AX. I.

Ax. 2.

That which is morally good is to be defered and profecuted, that which is evil is to be avoided.

The greater congruity or incongruity there is in any thing to the reason of Mankind, and the greater tendency it hath, to promote or hinder the perfection of man's nature, fo much greater degrees hath it of moral Good or Evil. To which we ought to proportion our Inclination or Averfion.

There is in fome things fuch a natural decency and fitnefs, as doth render them moft agreeable to our reafon, and will be fufficient to recommend them to our practice, abftracting from all confiderations of Reward. As in loving those who are kind to us, and from whom we receive benefit: In compenfating Good with Good, and not with Evil.

It is moft fuitable both to the Reason and Interest of mankind, that every one should fubmit themfelves to him, upon whom they depend for their Well-being, by doing fuch things as may render them acceptable to him.

It is a defirable thing for a man to have the affiftance of others in his need and diftrefs. And 'tis not reafonable for him to expect this from others, unless

he

he himself be willing to fhew it to others. The rational nature and the Perfecti- Ax. 3. on belonging to it being more noble than the Senfitive, Therefore Moral Good is to be preferred before Natural, and that which is Morally Evil is more to be hated and avoided, than that which is Natural.

A prefent natural Good may be part- Ax. 4. ed with upon a probable expectation of a future Moral good.

A prefent Natural Evil is to be endu- Ax. 5. red for the probable avoiding of a future Moral Evil.

CHAP. III.

Some Propofitions necessary to be premifed for the removing of feveral prejudices in debates about Religion.

Efides what hath been already fuggefted concerning the first foundations to be laid, in order to a discourse about Natural Religion, I fhall in the next place offer to confideration these feven following Propofitions, as being very proper to prevent or obviate the Cavils of Sceptical captious men.

1. Such things as in themselves are equally true and certain, may not yet be capa ble of the fame kind or degree of Evidence as to us. As for inftance, That there was Such a man as King Henry the Eighth, that there are fuch places as America, or China. I say these things may in themfelves be equally true and certain with thofe other matters, That we now fee and are awake, That the three Angles in a Triangle are equal to two right ones. Though for the first of these we have

only

only the teftimony of others, and human tradition; whereas for the other we have fenfitive proof, and Mathematical demonstration. And the reafon is because all Truths are in themselves equal, according to that ordinary Maxim, Veritas non recipit magis & minus. And therefore nothing can be more irrational than for a man to doubt of, or deny the truth of any thing, because it cannot be made out, by fuch kind of proofs of which the nature of fuch a thing is not capable. A man may as well deny there is any fuch thing as Light or Colour, because he cannot hear it, or found, because he cannot fee it, as to deny the truth of other things because they cannot be made out by fenfitive or demonstrative proofs. The kinds of Probation for feveral things being as much difproportioned, as the objects of the feveral fenfes are to one another.

2.

Eth. lib. 1.

cap. 3.

lib. 1. cap.

ult.

2. Things of feveral kinds may admit and require feveral forts of proofs, all which Ariftot. may be good in their kind. The Philofopher hath long ago told us, that accor- Metaph. ding to the divers nature of things, fo muft the Evidences for them be; and that 'tis an argument of an undifciplined wit not to acknowledge this. He that is rational and judicious will expect no other C. 4 kind

kind of Arguments in any cafe than the fubject-matter will bear. How incongruous would it be for a Mathematician to perfuade with eloquence, to use all imaginable infinuations and intreaties that he might prevail with his hearers to believe that three and three make fix? It would be altogether as vain and improper in matters belonging to an Orator to pretend to strict Demonftration. All things are not capable of the fame kind of Evidence. Though the Conclufions in Mathematicks, by reason of the abstracted nature of thofe Sciences, may be demonftrated by the clearest and most unquestionable way of Probation to our reafon, yet it is not rational to expect the like proof, in such other matters as are not of the like nature. This he himself applys to Moral things, which being not of fuch fimple abstracted natures, but depending upon mixed circumstances, are not thereProtrept. fore capable of fuch kind of Demonftrative proofs. 'Tis a faying of Jamblicus, That demonstrations are not to be expe&ted in matters concerning God and divine things. Nor is this any greater prejudice to the certainty of fuch things, than it is that God is invifible. And thus likewife it is, for the fame reafon, with many

1

in Sym

hol. 25.