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princes : the same quiet existed, when the Kalorahs first obtained power, and when the Talpúrs wrested that power from them, The bloodshed and violence, which accompanied the latter event, were confined to the court and its mercenaries.
The relative position of the Scindians and their rulers did not tend to any reciprocity of feeling. There was nothing national in any of the wars, which have thrown down and raised up dynasties. It was the business of the court: and, beyond the temporary confusion consequent on the change of local ministers, was unfelt and uncared for by the Scindians at large. Naturally quiet and industrious, they preferred peace to warthe tranquillity of their homes to the turmoil of the camp; and, their interests and customs being respected, they sided with neither party, but patiently awaited the result. At the time of the British conquest, we do not deny that there may have been some prospects of benefit entertained by the general mass of the people in anticipating our sway, not arising from former oppression, but from a certain vague idea of future betterment. Nearly twenty years have elapsed since Shore, with candid truthfulness, hesitated not to expose the fallacy, so common at that period, when it was assumed as an axiom, that "the 'natives were a low degraded set, with very few good qualities; • their institutions, customs, and government, excessively bad ; ' while we and ours, on the contrary, were everything that was ex'cellent; and that they were pleased and grateful to us for
having substituted a good Government for their own bad ones.” Much has been done since that time to render Shore's rebuke less deserved: but much still remains to be done, especially in the proceedings of our judicial courts. But whilst we deplore what still remains of this national conceit, yet we believe, that where an accession is made to the British-Indian empire, and neither fanaticism nor national union is opposed to check the feeling, there will be found among the people an undefined but general conviction that the Company's rule will be beneficial to them. In Scinde this may be supposed to have been peculiarly the case, both from the total absence of opposing causes, and from the distance of the province from the countries then under British dominion. They heard of the proverbial honesty of intention of that Government, of the general tranquillity of the people, of its own greatness and internal unity, wbich assured its subjects of security from foreign invasion : but they were ignorant of the details of its administration, of the wheels with in wheels which connected the governed and the governors, of the changes which would take place in their relations to each other, and of the many causes whicb would tend to affect their
social and domestic happiness. To such countries the Company's “Ikbál" is doubtless a grand vision : but its glories too often fade, the nearer it approaches. When General Napier drew the sword in Scinde, the task before him was (as compared with that before other invaders) an easy one; though its glori. ous termination, with the scanty means at his disposal, shed a noble lustre on his already high military renown.
He had not to conquer Scinde, but the Amírs and their mercenaries. A victory over them once obtained, the work was done. There were no men of real influence about the court ; few, who had influence even among the soldiery; and none, who could influence the country. Once thoroughly broken, there was no one, who could afterwards raise the standard of revolt, or even cause temporary annoyance to the Government by any attempt to do
Sensible of this, the General himself was able to assert, immediately after his crowning victory, that "not another shot would be fired in Scinde." The expulsion of the Amírs, the dispersion of the army, and the peaceable disposition of the people, formed a rare combination of circumstances, which enabled the Governor to pursue his system of administration in tranquillity and ease. It then rested solely on the capacity of those first intrusted with power to strengthen and define the hitherto dawning, but vague, popularity of the new order of things-or on their incapacity to weaken and eventually annihilate it.
It has been sometimes asked, “What has become of those masses, who retreated sulkily from the Fulailí, on the memorable 17th February, 1843 ?" Let us consider the nature of those masses, and we may arrive at the solution of the ques. tion. Each Amír had his own retainers, and these consisted of many classes--the Rajput, the Pathan, the Belúch, and the Sídí. Not only the reigning Amírs, but all their numerous relations, were alike attended by bands of retainers : and each jaghirdar, who held his possessions on military service, brought his knot of followers to swell the heterogeneous horde. Thus were collected from all quarters of India the thousands, who vainly opposed themselves to the British bayonet. Every one, who has had experience of the tribes of Western India, will be aware of the facility in raising from them a large army of military adventurers, who have nothing to lose at home, and everything to expect abroad. The Amírs, their relations, and feudal dependants, were possessed of wealth, the great attraction. High pay, and a free and easy life, were the induce ments offered to retain their services, which were at tbe disposal of their masters, so long as the coffers of the latter were full. But they were unaccustomed to fight en masse," were unin. structed in war, and had no common bond of interest. But a small portion of those, who fought at Meaní, had a real interest in the country; and even defeat was not apprehended by the majority as entailing any permanent misfortune-nothing beyond a temporary want of employment. Such were the men, whose many-coloured turbans and varied costume caused that picturesque appearance, which has been not inaptly compared by the chroniclers of those events to “a field of poppies.” When the struggle was over, and victory declared against them, when their masters were expelled, and their coffers the prize of the victors, these mercenaries had nothing more to look for; there was no latent hope of their services being again put in requisition; and the only course left to them was one, to which they were not unaccustomed, viz. to return to their various homes, and seek employment elsewhere. Nothing opposed them. No pursuing army was at their heels. No intermediate allies of the conquering power interfered to stay their progress. Meanwbile, the jaghirdars, now freed from their allegiance to the Amírs (for they were in fact mere contractors for mercenaries), had no longer any motive for retaining their soldiery; so that these too received their discharge. The dispersion was general, but gradual ; the disbanding took place at different points, and the discharged adventurers journied towards various quarters. The same facility existed for their dispersion as for their collection. Probably not ten of those, who appeared at Meaní, could now be found together out of employment. All left Scinde, and are now scattered over the hills of Beluchistan, the countries beyond the Bolan Pass, Rajputanah, and some parts of the Punjab, with no intention or inducement to return to Scinde. Nay, probably many fought with us and our ally of Bahawulpúr in the late campaign. Some few remained, and found employment, either under the British Government, or in the territories of Mir Ali Morad; whilst a portion of the Beluchís returned to their villages and to more peaceable employments.
