second disease which is described in the writings of Cullen, Sydenham, Pringle, &c., and from which the tropical form of the malady has not hitherto been discriminated. This latter modification, Mr. M'Gregor thinks, is so closely connected with diarrhoea, that he has always experienced difficulty in distinguishing them. He informs us, however, that mercury is now the remedy every where relied on,' for this state of the dysentery; a remedy which certainly is inadmissible in diarrhoea. The nitric acid has been also employed with success in this complaint.

The sketch which we have given of these Sketches will impress our readers with a favourable idea of their value. It is sufficient to add, that the volume communicates the observations of a man of judgment and experience, on topics of the first importance. The author is generally contented with relating what he saw, without deviating into speculation and hypothe sis; though, from some parts of the work, we apprehend that he is infected with the chemical physiology. He seems to conclude that the operation of mercury and nitric acid must be similar, because they both act favourably on the same disease; and he occasionally hints at the oxygenation of the system :but these are trifling defects, compared with the solid value of the work.

ART. VIII. Discourses on Theological and Literary Subjects. By the late Rev. Archibald Arthur, M. A., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. With an Account of some Particulars of his Life and Character. By William Richardson, M.A., Professor of Humanity in the University of Glasgow. 8vo. pp. 523. 8s. Boards. Longman and Co.

WE E learn that the discourses here given to the public' were not intended by their author to be published as they now appear. With the exception of three or four, none of them ever seem to have been written over by him twice. The liberty taken in offering them to the public, was from the wish entertained by his near relations, of preserving and doing honour to his memory; which they thought could be done, even though the works to be published were as imperfect as has now been mentioned. In prosecuting their design, they requested the editor to make a selection of such discourses, and present them to the public in such a manner, as would best answer their intention. He undertook the office with much reluctance; and had he been aware of the great difficulty attending it, his reluctance would have been still greater. But his regard for the deceased overcame his objections.'

This regard ought, we think, tó have induced so good a judge to a different determination,at least with reference to the theological part of the volume. It is cruel to expose to the view of the world, those productions which were never de signed by the writer to undergo that ordeal; and the partiality of relatives, who are often altogether incompetent to decide on such matters, should never be deemed of any weight. This remark applies with more force to a public than to a private character. Much might be expected from the person who fills the chair which was once contested by Burke, Hume, and Adam Smith; and therefore here it was not the individual alone who ought to have been considered, but the reputation of a respectable learned body was also involved. If we love the amiable feelings which gave way in this instance, we should have more approved the firmness which would have refused compliance with ill-judged solicitations. It is not difficult, from the above passage, to collect the real sentiments of the editor himself; and we believe that they fully coincide with our own.

Mr. Arthur appears to have been much wedded to the principles of the Scotch Metaphysical School, which pretended to make common sense the basis of its philosophy; and he connects with these principles the great truth which is the subject of his first discourse, the existence of a God, and reasons as if he thought that it could be demonstrated on no others. When he is contented to urge the usual arguments on any of the topics which he considers, he adduces them in an able and agreeable manner; as the following extract exemplifies:

That the universe must have proceeded from a designing cause; and could not possibly have proceeded from a cause without design and intelligence, by whatever name it may be denominated, whether it be called chance, or necessity, or fate, is exceedingly obvious. Nothing beautiful, regular, and orderly, ever proceeded, or can pro ceed, from an undesigning cause. Suppose matter to have existed originally of itself, and to have been endued with motion from eter nity; and suppose that motion to have been continued without di minution; there is no doubt, but these materials, continually agitated, would, in the course of millions of ages, have assumed various forms; but there is no probability, that ever these forms would have been regular; and much less that there should be regularity in all their revolutions, mutual connections, and dependencies. Did ever chance form a machine so regular as a watch? Throw the different wheels, and springs, and pinions, of which a watch is composed, into one vessel; and keep the whole in motion for ages; and after all, neither the whole, nor any part of them, will ever be properly placed and adjusted-Take a case that has often been put in handling this argument. Suppose a triangular prism, with three unequal sides, and a scabbard perfectly adapted to it, to be both set in motion through empty space; grant both of them the power of altering their motions,

and

and of flying up and down in every possible direction, it is infinity to one that they will never meet. Supposing they did meet, it is still infinity to one, that they do not meet in that one particular direction in which the prism will enter its scabbard. If chance, then, cannot effectuate those simple adjustments, to which the design of a child is equal, how can it be imagined that it should adjust the innumerable parts and revolutions in the universe? There is not the slightest shadow of probability to justify such a supposition. Even though chance should sometimes have stumbled upon a regular form, after a variety of trials, in the way that Epicnrus, imagined men, and animals, and vegetables, to have been fashioned; these forms would again have been immediately destroyed, in the same manner that the monstrous appearances that had existed before them, in infinite multitudes, were destroyed, in consequence of the motion and changes of situation, which, upon that supposition, are always going on among the particles of matter. If chance never could arrange unorganized matter into those beautiful and regular forms with which we see it invested; could it, or necessity, or any blind cause, by whatever name it may be called, ever produce a being endued with life, sensation, intelligence, and the power of voluntary action? Can that which has itself no design or understanding, produce a wise and intelligent mind? The supposition is absurd. It is supposing an effect to be produced by an inadequate cause; which is precisely the same thing as to suppose it produced by no cause at all. It is strange that such an opinion should have ever been embraced by philosophers, the folly of which is manifest even to a child. An infant, if its bells on its rattle be taken away, never dreams that they were taken away by nobody, but immediately judges that they were removed by some person or other. Even a dog, if a stone be thrown at him, never imagines that the pain he feels arose without a cause. He either Bies from the place, that he may be exposed to no further sufferings, or he turns with resentment to defend himself."

