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left behind, the dealings of nations are reduced to a game in which all the chances are in favour of the most unscrupulous competitor, and consequently all are enveloped in the same fog of suspense and insecurity. It is indeed a war of all against all," in which promises are weapons of offence and destruction not less than shells or torpedoes. To vary Hobbes' famous phrase, Gens genti lupus; though, on this view, the successful nation must show not less of the fox than the wolf in its dealings. And so, as always happens in the long run, mere momentary expediency, when taken as the supreme rule of action, becomes supremely inexpedient; and the device of making promises with the intention of keeping them only so far as the interest of the moment is served, involves all nations alike in a common burden of suspicion and suspense, of huge permanent armaments and, at the worst, in such a war as we now witness.*

(2) Generosity.-The question whether generosity is a virtue capable of a national application is perhaps more difficult; for here the argument from trusteeship comes in more directly. How can a statesman rightly give away any advantage to which the people whom he represents have a reasonable claim? How can he be sure that he will be supported in so doing? For after all, the nation as a whole has the right to dispose of its common possessions.

If we use the term "generosity" in its narrower sense, there is probably no great scope for its exercise in international relations. Or, rather, the expression of sympathy between nation and nation in time of misfortune is not as a rule the direct function of governments; and the willing help which passes from land to land in the case of a devastating famine or earthquake usually passes through private or semi-private channels. It is perhaps inevitable

* Of course, if it be held that war is the supreme and natural function of a virile nation, and consequently no real evil but rather a good, then the Machiavellian theory of diplomatic faith cannot be touched by such criticisms. If war is the end aimed at, the giving of promises not meant to be binding is a fruitful provider of occasions for war. In this way the ultra-Prussian theory is at least consistent.

though it is also a matter for regret, that, in general, States as such should be debarred from showing the virtue of mutual helpfulness. But, if the nation which brings help makes its sympathy known in other ways, the chief end is attained. There are indeed instances of generosity on the part of governments, one of the most familiar being the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece by Mr. Gladstone; but this might almost be regarded as an act of justice in view of the character of the islanders and the fact that their kinsmen in Greece were a sufficiently well organized nation to offer them good government.

But if we extend the term "generosity" to include that which is perhaps better known as magnanimity—the willingness to go to the help of the oppressed, or to refrain from exacting the last fraction of tribute from a conquered or subject people-there are many instances to be found. Yet even here it may be objected that a government has no right to pledge the resources or endanger the welfare of its people in the interest of other nations. And, if there were no living contact between government and people this might indeed be so. If the whole initiative and the whole power of decision lay with the small group of statesmen on whom the immediate responsibility for action rests, they might judge that, in a choice between magnanimity and a strict regard to the safety and interests of their own people, they were bound to choose the latter. But just here is one of chief gains of democratic government-that a natural link is forged between the statesman and the people whom he represents and that he may win their free consent to whatever action he deems best and most honourable for the nation as a whole. Nor is there any nobler rôle possible in our modern world than that of the leader of a free people, who sets before them two paths and persuades them to tread the higher even if it leads to the sacrifice of some material gain. Thus, it is no mean argument in favour of democracy that it provides a way of escape-even if it be seldom used to

the full-from the dilemma between generous action on the national scale and the hampering conception of trusteeship narrowly interpreted. When a nation can decide for itself, and even when it is in close contact with its representatives who must decide, it possesses at least the means and the opportunity for generous action.

(3) Self-sacrifice. - Generosity, in all its higher reaches, involves sacrifice. But national self-sacrifice is the last virtue which we could look for on the theory that the primary and dominant object of government is the well-being of the governed. Yet there is a sense in which sacrifice is the soul of all virtue. If fidelity to one's word, or justice, or generosity, do not involve some element of self-abnegation or personal loss, we say in ordinary speech that there is "no virtue" in them. Even duty would lose its characteristic meaning if it could always, or generally, be performed without loss or pain. So those who seek to rule out sacrifice from the roll of national virtues cut deep into the very conception of national morality. If veracity and justice are duties, and if there is merit in fulfilling them, that merit must be won at some cost of sacrifice.

