benighted faithful; others will enter into a state described quite as vaguely as by any of the Gospels. The belief in predestination at once imparts submission to Fate, and quickens, not deadens, mental and corporeal efforts. It may be my Nasib or Kazá to escape such and such a danger, or to succeed in such and such an enterprise by such and such means as may suggest themselves, and I act accordingly. Yet (p. 325) it is owned that Abyssinian Christians are far beneath the Moslems in industry and honesty, showing that the race of man modifies faith at least as much as faith influences races. In p. 375 we find it admitted that El Islam, more intelligible to the Negro (and Negroid), and more compatible with his culture in Abyssinia, gains on Christianity. In page 388 we find Mr. M. Martin quoted to the effect that no Indian has ever become a true Christian. Even Voltaire,* by no means the most exact of men, never made such a blunder (repeated in p. 317) as to ascribe to the Moslems a doctrine that women possess no souls. Old Christian authorities, who looked at marriage only from a sexual point of view, have seriously doubted the fact; the Moslems never. It was a silly scandal spread centuries ago to rouse one half of humanity against El Islam, the first and greatest reformation of the corrupted faith called Christianity; and its effects have endured till this day. No Arab refuses to use a knife or a spoon; those who object to forks are of the same trempe as the many devout Christians who look upon science as a something unholy. It is new to assert that the Arabs in Africa are but little superior in intellectual culture to many heathen peoples: El Islam orders a school to be built by every one who erects a mosque; it will be well when England learns the lesson. The faith of the Koran is, of all theistical faiths, the most nobly tolerant, as all practically acquainted with it are aware. Such observers as Lady M. W. Montague never found that women in Muslim countries want liberty, or hold an undignified position: the idea seems burned into the European brain, but it is simply absurd, the effect of misrepresentation and a most superficial study. The Muslimah is certainly guarded from temptation; and when she falls into it she is deservedly punished. The Christian woman is exposed to every risk, and placed upon a comfortless eminence, that publicity may deter her from yielding. Which process is the more logical? It is, alas! not only Turks, Syrians, and Arabs who believe

Voltaire, Dictionnaire Philosophique, sub voce Alcoran, "Il n'est pas vrai qu'il exclue du paradis les femmes." It is instructive to compare this article with the above mentioned page of Dr. Waitz; and I venture to hope that, in another edition, these errors will be corrected. In page 377, we are told that the Count d'Escayrac de Lauture is an eloquent eulogist of the Mohammedan religion; the reason being that that traveller has experience and no prejudices.

VOL. II.-NO. VII.

S

that they fulfil every duty by prayers and ceremony. Lastly, to quote the most extraordinary error of all, the idea of attributing to El Islam an "eudæmonistic colouring" is diametrically opposed to fact. Mohammed strove stoutly against asceticism, the bane of oriental systems, but he strove in vain: the characteristic of El Islam is a peculiar gloom.

With respect to the orthography of proper names, I find that both the author and the translator have preserved the forms used by the authorities from whom they borrow; and, indeed, to have done otherwise would have caused a great increase of labour without proportionate advantage. We find, therefore, such forms as Kaffirs (p. 45, for Kafirs or Caffres), Tudas (p. 45, for Todas), Yarriba (p. 60, for Yoruba), Barabra (p. 60, for Barabara), Tschego (p. 91, for Nchigo), Papaws (p. 100, for Popos), Cunka (p. 105, for Cankey or Kankei), St. Thomas and Annabon (p. 133, for San Thome and Annobom), Camanchses and Riccarees (p. 141, for Komanches and Arikaris), Yebus (p. 242, for Jebus or Ijebus), Sowaheili (p. 254, for Sowahili), Apollonia (p. 299, for Appolonia).

On the other hand, I think it to be regretted that the excellent translator should have preserved such palpable Germanisms as Jemen (p. 48, for Yemen), Maniok (p. 59, for Manioc), Schoschonies (p. 62, for Shoshonis), Adamaua (p 209, for Adamawa), Vindjha (p. 252, for Vindya), Schamanism (p. 303, for Shamanism), and Cawries (p. 367, for Cowries). Amongst the errors and misprints must be reckoned Botokudes (p. 55) and Botocudes (p. 215) for Botucudos, the word being derived from botuque, Port. a bung; Dentrecasteaux (p. 295, for D'Entrecasteaux) and De Barras (p. 326, for De Barros). Finally, in p. 257, "twirling," should be substituted for whirling, and, in p. 335, bison for buffalo.

BAIN ON THE SENSES AND THE INTELLECT.*

ONE portion of Professor Bain's great work on the human mind has, after an interval of nine years, reached a second edition. We are in doubt whether we ought to congratulate him on the fact, or condole with him on the delay. But, all things considered, we believe we may congratulate him, and we do so most sincerely. It seems hard, at first sight, that the second edition of a sensation novel should spring The Senses and the Intellect. By Alexander Bain, M.A. Second Edition. London: Longman and Co.

up, like a mushroom, in a night, while the second edition of a philosophical work requires nine years for its development. But the author of the philosophical work may console himself with the reflection that his reputation will endure, when that of his rival is dead and buried. The elephant sees out many generations of mushrooms; and Professor Bain's reputation will survive that of many sensation novelists.

The fact that Professor Bain's work has reached a second edition tells not a little in favour of the pursuits of the present generation. The Senses and the Intellect is not unnecessarily technical, but it is not a dilettante's book. The man who works steadily through it performs a task of some severity-of such severity that, unless the work were congenial, he would not perform it at all. But let it not be supposed that in saying this we wish to detract either from Professor Bain's matter or from his style; we believe, on the contrary, that the work is made as attractive to the general public as such a systematic treatise on this subject can be made. The news that the first edition has been absorbed we think we must regard as very good news for the psychologist and the anthropologist.

