to pass a true judgment, than such a one as is biaffed by affections and interefts. That there are fuch things as Virtue and Vice. That Mankind is naturally defigned for a Sociable life. That it is most agreeable to reafon and the common interests of those in Society, that they should be true to their Compacts, that they should not hurt an innocent perfon, &c.

And as for the evidence from Teftimony which depends upon the credit and authority of the Witneffes, these may be fo qualified as to their ability and fidelity, that a man must be a fantastical incredulous fool to make any doubt of them. And by this it is that I am fufficiently affured, That there was fuch a person as Queen Elizabeth; That there is such a place as Spain.

And fo for the Evidence of Experience, I am by that to a great degree affured of the fucceffion of Night and Day, Winter and Summer; and have no fuch reason to doubt, whether the house wherein now I am, fhall this next minute fall upon me, or the earth open and swallow it up, as to be in continual fear of fuch accidents.

II. That kind of Affent which doth arife from fuch evidence as is lefs plain and

clear,

clear, is called Opinion and Probability. When though the proofs for a thing may preponderate any thing to be faid against it, yet they are not fo weighty and perfpicuous as to exclude all reasonable doubt and fear of the contrary.

And this doth arise from a more imperfect and obfcure representation and conception of things, either by our Senses or understandings, by Teftimony or by Experience.

When the Evidence on each fide doth equiponderate, this doth not properly beget any Affent, but rather a Hefitation, or fufpenfion of Affent.

CHAP.

More.

CHA P. II.

Two Schemes of Principles relating to Practical Things, whether Natural or Moral, propofed in the Method ufed by Mathematicians of Poftulata, Definitions, and Axioms.

Aving premised these things in ge

HAV

Vid. Dr. H. Evidences and Affents; I shall in the next place offer fome particular Schemes of Principles relating to Practical things, whether Natural or Moral, in the fame way and method as is used in the Mathematicks, confifting of Poftulata, DefiniMons and Axioms.

Poftula

tum.

A Scheme of Natural Principles.

Every thing is endowed with fuch a natural Principle, whereby it is neceffarily inclined to promote its own prefervation and well-being.

That which hath in it a fitness to pro

mote

mote this end, is called Good. And on Defiin. 1. the contrary, that which is apt to hinder it, is called Evil. Amongst which there are feveral degrees, according as things have more or less fitness, to promote or hinder this end.

The leffening or.efcaping of Evil is to be Def. 2. reckoned under the notion of Good.

The leffening or lofs of Good is to be reckoned under the notion of Evil.

That which is Good is to be chofen and Axiom. 1. profecuted, that which is Evil to be avoided.

The greater Good is to be preferred before 2. the lefs, and the lesser Evil to be endured rather than the greater.

Such kinds of things or events, whether Good or Evil, as will certainly come to pass, may fall under computation, and be eftimated as to their feveral degrees, as well as things prefent. Becaufe when fuch a space of time is elapfed, that which is now future, will become prefent. Which is the ground of mens dealing for Reverfions.

3.

And thus likewife is it for fuch things 4. as may probably come to pafs; Though this probability fhould be fomewhat remote, it is counted a valuable thing, and may be estimated at a certain rate, for a man

to be one amongst four or five equal Competitors for a place, to be the fourth or fifth Expectant of an Inheritance; though in fuch Cafes there be the odds of Three or four to One, yet the price that is set upon this, may be fo proportioned, as either to reduce it to an equality, or make it a very advantageous Bargain.

5. Aprefent Good may reasonably be parted with, upon a probable expectation of a future Good which is more excellent. Which is the cafe of Merchants, who have large Estates in their own poffeffion, which they may safely keep by them; and and yet chuse to venture them upon a thousand hazards, out of an apprehenfion that there is a greater probability of their gaining, than of their lofing by fuch Adventures.

And this would be much more reasonable, if befides the probability of gaining by these Adventures, there were the like probability of their being utterly undone and ruined, if they fhould neglect or refufe to venture.

The greater the advantage is, the more reasonable must it be to adventure for it. If it be reasonable for a man to run the venture of twenty pounds for the