of such an existence, those who think that philosophy has to do with something more than the mere laws which govern the development of the Grand-Etre will not allow themselves to be thus limited. It is impossible not to

be struck with the resemblance between M. Comte's conception and the ancient notion of the earth being a living organism, of which plants and animals are outgrowths. No doubt Comte's conception is superior to that. Instead of the earth being endowed with a soul, this is given to the organic whole, which is gradually evolved as its vegetable and animal organs are formed and perfected, matter being entirely subordinated. Practically, however, the earth, and all the existences which it contains and which are dependent upon it, form a totality, every part of which bears a certain relation to the GrandEtre thus constituted. In this totality, however, may we not have an existence which bears the same relation to some more widely extended organism as that in which each man or animal stands to the Grand-Etre of Comte? Every man is a microcosm in himself, embodying all the elements which may be found separately or in less complex union in other portions of the organic whole, but the parasite on the body of a man would certainly be in error if it were to declare that he is the Grand-Etre. So, also, the man, who can see beyond this globe, and who has faculties by the exercise of which he can be reasonably satisfied that the earth with its various organic forms must stand in some definite relation to the other worlds which surround him on every side, apparently in endless series, may safely assert that, although for some purposes "Humanity" is to him a Grand-Etre, yet that there must be a greater whole which includes even humanity itself as one only of its parts, the Infinite Existence.

The only real objection to the recognition of this as a

en

fact sufficiently probable to furnish the warrant for religious belief, arises from the scientific principles of Positivism, according to which it is useless to speculate as to first causes, and therefore, as to the existence of an absolutely Supreme Being. But, if the mind cannot do without an object of actual worship, some such a conception as this must be accepted even by Positivists themselves, since their Grand-Etre is not, as will now be shown, in reality a fitting object for religious reverence. This may seem strange, considering that the new religion of humanity has been thoroughly elaborated by its author in every detail. The truth of the statement, however, requires little proof after the description of the GrandEtre already given in Comte's own words. How can that be a fit object of worship which, notwithstanding its immensity and eternity, is subordinated to the " semble de l'ordre extérieur," which has only gradually been developed under the conditions furnished by that order, the immutability of which constitutes "la première base systématique de la religion finale, pour régler et rallier, non seulement nos opinions et nos actions, mais aussi nos affections elles-mêmes." 2 Not only, however, has the Grand-Etre no existence as such until the appearance of man on the earth, but its attributes, as being those of existences "suffisamment assimilables," must depend on the intellect and moral conduct of particular human beings. Viewed in this light, the Grand-Etre of Auguste Comte is as unsatisfactory, considered as an object of worship, as the idol-fetiche. Of course the conception is vastly superior, but, as depending altogether on man himself, they are equally wanting in the elements required to constitute a fitting object for the exercise of the religious emotions; an opinion which would seem to be consistent at least with Comte's asser1 Op. cit., p. 449. 2 Do., p. 504.

tion that the positivist religion is a rehabilitation of fetichism.1

It is the dependence of the Supreme Being on man which shocks the ordinary religious sense. If the Grand-Etre were an actual organic existence which, by a process of incarnation, becomes revealed as man, its worship could be understood, since, being antecedent to man, and the source of his being, it would possess the elements necessary to constitute an object of reverential regard. But it is far otherwise with a Being which, taking its rise from man himself, could not have existed before him, and which can never possess the moral or intellectual superiority to man looked for in an object of worship, seeing that its intelligence or morality is simply that of the human beings which have been incorporated with it. How far, indeed, the Grand-Etre of Comte can be said to have any real existence is a question. It is possible to understand that mankind, as represented by the individuals who have from age to age lived and been agents in the great work of human culture, constitutes an organic whole. But the Grand-Etre receives only those who have, not merely passed away from this life, but have really ceased to exist, except in the memory of succeeding generations, and its existence, therefore, may well be declared to be no more actual than that of the individuals whose memory rather than whose being it has incorporated.

The majority of earnest thinkers, even among Positivists themselves, will probably be of the opinion that the true value of the conception of the Grand-Etre is moral rather than religious. The recognition of humanity as an organic whole, towards which every individual bears a definite relation and owes certain duties, forms in some respect an advance even on the Christian idea

1 Politique Positive, vol. ii. p. 135.

of humanity as a brotherhood. In Christianity, as in all earlier religions, moral obligation in relation to others is more or less subordinated to the salvation" of the individual; whereas, with Auguste Comte, universal love is the first principle of action, founded on the claims of the Grand-Etre, which include those of each of its individual organs. So far then as the conception of "humanity" requires the generalisation of the idea of duty as between man and his fellow, it is of the utmost value. It constitutes a moral organisation which the selfish element innate in all earlier religiomoral systems prevented them from ever effecting. As an apostle of humanity, therefore, Auguste Comte, who may be said first to have clearly formed that conception, deserves the grateful recollection of all men interested in moral and social progress, and there is little doubt that his name is destined to be handed down to posterity in connection with a movement which, if rightly directed, may almost amount to a moral regeneration of mankind. It by no means follows, however, that the superstructure which Comte has raised on the basis of "Humanity," will be that which is fated to be worked out in the future. The conception of mankind as an organic existence, which has undergone, and is still undergoing, a process of development destined to result in the attainment of a physical and mental perfection, is not restricted to Positivism. Comte has, however, the merit of having entered more fully into the conception, and of having been the first to point out its bearings on the development of man's intellectual and moral nature, if, indeed, any other writer can be said to have done so. He has, moreover, so thoroughly worked out the conception, that there is little left for positivists to do beyond applying and carrying out the principles which their master has laid down, if not established. It may

be doubted, indeed, whether there are many persons outside of the positivist circle who have any idea of the completeness of Comte's design, and of its execution. The system of Positivism is truly original. It not only forms a synthesis of the whole of human progress, coordinating the various phenomena, intellectual and moral, which accompanied it, and formulating the laws which govern its gradual development, but it seeks to fix the goal towards which humanity is tending, and to ensure its attainment by the control of all man's powers and the systematic direction of all his moral and intellectual activity.

The marvellous product of Comte's thought is truly a philosophy of humanity, having for its aim the social regeneration of mankind on the basis of a perfect morality. When considered in this light, the Positive Philosophie and the Positive Politique are seen to be essential to each other as integral parts of a general design. Thus the rejection of the Politique destroys the very motive for the Philosophie, as the destruction of this cuts away the base of the Politique. While, however, we grant to Comte the admiration required by his genius, which displays itself, not only in the conception of humanity as a Grand-Etre, but in the scientific expression of the laws which govern its development and their application to the explanation of the phenomena of human progress, it is not necessary to accept all the principles which he has enforced. This is true particularly in relation to his moral system, and still more so with reference to the notions which are embodied in the religion of humanity. The latter, indeed, is not essential to Positivism, which it can hardly be doubted was originally intended by its author to be a purely moral synthesis. When once, however, mankind was conceived of as an organic existence, subject to the same laws of development as, and