propriety a law, because it really is fo, not lefs than the fenfe of juftice. If by law be meant a rule of conduct that we are conscious ought to be obeyed, this definition, which I conceive to be ftrictly accurate, is applicable undoubtedly to both. The fenfe of propriety includes this consciousness; for to say an action is proper, is, in other words, to say, that it ought to be performed; and to fay it is improper, is, in other words, to fay, that it ought to be forborn. It is this very consciousness of ought and should included in the moral fenfe, that makes justice a law to us. This consciousness of duty, when applied to propriety, is perhaps not so vigorous or ftrong as when applied to justice: but the difference is in degree only, not in kind and we ought, without hesitation or reluctance, to fubmit equally to the government of both. But I have more to urge upon this head. It muft, in the next place, be obferved, that to the fense of propriety as well as of justice are annexed the fanctions of rewards and 'punishments; which evidently prove the one to be a law as well as the other. The fatisfaction fatisfaction a man hath in doing his duty, joined with the esteem and good-will of others, is the reward that belongs to both equally. The punishments alfo, though not the fame, are nearly allied; and differ in degree more than in quality. Difobedience to the law of juftice, is punished with remorfe ; difobedience to the law of propriety, with fhame, which is remorfe in a lower degree. Every tranfgreffion of the law of juftice raises indignation in the beholder; and fo doth every flagrant tranfgreffion of the law of propriety. Slighter improprieties receive a milder punishment: they are always rebuked with fome degree of contempt, and frequently with derifion. In general, it is true, that the rewards and punishments annexed to the fenfe of propriety are flighter in degree than those annexed to the sense of juftice. And that this is wifely ordered, will appear from confidering, that to the well-being of fociety, duty to others is ftill more effential than duty to ourselves; for fociety could not fubfift a moment, were individuals not protected from the headstrong and turbulent paffions of their neighbours. Reflecting Reflecting coolly and carefully upon the fubject under confideration, the constitution of man, admirable in all its parts, appears here in a fine light. The final cause now unfolded of the sense of propriety, must, to every difcerning eye, appear delightful; and yet hitherto we have given but a partial view of it. The sense of propriety reaches another illustrious end; which is, to co-operate with the sense of justice in inforcing the performance of focial duties. In fact, the fanctions vifibly contrived to compel a man to be just to himself, are equally ferviceable to compel him to be just to others. This will be evident from a single reflection, That an action, by being unjuft, ceases not to be improper. An action never appears more eminently improper, than when it is unjust. It is obviously becoming and fuitable to human nature, that each man do his duty to others; and accordingly every tranfgreffion of duty with respect to others, is at the fame time a tranfgreffion of duty with respect to self. This is an undisguised truth without exaggeration; and it opens a new and delightful view in the moral land scape. fcape. The profpect is greatly enriched, by the multiplication of agreeable objects. It appears now, that nothing is overlooked, nothing left undone, that can poffibly contribute to the enforcing social duty. For to all the fanctions that belong to it fingly, are fuperadded the fanctions of felf-duty. A familiar example fhall fuffice for illuftration. An act of ingratitude confidered in itself, is to the author disagreeable as well as to every spectator: considered by the author with relation to himself, it raises self-contempt; confidered by him with relation to the world, it makes him afhamed. Again, confidered by others, it raifes their contempt and indignation against the author. These feelings are all of them'occafioned by the impropriety of the action. When the action is confidered as unjuft, it occafions another set of feelings. In the author it produces remorse, and a dread of merited punishment; and in others, the benefactor chiefly, indignation and hatred directed upon the ungrateful person. Thus shame and remorse united in the ungrateful VOL. II. D perfon, |