eccentricity and vigour, the desolate condition to which an actualized Idealism brings the mind: 'The worst of all is the pinched, aimless, perked-up, insular life that a god must live. He has no society. If I am not (as the idealistic Ego) to sit still all the time and to all eternity, if I am to let myself down as well as I can, and make myself finite, just to have something about me, I shall be like the poor little princes; I shall have nothing about me but my own servile creatures to echo my words.' 'Any being whatever the Supreme Being himself, if you choose-wishes something to love, something to honour. But Fichte's doctrine of every man his own body-maker leaves me nothing at all, not even the beggar's dog or the prisoner's spider. For, granted that those two animals existed, the dog, the spider, and I would only have the nine pictures which we would paint of ourselves and of each other, but we would not have each other.' Something better than myself-that better something to which the flame of love leaps up-is not, if Idealism be true, to be had. The mantle of love, which for ages has been narrowed to the canonical four fingers' breadth of the bishop's pallium, now goes up in a blaze, and the only thing a man has left to love is his own love. Verily I wish there were such things as men, and I wish I were one of them.' 'If it has fallen to my lot, unhappy dog that I am, that nobody really exists but myself, nobody is as badly off as I am.' 'No sort of enthusiasm is left me but logical enthusiasm. All my metaphysics, chemistry, technology, nosology, botany, entomology, runs down into the old principle, Know thyself. I am not merely, as Bellarmin says, my own Saviour, but I am also my own devil, my own messenger of death, and master of the knout in ordinary to my own majesty. Around me stretches humanity, turned to stone. In the dark, desolate stillness glows no love, no admiration, no prayer, no hope, no aim. I am so utterly alone! no pulsation, no life, anywhere. Nothing about me, and, without me, nothing but nothing. Thus come I out of eternity, thus go I into eternity. And who hears my plaints and knows me now? Ego. Who shall hear me and who shall know me to all eternity? Ego.'

19. The picture drawn by Jean Paul is gloomy enough, yet it has a solitary point of light and relief. The Ego itself is left: one

only, it is true, but each man will consider that his own. And it is the fact that Idealism is supposed to leave this great something secure that has given it a fascination to men, who feared that other systems would leave them nothing, not even themselves. A self-conscious, a possibly immortal, something,-this, at least, is gain.

When everything else sinks in the ocean of idealistic nothingness, does not the personal Ego stand unshaken, a rock towering in solitary grandeur above the sweep of all the billows of speculative doubt? On that long line of coast, chafed by waves which ever pile it with fresh wrecks, will not that rock of personal consciousness furnish a base for one light-house of the mind? Alas! no; for the logic of Idealism robs us of consciousness of self. If, as Berkeley and all Idealists assert, ideas without correlate realities are the only objects of knowledge, the personal mind itself is either mere idea or it is unknown.

Idealism can only affirm 'There is consciousness,' but it does not know what is conscious. If the Ego be assumed to be the object of knowledge, it is in that very fact transmuted into idea; it is the mirage of a mirage. Two things which God hath joined together cannot be put asunder without loss to both. The murder of matter is the suicide of mind.

20. Tested, then, by its own logic, where does Idealism end? We shall not answer the question for it, but accept the answer of its pure and great representative, Fichte. 'There is,' says he,' 'nothing permanent, either within me or external to me. All is ceaseless change. I know of no being, not even of my own. There is no being. I know nothing and am nothing. There are images: they are the only things which exist, and they know of themselves after the manner of images, -images which hover by, without there being anything which they hover by,-which hang together by images of images,images which have nothing to image, unmeaning and aimless. I myself am one of these images. Nay, I am not so much as that; I am only a confused image of images. All reality is changed to a marvellous dream, without a life which is dreamed of, without a mind which dreams; a dream which hangs together in a

⚫ Bestimmung des Menschen, 142.

dream of itself. Intuition is the dream; thought-the source of all the being and of all the reality which I frame to myself, source of my being, source of my power, source of my aims-is the dream of that dream.'

XV. Characteristics of the Present Edition.

It is designed that the present edition of the great philosophical Classic of Berkeley shall be in every respect the standard one.

I. It contains the text of the Principles given in Berkeley's works, collected and edited by Alexander Campbell Fraser, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. This edition was printed in 1871, at the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 4 vols. 8vo, the fourth containing a life of Berkeley.

The text of the English edition is thoroughly critical, printed with great accuracy, giving the various readings of all the editions of the Principles. The present text is a careful reproduction of that of Fraser, except that a few typographical errata have been corrected, after collation with the other editions. It is claimed for the present text of Berkeley that it is more accurate than any other.