Mr. Arthur is not equally successful when he is required to meet close reasoning, and to combat subtil disputation. The maxims of his school taught him to regard as replete with danger, Mr. Hume's doctrine relative to cause and effect; and in an evil hour he undertook to refute it. His mode might have proved satisfactory to his pupils, but we suspect that a different fate awaits it when submitted to competent judges. In the much admired Essay on Necessary Connection, Mr. Hume denies that we have any knowlege of power, or of any necessary connection between cause and effect; he also oontends that we are never able to discover any quality which binds these together, and which renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. Here, in the judgment of Mr. Arthur, is laid the corner stone of atheism; and he stoutly sets himself to work to destroy it. It is unfortunate that, in order to clear his way, he has thought it necessary to subvert the foundation of Mr. Locke's philosophy, namely his doctrine on the origin Cc 4

of

of ideas. Finding that Mr. Hume grounded his conclusions on this doctrine, he boldly denies it; tells us that we have many ideas which are neither derived from sensation nor reflection; and produces, as examples, our ideas of substance and identity. He ought first to have proved that we have an idea of substance, before he took the trouble of denying its derivation from certain sources; for it is to be observed that, though he will not allow that it is effected by sensation or reflection, he does not assign to it any other cause. Had the Professor looked into the elementary treatises on logic, he would have seen that the instance which he puts is there stated as being something unknown, in which qualities inhere; so that if the learned lecturer were in the situation of other men, which is that of having ideas only in the cases in which he had knowJege, we fear he would have been at a loss when called to produce this substance. What is our knowlege of any one single object? is it any other than that of its qualities? All beyond is supposition: a substratum in which they unite may or may not exist; whatever the fact may be, it lies beyond our view. The answer of the Philosopher, had the objection been urged to him personally, we conjecture would have been this; "Shew to me that the idea exists, which you maintain does not proceed either from sensation or reflection. In the mean time, I am at liberty to observe, that it is no mighty feat to demonstrate that certain sources are incapable of producing what never did exist. Believing as you did, that such an idea did exist, and negativing the generally received mode of derivation, it would have been condescending in you to have shewn what the source was, whence it did proceed."

The idea of identity,' says Mr. Arthur, is neither derived from sensation nor reflection.' It would be perhaps affecting too great a precision of language, to object to calling that an idea which is made up of several ideas. Identity is a term which involves a proposition, or it may be considered as a general complex idea; let it then be restricted in its application to something determinate'; let it also be analyzed into its component parts; and we shall not find any one of them which may not be traced to the allowed sources. The system of Locke, it seems, then, stands firm against the Professor's attack; and so far Mr. Hume comes off unhurt. We admit that it is because he thinks he has shewn that neither sensation nor reflection furnishes us with ideas of power or necessary connection, that Mr. Hume is led to deny our having any knowlege of these matters."" The reader is aware that the Philosopher discusses less the things themselves, than our knowlege of them; that he does not absolutely controvert their existence, but that he

simply maintains that we have no proof of them; that, as far as our knowlege goes, there is no causation, there is nothing more than constant consequence or conjunction.

In the subsequent passages, the Professor makes liberal concessions to the Philosopher; for he admits that the idea of power cannot be collected from the operations of inanimate objects, and that the relation of cause and effect does not subsist among them:

"None, however, except beings possessed of understanding and will, can properly be said to be endowed with active power; or, to speak more accurately, none but beings possessed of will, are really endowed with it; for understanding is implied in the very notion of will, as no person can will an action of which he has no conception. Hence there is no propriety in ascribing efficiency or power to inanimate objects. Matter is inert, and can have no active power whatever. When we say that the stroke of a club is the cause of the motion of a ball, we use language metaphorically; and we do not really mean that the club is the cause of the motion, but that the intelligent and active being who holds it, and strikes with it, is the cause. The effect is the consequence of volition; and the mind of the agent is connected with it, notwithstanding the intermediate service of the club, no less than it is with those events where there is nothing intermediate, but the swelling of muscles, and the other involuntary motions of the human body. The club itself, we know, possesses no power; and though it and the ball were to be in conjunction for a century, no motion would ensuse from their position. -We are apt to speak of natural causes; we see motion produced in one body by means of another: But the language here is metaphorical, and no man believes that the body, which is considered as the mover, has in itself any power to communicate motion; but is, on the contrary, convinced that its motion is occasioned by something else.'

The notion of power in ourselves differs from the notion of it suggested by the revolutions and changes of the material world. regard to our own power, we feel an inward conviction, by means of which we naturally and involuntarily connect our volition with its consequence.

In observing those laws of the material world, on the contrary, which we usually denominate causes, in conjunction with the events which happen agrecably to them, we perceive no such natural and intimate connection. With respect to natural effects, we must gather our knowledge from experience and observation; and after collecting a variety of instances, must determine the law to be universal or par tial. In this case, we are not judging, in reality, concerning cause and effect; we are gathering general conclusions from inductions of particulars; we are not thinking of power at all; nor do we speak of cause and effect, unless in a metaphorical and analogical sense. Power and efficiency are the attributes of a voluntary and intelligent agent, and of him only. Mind is the only cause with which we are acquainted; and in consequence of its exertions only, can effects be produced.'