SER VIII. Being and Being in Union, does not make a-Plurality of Beings, which acquits them from the Charge of Polytheism, clears the Orthodox likewife from the Imputation of Tritheifm. If this Principle does not hold true, they must confequentially maintain an Infinity of Gods; if it does, we cannot be. faid to maintain a Trinity of Gods.

It is not material to examine, whether the Hypothefis of Extenfion is true or false; the Principle, upon which alone the Patrons of it can be vindicated from the Charge of afferting a Multitude of Deities, will ftand it's Ground.

Let us try the whole Force of Me taphyfics; let us think as much as poffible upon the Stretch; yet, after the utmost Expence of Thought, the only Conceptions we can frame of the divine Unity are Indivifibility and Simplicity; the one amounting to no more than a Negation of Divifion, and the other of any foreign or heterogeneous Mixtures. He who from these two negative Ideas would pofitively infer, that there must be only one Perfon in the divine Nature, muft form a Demonftration, where he has not fufficient Data to build upon. It is hard to fix a positive Principle

Principle of Individuation, from whence SER. VIII. we may clearly argue, even in finite Beings. I know fome make Confcioufnefs the Ground of Unity: But then what is the Ground of Consciousness? Nothing can be the Ground, Reason, or Principle of any Thing, which is, in the Order of our Ideas and of Nature, fubfequent to the Thing, of which it is fuppofed to be the Ground, But Consciousness is fubfequent to the Unity; and therefore not the Ground of it, Confcioufness is that reflex Act, by which I know what I am: Now, if I must be what I am, (one or more) before I know what I am; then Confcioufnefs must be fubSequent to the Unity. The being what I am, must be the Foundation of my knowing what I am, and not vice verfâ. Consciousness, a perfonal Act, does not conftitute but presuppose, the Perfonality, from which the perfonal Act refults. It may be added, that, if we are only one because confcious; then we put off Unity, like our Clothes, when we lye down and fall asleep; and refume it again when we awake. This Scheme bears a near Refemblance to his, who made Neceffity a mere Mode of Exiftence, in the Order of our Ideas, antece

SER. VIII. dent to, and the Ground of, the Substance, whofe Mode and Attribute it is: Just so, this Hypothefis fuppofes Confcioufnefs to be the Ground of an Identity, which must be prior to the Confcioufnefs. We cannot justly argue, that we are confcious we are one-therefore we are one: The Process of the Argument should be thus; We are one-therefore we are confcious we are one? The Truth of our confcious Knowledge depending upon the Nature of Things; and not the Nature of Things upon our conscious Knowledge.

Difmiffing therefore Confcioufnefs as the Ground of Unity, we can advance no farther, than that Maxim of the Schools, Unum eft indivifum in fe. The Perfons then are each Being becaufe they exist, invefted with distinct Offices and peculiar Relations; but not Beings, because they do not exift feparately.

And this puts me in Mind, fecondly, of another Objection; that if Union of Subftance with Subftance, conftitutes one Subftance; then Union of Perfons with each other must conftitute one Perfon.

But to this I answer, that the Objection fuppofes Unity of Perfon and Substance to

be

be the fame, which wants to be proved. SER.VIII. We use the Word Plurality of Perfons to express that the Substance, however united,

is

yet diftinguished by appropriate Relations, as that of a Son to a Father, and by distinct Offices: Whereas Plurality of Subftances implies, the Subftance to be divided or divifible. So many feparable Perfons are so many Substances; but Perfons, incapable of any Difunion or Divifion, are one Subftance. Obferving that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are every where, in Scripture, dignified with the fame infinite Perfections of Power, Knowledge, &c. and invested with the fame effential Attributes; we conclude, they have all the fame Effence; the Effence being nothing but an Affemblage of all the effential Attributes: But finding, that they have likewife perfonal Properties, distinct Offices and Relations, we conclude they are diftinct Perfons.

It may be objected, that the Son is not felf-existent: And if not self-existent, then not neceffarily exiftent. But I reply, the Ideas are distinct: The former implying, whence a Being is; the latter, what he is: Self-exiftent, that the Being is of none; neceffarily-existent, that the Being immuGg 4 tably

tably exifts: The one is a mere negative Idea, being only a Negation of any Caufe of Existence; the latter implies fomething pofitive, viz. Permanency, Stability, and an infinite Ability to exist. The Son, though he is of the Father, and therefore not self-existent; yet is neceffarily-existent, being the Jehovah, the ro ov, and is coeternal with the Father: Just as Thought, however fubfequent in the Order of our Ideas, is co-eval with an eternal thinking Mind. Nor is there any more Difficulty, in the Notion of an eternal Reference of the Son to the Father, than there is in the Notion of Eternity itself. It is ridiculous to object that God is a felf-existent Perfon, of all poffible Perfections. For if the Objectors can prove, that Self-Existence and neceffary Existence are fynonymous Terms, then the Logos must be felf-exiftent, because he is neceffarily exiftent: and indeed the Nature is felf-exiftent, though the Perfonality proceeds from the Father by such a neceffary and eternal Act, as thofe, whereby he loves, enjoys and contemplates himself. But if neceffary Existence be distinct from Self-Exiftence; Self-Exiftence, as diftinct from neceffary Exiftence, does not imply