necessary that the commander be thoroughly conversant with every piece and every move upon his chess-board; no sane person can expect him to take up the game and to play it well, at a moment's notice and without a pause, from the hands of one who has thoroughly embroiled it. In support of this separation of the political and strategetical from the merely tactical came the additional fact, that the officers in command of armies and divisions, belonging most frequently to the royal army, were held debarred from the exercise of political functions by their inacquaintance with the general policy of the Government, and their ignorance of the languages, feelings and habits of the people of India and its neighbouring countries.

Various therefore were the influences, besides the ambition of the individual, which placed a Macnaghten at Cabul; and it must be allowed, that however objectionable might be the system above adverted to, a Cotton and an Elphinstone were not calculated, either by their mental or their physical capacities, to be entrusted with the conduct of affairs in Affghanistan. Men of a higher order of intellect were essential for such a command; and, along with intellect, physical energy was indispensable. Men of this stamp were not wanting, had there been either the will or the ability to select them and such reasons and motives, as have been alleged, must be considered a very insufficient apology for shackling a military commander in Affghanistan with a civil Commander-in-Chief, influenced by similar motives to those which lead Governor-Generals to employ envoys and agents. Macnaghten, in order systematically to keep the thread of events under his own cognizance, and to maintain the exercise of general supervision and controul, was forced to have a large staff of subordinate political functionaries, to whom, as his lieutenants, the guidance of such operations, as he could not himself superintend, were to be entrusted. These deputies were for the most part young men, zealous indeed, but ignorant of the country and the people, and having yet to purchase that experience in men and practical wisdom in affairs, which, moderating the thirst for personal distinction and enlarging comprehensiveness of view, can alone mature into safe instruments the po litical servants of a Government. They have been much blamed; but the system, rather than the agents, was at fault; and some of them were not only very able men, but did important service in the line prescribed for their exertions.

The remoter causes of the insurrection trace back to an early date in the occupation of Affghanistan; and, before entering upon the more immediate and proximate causes, it is essential for

a right and fair comprehension of the subject to carry the mind back to the time of the Shah's entry into Cabul. This period is chosen, not because the events, which had preceded, should be altogether cast out of a review of the remote causes of the outbreak, but because in order to bring them to bear with their own proper weight and influence, a comprehensive summary of our general policy, and of its effects upon the minds and apprehensions of the people of Central Asia, would be indispensable. But such a retrospect would demand more space than we can afford; and, as the recovery of his throne by Shah Shuja was, after the repulse of the Russians from Herat, the ostensible object of the march of our army into Affghanistan, the attainment of that object forms a real epoch in the policy pursued, and is both a natural and convenient point, from which to consider the nature and character of our measures.

The Shah having been re-seated on his throne, though not (as had been prognosticated by the Governor-General) by his own subjects and adherents, a very grave and important question presented itself for the consideration and decision of Macnaghten, upon whose advice the Anglo-Indian Government was dependant. The objects of the British Government had been attained for, in the words of Lord Ellenborough," the Government of India had directed its army to pass the Indus in order to expel from Affghanistan a chief believed to be hostile to British interests, and to replace upon his throne a sovereign represented to be friendly to those interests, and popular with his former subjects." Both had been effected; and the question to be decided was, whether the moment contemplated by the GovernorGeneral had arrived: for Lord Auckland's manifesto had promised that "when once he (Shah Shuja) shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Affghanistan established, the British army will be withdrawn." The promise, thus vaguely worded and qualified, admitted of fulfilment by the adoption of one of two very different courses. Macnaghten had the option, either to take advantage of the favourable juncture when the British army could be withdrawn with the honour and the fame of entire success, and to devolve upon Shah Shuja, holding with the contingent (upon whose fidelity he could rely) the main points of Cabul, Ghuzni and Candahar, the onus, not only of maintaining military hold of the country, but also, unshackled by the unpopular tutelage of a British Envoy and with the civil administration in his own hands, that of establishing the royal authority throughout the less accessible districts, and of reconciling by adroit management their turbulent chiefs to his sway :-or, it was open

to Macnaghten, mistrusting the Shah's power and ability thus to maintain himself, to continue the military occupation of Affghanistan by the British troops, and to govern in Shah Shujah's name, on the plea that the engagement was not alone to place him on the throne, but also to secure his power, and to establish the independence and integrity of Affghanistan. Had our policy been truthful and honest, every thing combined to favour the first proposition. Macnaghten avowed himself convinced of the popularity of the Shah, whose reception he had represented as being on the part of the Affghans" with feelings nearly amounting to adoration." The Shah was known to be by no means deficient in ability; Macnaghten himself described him to Rawlinson, as a shrewd, cool, sensible, calculating character. His courage was of a doubtful hue; but this alleged natural timidity could not fail of receiving assurance from the presence of a disciplined body of foreign mercenaries-the contingent-well armed and well officered; whilst the occupation of the key points of his country would, at small cost, have enabled the Shah to maintain with the aid of the contingent such a grip of Cabul, Ghuzni, and Candahar, that nothing but an army well provided with battering guns could have shaken his hold on these important points. Shah Shuja might possibly, with such a bit in the mouths of the people and with conciliatory conduct towards the chiefs, for whose restless but petty ambition he could have found scope in the Civil and Military Service of the State, soon have been in a position to brave the return of Dost Mahomed. Freed from the dictation of a British Envoy and from the domineering presence of a British army, provided that his financial measures had proved judicious, his popularity would have increased. He would have had the winter, which, from its severity, imposes rest and peace, as a season in which to consolidate his administration, and during which he would have had leisure to work on the characters and wishes of the chiefs, and to raise an influential party favourable to his reign. A person, sincere in his conviction of the Shah's popularity, and having a clear perception of our position in Affghanistan, would have seen that it was a critical moment in the Shah's career. We know that the Envoy's representations of the Shah's popularity were the creations of his own imagination; and that it is extremely doubtful whether the Shah, given the opportunity above contemplated, would have had either the tact, or the firmness, essential to success in his position. It is certain that his failure would have proved the hollowness, if not the falsehood, of our policy, and would