For us all it has become easier in the last year to see that this conception does indeed apply in the life of nations because of the example of Belgium. It is true that an example so shining and so terrible comes but seldom in the whole course of history; but when it comes, who can fail to recognize its meaning? Not the least remarkable thing in the action of Belgium in August 1914 was the swiftness-nay, the immediacy-of the resolve to resist at all costs. Kant has a far-reaching distinction between the "hypothetical imperative" of prudence, which depends on some deliberately chosen object of pursuit or maxim of interest, and the "categorical imperative" of duty, which suffers no deliberation and can be evaded only by the betrayal of that which is highest in our nature. That there is a "categorical imperative "

in the life of nations, and that it overrides all the ordinary maxims of a prudent statesmanship, was never more clearly shown than by King Albert and his advisers in these fateful hours. They knew that they were trustees for their country; but, faced with two conceptions of trusteeship-that of material interest and that of freedom and honour-they unhesitatingly chose the latter.

These characteristics of their decision are clearly brought out in an address given some months later in Paris by M. Vandervelde :-" The terrible menace or the infamous offers of Germany were enough to cause unanimity among us on a question of honour. And on 4th August, 1914, at the moment when the German armies were beginning to invade our territory and we knew from the first burnings and butcheries what was before us, at the moment when we knew what the performance of our duty was to cost us, there were no longer in the Belgian Parliament either Republicans or Monarchists, either Liberals or Catholics, either Flemings or Walloons-there was only a unanimous nation when, speaking in its name, King Albert concluded with these words: 'We may be conquered, but we shall never be subdued.' No small part of this unanimity was due to the fact that the Belgians regarded the neutrality of their country, not only as a safeguard to themselves but as a trust for other nations. So its preservation was doubly a duty. "This was what the Government realized. There was no discussion on this point. In the Council of Ministers there was unanimity. Knowing what awaited Belgium, no man hesitated-do what thou oughtest, come what may." So in the twentieth

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century the nation again drew inspiration from the watchword of William of Orange in the sixteenth :-"It is possible to undertake without hope, and to persevere without succeeding.' 99 *

Could there be a more unanswerable proof that the highest spirit of individual self-sacrifice may be equalled

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or surpassed by a whole people? And if, happily, the opportunity for such a proof to be given comes seldom, when given, it remains as a beacon for succeeding ages.

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There are, then, two conditions which must be fulfilled if we are to do justice at once to the trusteeship of rulers for their peoples and to the capacity for high moral action inherent in the nations themselves. The thought of trusteeship must be interpreted in a high sense, as extending to spiritual possessions not less than to material goods; and the great body of the people must support their leaders in this interpretation. The latter condition is most naturally and normally fulfilled in a democratically governed country, yet the form of democracy is not essential. There may be a true moral unity where representative government has not yet been attained or has been broken into fragments by misfortune. The part of the women of Europe in contributing to the ethos and influencing the general will of their respective lands cannot be denied, even though they have as yet in the principal States no constitutional means of making their ideals operative. And in time of extreme stress, such as that which has befallen Belgium, national sentiment and the conviction of national unity tend to centre round a man, or a small group of men, rather than round any institution, however essential in normal times.*

It is when such a sense of unity-such an exercise of the common will-comes into play, whatever its particular organ of expression, that the attribution of a moral personality to a nation is seen to be no mere metaphor, and the capacity for sacrifice on a national scale to be

* In the address just quoted M. Vandervelde used these words: "La résistance belge, on l'a incarnée-car on éprouve toujours le besoin d'incarner l'âme d'un peuple dans quelques individualités-dans trois figures symboliques: le Roi, le Cardinal archevêque de Malines, M. Max, bourgmestre de Bruxelles. Et tous les trois incarnent réellement quelque chose de l'âme de la Belgique." At the close M. Charles Gide, who presided, said, truly as well as gracefully, that a fourth name should be added--that of the speaker himself. We may well regard that nation as fortunate in misfortune which can find such a fourfold leadership and expression of its highest ethical character; and can add to the unity of Church and State the strength of Labour and of Civic patriotism.

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