilessly chained him to a rock, and shutting out all succor, left him there to die.

France had not forgotten, much less had the nephew forgotten or forgiven. Now that nephew wielded the power of France, his army was superior to any thing which England could command, and her navy was only the second in the world. Well might Englishmen inquire, how will this power be used? What purpose has this new Bonaparte in these vast preparations? What can he intend, unless to carry out the policy of his uncle in the invasion of England, and to revenge France and his family for national defeat, and especially for St. Helena and Waterloo. Those who remember the tone of the English Press at this period, know well how deeply the English nation was moved, even alarmed at the menacing attitude of France, from whom came no threatening word, but whose sphynx-like mystery was a source of terror, while especially at her great naval stations opposite England, the hum of preparation continually sounded.

What could this warlike activity mean, unless a sudden attack upon England was meditated? Between France and all other powers there seemed no cause for war. But the preparations and growing power of France were not the only causes which created uneasiness in England. Her supremacy had become a commercial rather than a military one, notwithstanding the immense strength of her navy, and it was necessary for her if she would rule the world, to retain her markets, to prevent, if possible, the growth of commercial rivals, and to secure the colonial possessions which she had wrested from others. As she surveyed the world, an eastern and a western vision troubled her. Hitherto Russia had been regarded as a mere military, barbarian Colossus, whose joints were not well compacted,

composed of heterogeneous materials, that could not be united in one true, organic, political structure, with a common life, which would insure a regular and healthy growth.

But Russia, under Nicholas, began to give signs that she was more than a mere barbarian camp, more than a nation of serfs and wandering Tartars. She gave evidence of a true national life, of enlargement, which was growth from a national life centre. Under many disadvantages the Russian Emperor was striving to give his country the means of independent self-development, and was laboring to establish manufactures and internal commerce, and to make profitable use of the great resources of his empire. He was establishing schools for his people, literary, and agricultural, as well as military, opening roads, projecting railways and canals, and putting steamboats upon his numerous rivers.

He was improving his navy and his mercantile marine, and in all his operations he seemed to prefer American mechanics, and American machinery, a fact which, of course, did not escape the watchful eye of England.

He had constructed a large fleet upon the Black Sea, and its fortified rendezvous, Sebastopol, was only a few hours sail from Constantinople; Turkey, unless defended by other powers, was apparently within reach of the Czar, and once in possession of Constantinople, Russia would have the means not only of becoming a great military power, but she would certainly be a first class manufacturing and commercial nation.

Russia, moreover, had already extended the outposts of dominion far on eastward, from the Black Sea along the Caucasus, and the northern frontier of Persia, and England saw, that if Turkey were overgrown, even the peaceful march of Russia eastward, would bring her at no distant date to the borders of her Indian possessions. The English Press at this time was complaining, as if it were ill-treatment of Great Britain and Europe, that Russia was planting vineyards in the Crimea with the intention of making her own wine, and that she was multiplying her flocks of sheep for the purpose of manufacturing her own woolens, and