The differences between the first and the second edition are, as Professor Bain says in his preface, not very material; we shall have a word or two to say upon them presently, but before doing so we will sketch out the general plan of the work.

After giving his definition and division of mind, Professor Bain begins with a chapter on the nervous system and its functions. The experiments of Flourens are cited to prove the different offices of different parts of the encephalon, and especially of the cerebellum. Although the objections of Brown-Séquard to the conclusions of Flourens are quoted, they do not appear to have shaken Professor Bain's confidence in the theory that the cerebellum harmonises the locomotive movements. Indeed, we should have liked this chapter better had the author spoken with greater diffidence of the present state of cerebral physiology. In the first volume of the Anthropological Review (p. 337), numerous apparently contradictory facts and experiments, as well as contradictory theories of different physiologists are brought into juxtaposition. It is impossible to read that article without coming to the conclusion that there is indeed some connexion between the encephalon and mental phenomena, but that it is at present impossible to state definitely what is the nature of that connexion. Professor Bain argues that the brain is the principal organ of mind; yet, in a footnote, he gives us the experiment performed by Pflüger, which we quote: "A beheaded frog, whose hind foot is touched with an acid, makes efforts with the other hind foot to wipe away the acid. If a drop is placed on the back on one side, the animal uses

the leg on that side to relieve itself of the sting; and, farther, if by cutting the nerve that leg is rendered powerless, the other leg is stimulated to remove the acid. These actions have the character of the voluntary actions; and yet they proceed from no higher a centre than the spinal cord." Professor Bain's remarks on the difficulty which arises here are not very satisfactory. "We have," he confesses, "no means of adequately explaining such a phenomenon. Possibly, in animals of a low order, the processes of will and intelligence are not so exclusively centralised in the brain as in the higher vertebrata." Possibly so; but the results of different experiments are so contradictory, that we think the only course an unprejudiced man can at present take is to suspend his judgment.

After instituting a comparison between nervous force and electricity, Professor Bain says, "The current character of the nerve force leads to a considerable departure from the ancient mode of viewing the position of the brain as the organ of mind. We have seen that the cerebrum is a mixed mass of grey and white matter-the matter of centres and the matter of conduction. Both are required in any act of the brain known to us. The smallest cerebral operation includes the transmission of an influence from one centre to another centre, from a centre to an extremity, or the reverse. Hence, we cannot separate the centres from their communicating branches; and, if so, we cannot separate the centres from the other organs of the body that originate or receive the nerve stimulation. The organ of mind is not the brain by itself; it is the brain, nerves, muscles, organs of sense, and viscera. When the brain is in action there is some transmission of nerve power, and the organ that receives or that originated the power is an essential part of the circle of mechanism.

"The notion that the brain is a sensorium, or inner chamber where impressions are accumulated, like pictures put away in a store, requires to be modified and corrected......Whether, under a sensation of something actual, or under an emotion, or an idea, or a train of ideas, the general operation is still the same. It seems as if we might say, no currents no mind. The transmission of influence along the nerve fibres from place to place seems the very essence of cerebral action. This transmission, moreover, must not be confined within the limits of the brain; not only could no movements be kept up, and no sensation received by the brain alone, but it is uncertain how far even thought, reminiscence, or the emotions of the past and absent could be sustained without the more distant communications between the brain and the rest of the body-the organs of sense and of movement."

This theory is ingenious, and would be strictly in accordance with Hartley's theory of vibrations, of which Professor Bain's work constantly reminds us; but there is an objection to the theory, so far as

1

memory is concerned, which seems to us unanswerable. The warrior who has lost his limbs in battle can in memory fight his good fights over again, and suffer pangs in the tissues that lie beneath the sod. The current in this case certainly stops short of the apparent seat of the revived sensation; and if in this case, why not in all? But, though we cannot shut our eyes to this difficulty, we must not forget that the "current" theory is in perfect harmony with modern scientific views of Force. The objections to the sensorium theory are perhaps equally great, especially when we take into consideration Pflüger's experiments with the frog; and so, again, we have forced upon us the conclusion that, on this subject, we know nothing. At present, the only way of arriving at a state of certainty on these subjects seems to be the adoption of Dr. Ludwig Büchner's method. He generally deals with a theory antagonistic to his own in this manner: "There is not sufficient evidence to establish this theory to my satisfaction; the absence of sufficient evidence to establish a theory is equivalent to the presence of sufficient evidence to disprove it; therefore, this theory is wrong, and mine is right." Fortlage, it seems, has had the misfortune to differ from Dr. Büchner, and has considered it an error to place the seat of the soul in the brain. "If Fortlage," says Dr. Büchner, "had taken the trouble of reading, merely superficially, any manual of physiology, he would have kept this remark to himself." Perhaps, if Dr. Büchner had weighed the evidence on all sides of the question, his work would have lost much of its dogmatism, and not a little of its brilliancy.

To return, however, from the cock-sure to the pains-taking school of psychology. Professor Bain next proceeds to consider the muscular system, and what he calls spontaneous activity. As this theory of spontaneous activity is made a prominent feature in his system, we must endeavour to explain what it is, and upon what basis the author conceives it to rest. The theory is that muscular movement is antecedent to stimulus and to sensation; that it is the result of a spontaneous flow of energy from nerve-centres; and this theory the author believes to be a necessary part of a satisfactory theory of volition. The proofs are thus recapitulated in Professor Bain's work on The Emotions and the Will:

"The physiological fact of a central discharge of nervous energy where no stimulus from without is present as a cause; the activity of the involuntary muscles displayed in the maintenance of the respiration, the circulation of the blood, etc.; the circumstances of awakening from sleep, wherein movement as a general rule appears to precede sensation; the early movements of infancy, and the activity of

* Kraft und Stoff.