As we

spect from other developed religious systems. have seen, the mysteries were instituted for exactly the same object as the teachings of Gautama had in view. The aim of Christianity itself, although its morality is certainly of a nobler type, was the deliverance of man from the consequences of sin, if not metempsychosis, yet future punishment such as has been supplied by modern Buddhism. The practical virtue of the latter system depends no doubt on its moral influence, and yet Gautama, judged of by the aim of his teaching, is rightly viewed as a Saviour or Redeemer, rather than as a mere moralist. Dr Muir, in drawing attention to the application of that title to Gautama,' says that "Kumârila Bhatta, a renowned Brahmanical opponent of the Buddhists, while charging Buddha with presumption and transgression of the rules of his caste, in assuming the functions of a religious teacher (with which, as belonging to the Kshattriya, and not to the Brahmanical class, he had no right to interfere) ascribes to him these words, 'Let all the evils (or sins) flowing from the corruption of the Kali age (the fourth or most degenerate age of the world) fall upon me, but let the world be redeemed!”” Nevertheless, as Dr Muir remarks, there is no reference here to vicarious atonement, but only an "enthusiastic utterance of highly-strung moral sympathy and charity," such as that which Saint Paul expressed when he said "I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren."

It is almost inseparable from such a system as that founded by Gautama, that the moral duty which it enforced must sooner or later come to be interpreted in so narrow a spirit as to nearly preclude the benevolent conduct towards others which had so much value in the eyes of its founder. Prof. Max Müller does, indeed, say

1 Trübner's "Literary Record," Feb. 28th, 1871, p. 95.

of Buddhism that "the morality which it teaches is not a morality of expediency and rewards. Virtue is not enjoined because it necessarily leads to happiness. No, virtue is to be practised, but happiness is to be shunned, and the only reward for virtue is that it subdues the passions, and thus prepares the human mind for that knowledge which is to end in complete annihilation."1 This is true, in one sense, but it should be remembered that the reward of virtue, is valued only as a means of escaping what Gautama taught to be the most miserable fate. Although virtue was not practised directly for the sake of happiness, yet indirectly it was so; since it ensured deliverance from the misery of existence. Its object, Prof. Max Müller himself asserts, was "to guide each individual towards that path which would finally bring him to Nirvâna, to utter extinction or annihilation. The very definitive of virtue was that it helped man to cross over to the other shore, and that other shore was not death, but cessation of all being. Thus charity was considered a virtue; modesty, patience, courage, contemplation, and science, all were virtues, but they were practised only as a means of arriving at deliverance." This passage cannot be accepted as giving a correct idea of the nature of Nirvana, but it well reveals the weak point in the moral system of Buddha. Its sanctions are essentially selfish. Virtue has no value in itself, and virtuous action, as could only be expected of a system which treats contemplation and metaphysical knowledge as virtues, is not measured by the benefits it confers on others. Universal love and benevolence are enjoined, and they were practised by Gautama and his immediate disciples, but their ultimate object was the benefit of self; and it is not surprising, therefore, that when the traditional influence of Gautama's example grew weak, 2 Do., p. 249.

1" Op cit." vol. i., p. 248.

the means were almost lost sight of in the end, and the necessity of charity took a secondary place in Buddhistic teaching.

"1

To enforce that benevolent action is commendable, not because it is right in itself, or as pleasing to God, but because it will aid in preserving the agent from a much dreaded evil, is to ensure that it shall finally cease, unless some healthier motive for it is provided. And such seems to have been the result in those countries where Buddhism at present prevails. Sir John Bowring says "The real and invincible objection to Buddhism is its selfishness, its disregard of others, its deficiency in all the promptings of sympathy and benevolence. Its highest virtue is fruitless contemplation; its noblest reward is to be found in eternal repose." This is said in relation, more especially, to the Buddhism of Siam; but it appears to be the same in all other Buddhist countries.2 How far the development of the selfish side of Buddhism had to do with its downfall in India may perhaps be questioned. Major Cunningham asserts that it was "a natural consequence of closing all roads to salvation, save the difficult path which led from one grade to another of the monastic orders. No layman could hope to be saved; and even the most zealous votary must have felt that the standard of excellence was too lofty to be reached. Absolute faith, perfect virtue, and supreme knowledge, were indispensable ; without these, no man could attain Buddhahood, and final freedom from transmigration. Continued celibacy, abstinence, and privations, were expected from all who had taken the vows; and a long course of prayer, penance, and devout abstraction, were requisite before

and

1 "The Kingdom and People of Siam" (1857), vol. i. p. 297. 2 Mr Spence Hardy insists strongly on this point. See "Eastern Monachism," p. 343 seq.

the votary could gain the rank of Arhata or Bodhisatwa. But as this was the only path to salvation, people of all ranks flocked to the monasteries," taking the vows of celibacy, abstinence, and poverty. The daily begging for subsistence of the early converts was no longer required, as the finest lands in the country had been alienated for the support of the monasteries. The inhabitants of these were envied by the people, and their wealth coveted by the rulers, and when finally this was seized, "the people looked on unmoved, and would not defend what they had long ceased to respect, and the colossal figure of Buddhism, which had once bestridden the whole continent of India, vanished suddenly like a rainbow at sunset."1 The fall of the re

ligion of Gautama seems to be ascribed here to defects probably inherent in the monastic system. It is evident, however, that it must be traced ultimately to the source previously indicated. Buddhism is strictly a "Path of Salvation," and so soon as freedom from metempsychosis was sought to be attained by other than moral means, it would lose its high moral tone, and with this, its hold on the popular mind.

Sir Emerson Tennent, when speaking of the moral influence of Buddhism, remarks that "both socially and in its effects upon individuals, the result of the system in Ceylon has been apathy almost approaching to infidelity. Even as regards the tenets of their creed, the mass of the population exhibit the profoundest ignorance, and manifest the most irreverent indifference. In their daily intercourse and acts, morality and virtue, so far from being apparent in practice, are barely discernible as the exception. Neither hopes nor apprehensions have proved a sufficient restraint on the habitual violation of all those precepts of charity and honesty, of 1 "The Bhilsa Topes" (1854), p. 167.

purity and truth, which form the very essence of their doctrine; and in proportion as its tenets have been slighted by the people, its priesthood are disregarded, and its temples universally neglected and in ruin.”1 Elsewhere the same writer, after making the questionable statement that "a sense of abstract right and wrong is a moral element of human nature," adds that 'in none are its dictates more perverted, more torpid, and more uninfluential than amongst the unenlightened Singhalese. Conscience in them can scarcely be said to be seared, for its impulses are but imperfectly awakened, and even when excited, they fail to echo to the appeals of truth, or but imperfectly respond to them. Shame and compunction are sensations comparatively unknown; the senses rather than the soul become the monitors of the man; the spiritual and the remote suggest no motive impulses; and virtue and vice are terms which acquire relation only through the interests and passions of the moment." It must not be thought that Buddhism has had no real ameliorating influence over the social life of the peoples professing it. So far from this being the case, it has probably permanently raised the general moral tone of society, although from Sir Emerson Tennent's description it would seem to be incapable of being lowered, in Ceylon at least. Among particular results, it has effected great improvement in the condition of the female sex. Father Bigandet says, in relation to women in Burmah and Siam-and it appears to be true also of other countries that "their social position is more elevated in every respect than that of the persons of their sex in the regions where Buddhism is not the predominating creed. They may be said to be man's companions, and