have given a denial to the bold assertions advanced in his behalf and that of the course pursued by the British authorities. We suspect therefore that the Envoy was rather the dupe of his own wishes, and of those which he knew to be entertained by the Governor-General, than of any real misapprehension of the exact degree of the Shah's popularity and influence. Certain it is that, inconsistently with his avowed and often-repeated persuasion of the Shah's favour in the hearts of his chiefs and people, the Envoy permitted himself to be influenced by Shah Shuja's fears, whose timidity could not rest so long as Dost Mahomed roamed at large, and who therefore deprecated the immediate withdrawal of the British troops. Macnaghten was also affected, only in a less degree than Burnes, with a dread of the onward march of Russian battalions and of the progress of the Czar's influence in Central Asia. Instead of keeping clearly in sight the primal interests of his Government, and in lieu of seizing the favourable moment for honourably and at once disembarrassing it from a position which every one saw to be both false and faulty, Macnaghten allowed minor motives, present importunities, and phantasms of a remote danger, to warp his judgment from a perception of his country's real honour and advantage; and, by adopting the second proposition, tarnished the one, compromised the other, and wrapped the close of Lord Auckland's Indian career in gloom and consternation. "Quinctili Vare, legiones redde !" (Varus! give me back my legions), did. not indeed break vehemently forth from that sorrow-stricken amiable nobleman: but who, that saw him, will forget his deportment, both at the council-table and in private, during the last months of his rule in India?

The objections to the course which was adopted were many and incontrovertible. The number of troops requisite for the efficient military occupation of such a country as Affghanistan was far greater than India, threatened with disturbances in the Punjab, could spare; the cost of their maintenance was exces. sive; the difficulty of communicating with an army, so far removed from the British frontier, was great; all convoys of provisions and munitions of war must traverse the interposed states of doubtful allies, thread long and dangerous mountain defiles beset with wild, lawless, plundering tribes, and be exposed to a multiplicity of risks, before they could reach the isolated army; the civil administration, leaning from the first upon the strong arm of a British force and influenced by a British Envoy, acting through a puppet-king, could not be expected to mould itself to the habits and feelings of the people, and must therefore necessarily be disliked by them; and, worst of

all, there was no prospect that such a system could possibly terminate in a period when the Shah, dispensing with his leading strings and British bayonets, could be left to rule alone: for, under such a system, nothing native to the soil and people could arise, upon which to base his power and authority. A mock king; a civil administration, hated because under foreign dictation, and dissonant from the feelings of the Affghans; an Envoy, the real king, ruling by gleam of British bayonets, and thus enabled to impose his measures, however crude or unpalatable; a large army, raising by its consumption the price of provision, and preying on the resources of a very poor country; these were the inevitable concomitants of having shrunk from withdrawing at once, in good faith and sound policy, the British army, while the moral impression made by its entire success was fresh and deep upon the Affghan mind, and would for some time have been an element of strength to the Shah, had he been left to establish his own throne.

In order that the reader may better understand the foregoing remarks, and may also trace the connection between the policy at first adopted, and the condition and circumstances under which the insurrection found us, we must devote a page or two to the illustration of Macnaghten's initial measures.

Shortly after the first occupation of Cabul, Macnaghten heard from Pottinger at Herat, that a Russian force, destined for Khiva, was assembling at Orenberg, and that Stoddart was still a prisoner at Bokhara, and anticipated being kept there, unless rescued by an English army. This information was coupled with the recommendation that the army, or at least one brigade, should immediately move on Balkh; the advice was coupled with the assurance, that a single brigade would be quite sufficient, there being no posts on the route to cause delay or give trouble, and no troops that could oppose the march of the brigade. Outram's return from his unsuccessful pursuit of Dost Mahomed, and the escape of the latter to the regions of the Oxus, combined with Pottinger's report, immediately filled the Envoy's breast with apprehensions of Russian enterprize upon that famed river, and strengthened him in his resolution not to part with the British army, but to retain as large a portion of it, as he could induce Keane to leave, or Lord Auckland to sanction; and with this view he at once wrote to Keane in a tone of alarm at the march of Russian battalions upon Khiva, and their occupation of the banks of the Oxus. Keane, who had seen enough in Affghanistan to satisfy him. that the Russian expedition from Orenberg might, with equal safety and propriety, be left to exhaust itself in overcoming the