3

latter, the extension of the principle of altruism to the members of the animal kingdom, is the natural consequence of their association with man as organs of the Grand-Etre, and as possessing the germs of all the moral and intellectual attributes fully developed in man,' while that extension in the former case, is probably connected with the doctrine of emanations so prevalent among eastern peoples. The positivist system may be thought to agree with that of Gautama in another important particular. The former knows nothing of a future life, death of the body being also that of the soul.2 Such also is, according to usual opinion, the teaching of Buddhism. The Nirvana of this system, however, is not actual annihilation of being. As has been shown in a preceding chapter, it is simply the extinction of all desire, accompanied by the loss of personal consciousness in an all-absorbing sense of oneness with the divine It is thus distinguished from the absorption of Hindu religious philosophy, although evidently founded on the same idea as to the relationship of the individual soul to the universal soul. The incorporation of the individual after death in the Grand-Etre, is not unlike the doctrine of absorption, which also implies the loss of separate existence. Comte, however, does not admit the possibility of a future life, even in this modified sense, and still less does he allow it to those human beings who are not worthy of incorporation into the Grand-Etre. His system has nothing, therefore, in common with the doctrine of transmigration, which is known to Buddhism no less than to Hinduism, as the consequence of a condition of moral impurity.

essence.

The absence from the system of Auguste Comte of a belief in a future state of existence removes an element

1 Barthelemy St Hilaire, p. 614, 672, seq.

2

op. cit., p. 586.

3

Supra, p. 291.

which has had a seriously deteriorating influence over the practice and principles of Buddhism. The object of Gautama's teaching was to make known to man the way to secure personal salvation, i.e., the deliverance from the evils of metempsychosis, and his morality, therefore, was not of so high a type as that of Comte, which requires the exercise of universal benevolence, not for the sake of self, but for that of others. The system of Auguste Comte is, indeed, founded on the entire abnegation of self, and on the necessity of living for others as a duty owing to them as organic parts of the GrandEtre humanity. This is certainly a noble thought, and yet as a principle of action it constitutes a serious defect. Buddhism, owing to its being in reality founded on essentially egoistic principles, ultimately became in most of its developments a system of pure selfishness.1 The Positivist religion, on the other hand, being based on the benevolent sentiments, must become purely altruistic. This, probably, would be no reproach in the eyes of Auguste Comte, whose adoption of the motto vivre pour autrui shows that he considered the cultivation of those sentiments as the chief aim of life. While not losing sight of the other side of human nature, the positivist treats the exercise of the intellectual powers as strictly subordinate to that of the moral attributes. In this he is correct so far as the ultimate test of the propriety of action may be said to be its effect on the moral nature of the agent, but not in the more exact sense required by the positive philosophy. According to the positivist view there is an intimate and special harmony between these two orders of functions. Comte Comte says, "L'altruisme, quand il est énergique, se montre toujours plus propre que l'égoïsme à diriger et stimuler l'intelligence, même chez les animaux. Il lui fournit un champ plus vaste,

1 Supra, p. 278.

un but plus difficile, et même une participation plus indispensable. Sous ce dernier aspect surtout, on ne sent point assez que l'égoïsme n'a besoin d'aucune intelligence pour apprécier l'objet de son affection, mais seulement pour découvrir les moyens d'y satisfaire. Au contraire, l'altruisme exige, en outre, une assistance mentale afin de connaître même l'être extérieur vers lequel il tend toujours. L'existence sociale ne fait que développer davantage cette solidarité naturelle, d'aprés la difficulté supérieure de comprendre l'objet collectif de la sympathie. Mais déjà la vie domestique en manifeste nettement la nécessité constante, chez toutes les espèces bien organisées.

" 1

L'in

That which is opposed to sociability, however, is not the intellect, the development of which is declared to be aided by altruism, but "self" with its egoistical instincts. Between these a continual conflict has been waged from the moment that action ceased to have relation only to self. This was not until the maternal instinct, called into existence through the exercise of the function of reproduction, profoundly modified the fundamental personality. Comte says as to this: "Il y suscite une ébauche, toujours touchante et souvent admirable, de la vie de famille, première base de la vie sociale. telligence propre à chaque organisme se trouve excitée par une destination qui n'est plus purement individuelle. Ses calculs sont même poussés ainsi au delà du besoin actuel, de manière à ébaucher la liaison de l'avenir au passé. Cessant d'être entièrement dominée par les instincts personnels, l'existence devient susceptible d'une certaine discipline morale, en s'adaptant à un ordre extérieur, envers lequel l'affection commence à tempèrer la nécessite." 2 The defect in Comte's system before referred to becomes evident when it is thus seen that Supra, p. 693. Supra, p. 601.

2

altruism is based on the maternal instinct. When tracing the genesis of moral ideas, it was shown that the development of that instinct can never do more than give rise to the active virtues, and that these are preceded by another series which, owing to their fundamental character as depending on the instinct of selfpreservation, are more important than the later ones. The idea of duty, which is essential to a system of morals, is, indeed, wholly wanting to the benevolent sympathies, when these are divorced from the passive virtues based on the instinct of self-preservation. Admirable, therefore, as the object of Auguste Comte's moral teaching may be, it would be found to be practically inoperative if applied on a wide scale, owing to the impossibility of deducing from its principles the idea of duty on which their moral efficacy depends. No doubt for those who have derived that idea from some other source, the new religion of humanity may supply every incentive necessary to ensure a life of the most perfect morality. It would be otherwise, however, with those who first applied themselves to the positivist cult for moral guidance. If their minds were prepared by the instruction which Positivism declares to be requisite, no doubt they would, if intellectually capable of such appreciation, be struck with the loftiness of its moral sentiment. In the presence of the conflict between sociability and personality, however, they would seek in vain for any firm moral basis. Nor could it be otherwise. Apart from the sense of right which is inextricably bound up with that personality, benevolence can be supported by sentiment alone, the predominating influence of which, however beneficial for a time and under certain conditions, must ultimately result in moral anarchy. The positivist, no doubt, would demur to this conclusion. He declares that duty follows directly upon

the relation of the individual to humanity, altruism thus containing its own moral sanction. This doubtless is so, if the individual stands in the special relation to humanity which Positivism teaches, that is, assuming the principles of the religion of humanity to be well founded. But if the relation of individuals to each other, as forming parts of a common organic whole, be of secondary and not of primary importance, the idea of duty does not necessarily arise. That it exists cannot be questioned, but it has a totally different foundation from that supposed by the positivist. This is proved by the reference made in support of his position to the special relations between individuals, as parent and child, master and servant, as also to that between a citizen and the state, from all of which duty is supposed to directly spring. It is not so, however, in reality. Reference to the principles laid down in the preceding pages,1 will show that the genesis of the idea of duty in these cases is dependent on the preceding perception and recognition of certain rights which have their basis in the egoistic instincts. And so also must it be with the duty which the individual owes to humanity at large. Instead of following directly upon a peculiar relation supposed to subsist between the individual and the organic whole, it is based on the egoistic instincts, and in this case also the idea of duty is the result of a process of genesis.2

The fact is that Comte, owing to his treating man as part of the Grand-Etre rather than in his individual. character, has subordinated too much the personality, with its so-called selfish instincts, to social feeling. He declares that "to the Positivist the object of Morals is to make our sympathetic instincts predominate as far as possible over the selfish instincts; social feelings over 1 Supra, vol. i., p. 296 seq. Supra, vol. i., p. 414 seq.

2