With this general internal quiet, and good feeling towards us, how_stood the country with regard to its neighbours ? To the East, there was nothing to fear. To the North, there stood a bugbear, but only a bugbear-the Punjab. Invasion from that quarter was as needlessly feared, as it was frequently prophesied. Violent and fretful as was the Sikh army, there were yet able and far-seeing men, whose councils influenced it, and whose main ends would have been fras. trated, had they turned their attention to Scinde. Was the advance to be made from Lahore ? With the British to the east, hostile tribes to the west, and a known intriguer and dangerous friend to the north, the idea was too ridiculous to be entertained. An invasion was still less to be anticipated from the South : for there we had no enemy, but the Múltan Dewan, with the small garrison of bis Fort, amounting, at the outside, to 4,000 men, and these principally foreigners. It may be said that he afterwards found no difficulty in raising an army to defy the British. But it must be recollected that incomplete arrangements and delays gave him many advantages, and lent to his cause a partial semblance of success; and even then, comparatively few of his troops were Sikhs—the remainder consisting of mercenaries, willing enough to enter his Fort, and draw his pay, but men, who, under no combination of circumstances, would have joined his standard in the field for the invasion of a country distant from their homes. Guns he had, it is true, but not in a condition to move them through a difficult country. Even when the revolt was wide spread, and victory was closer to the Sikhs than it had been to any native power we have met in India, to hold his own was all that was required of, or attempted by, him. But whether from Múltan or Lahore, the invading army would have had the Bahawulpúr army on their left to oppose them, and tribes of no friendly feelings to their right, with our creature Alí Morad in their front.
Invasion from Candahar was still more chimerical. It could not be anticipated, except as the result of a combined movement: and the chances of such a combination may be calculated from late events. When Scinde was almost denuded of troops, and reinforcements from Bombay, or the north, were out of the question, even when actually invited by the leaders of an apparently successful revolt, the Sirdars of Kandahar could do no more than boast and promise. Thus was Scinde as really free from all fear of foreign invasion, as of internal risings or revolts. One only cause of annoyance remained, in the predatory character of the Búgtís, Murrís, and other hill tribes on the N. W. frontier, whose excursions became frequent, and gradually so daring and formidable, that it behoved the Government to suppress them. Even here it must be remembered that a broad tract of desert intervened between their mountains and the inhabited parts of Scinde; so that it was the few villages on the borders, which alone were disturbed. It was necessary however to throw our protection over the remotest corners of the newly-acquired province : and accordingly Sir Charles Napier undertook the vigorous hill campaign of
1844-45, which terminated in the capture of the chief of the Dúmkí tribe, and the suppression of the plundering in any formidable degree. The campaign also gave his officers experience of the country and of the character of the enemy, which
vas advantageous in cases of subsequent aggression. When the General returned to his province, he left an officer to guard the frontier, who, formerly renowned, obtained here still further laurels, and gained a name prominent in the annals of Eastern Armies. Major Jacob and his illustrious corps were left to guard the troublesome frontier; and they performed that duty as they have performed all others.
Ere we leave this head of the subject, we must remark the population and extent of country, with which Sir Charles had to deal. The population of Scinde has been variously estimated at, from twenty to thirty per square mile: but, from the few local calculations which have been made, it appears that these numbers are too high, and fifteen per square mile seems nearer the correct proportion. An attempt was commenced in Scinde to make a census of the country: but it was supposed to be very unpopular, and connected with taxation, and was accordingly soon dropped. It is a pity that so little attention is paid in this country to statistical details. Some supposed disinclination on the part of the people is, in most cases, allowed to prevent the inquiry. But from what has been done, it is evident that much more might be effected by an uniform and unobtrusive method, whilst the reports of each year would be more accurate than the preceding one, as the people discovered that no results injurious to them were to be feared, and therefore came forward the more readily to assist in the preparation. The chief requisite is to obtain answers to the inquiries through the village officers.
The Scindians are principally cultivators and artisans. They are divided into numerous families or tribes; and the investigation of their origin and first settlement in the country would be an interesting enquiry. A great portion of them claim to have been originally Rajputs :-and we find members of most of these families in the Punjab, some of them yielding precedence to the settlers in Scinde, and others claiming the chiefship for themselves. The fishermen, located in villages on the banks of the river, are a poor, but industrious, class. The Hindus are of two classes-the traders, and the men, who gain a living in the employ of Government. Almost all the revenue officers, and the hordes, who are sent out every season as assessors, amíns, zabits, &c. &c., are furnished from that class. From living in a tolerated state in a Muhammadan country, they have