2. It contains the entire illustrations by which Professor Fraser has enriched his edition of the Principles,-his Preface and Notes, which are entirely worthy of his reputation as a thorough scholar, an acute thinker, and a brilliant writer. His notes are historical, critical, and exegetical; they imply admiration of Berkeley, and a sympathy, though not a blind or indiscriminate one, in his general thinking. They largely concur in Berkeleyanism, partly qualify it, and in certain directions aim at developing it.

3. To the Principles have been added three Appendixes of great value. The first is 'Berkeley's Rough Draft of the Introduction to the Principles.' It possesses a biographical and literary, as well as a philosophical interest,' illustrating the rise and growth of one of the most extraordinary productions of human speculation. The second appendix gives an account of Arthur Collier; who nearly cotemporaneously with Berkeley, and in entire independence on him, reached the same general results as to the nonexistence of an external world. To this account is added the Introduction to Collier's Clavis Universalis. The third appendix

is 'The Theory of Vision Vindicated' by a number of the most important instances of the 'experience of persons born blind.' Cheselden's paper is reprinted entire, and Mr. Nunnely's account of a case, 'one of the last and most philosophically described,' is given unabridged. These cases have a special, bearing on Berkeley's theory, but they are of great importance in their relation to all the theories of sense-perception, and have an interest to thoughtful readers of all classes.

4. In this edition will be found the entire notes and illustrations of Dr. Frederick Ueberweg, late Professor of Philosophy in the University of Königsberg. In the Philosophische Bibliothek,' edited by J. H. von Kirchmann, which is confined to the masterworks of philosophy in ancient and modern times, the first work from an English hand is Berkeley's Principles. The preparation of it was intrusted to Ueberweg, one of the greatest scholars of our age. He is known to English readers by the translation of his Logic and of his History of Philosophy. His estimates and critiques on Berkeley are admirable. Thoroughly appreciative of the greatness of Berkeley and the value of his views, the adverse judgments of Ueberweg are the more important. It may be fairly claimed for his notes that they present some of the best estimates and critiques ever made in connection with Berkeley's system, and that they have done something toward that confutation of Berkeley's Idealism which some of his admirers have pronounced impossible. Ueberweg says that his notes are essential to the completion of his work on Logic. The many English readers who possess and value Ueberweg's Logic will on that account, were there no other, be glad to have his notes on Berkeley.

To the notes of Fraser and of Ueberweg the editor has added much that is important and interesting from the best sources, with a large amount of original matter. These notes of Ueberweg and of the editor are numbered, and at the points at which they illustrate the text there will be found in it the numbers of the notes, in heavy brackets [ ]. The subjects of the notes are given in their titles. In the various annotations will be found. the most important parallels and illustrations of the Principles furnished by Berkeley himself in his other works.

5. The editor has prepared extended PROLEGOMENA, embracing -A Sketch of Berkeley's Life and Writings; an Account of his Precursors; Summaries of his System; Berkeleyanism: its Friends, Affinities, and Influence; Opponents and Objections; Estimates of Berkeley: his Character, Writings, and Influence; Idealism Defined; History, Outlines, and Criticisms of the Idealistic Systems, from Berkeley to the Present; Hume; Kant; Fichte; Schelling; Hegel; Schopenhauer; The Strength and Weakness of Idealism.

6. This edition contains a very full Analytical Index to every part of the work.

7. As the attention of all readers of philosophical works is now drawn to the great German thinkers, and as the metaphysical terminology of that language has peculiar niceties and peculiar difficulties, the editor has believed that he would render a special service by making this book, in some degree, a clue to these difficulties and a guide to these niceties. This he has done, first, by inserting before Ueberweg's notes the terms of this class which he uses in rendering Berkeley; second, by adding Ueberweg's German terms of this class to the translation of his notes; and third, by giving the leading German terms in the Index.

XVI. Its Objects and Uses.

I. This edition is meant to meet the intense and peculiar interest felt at this time in Berkeley's views. It at once proves and intensifies this interest that, in such close proximity in time, we should have from the successor of Hamilton an edition of the complete works of Berkeley, and from one who held the chair of Kant an annotated translation of Berkeley's Principles.

2. The mere text of the Principles, as it is here presented, can only be had elsewhere in connections which oblige the buyer to make a large outlay, and compel the purchase of much in which he may feel no interest. But to those who are able to purchase, but have not purchased, Fraser's Berkeley, this edition of the Principles may prove at least an advertisement, perhaps a stimulant, to the securing of those noble works, no fragment of which is destitute of value. If this book attains its end, it will lead to a larger study of all that Berkeley has written, a larger sale of