That next on the left of Fort Lincoln, "Fort Saratoga." That next on the left of Fort Saratoga, "Fort Bunker Hill." That on the right of General Sickles's camp, "Fort Stanton." That on the right of Fort Stanton, "Fort Carroll." That on the left towards Bladensburg, "Fort Greble." By command of Major-General MCCLELLAN. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General. RICHARD B. IRWIN, Aide-de-Camp. DEPREDATIONS OF FEDERAL SOLDIERS PUNISH General Order No. 19. The attention of the General commanding has recently been directed to depredations of an atrocious character that have been committed upon the persons and property of citizens in Virginia, by the troops under his command. The property of inoffensive people has been lawlessly and violently taken from them, their houses broken open, and in some instances burned to the ground. The General is perfectly aware of the fact that these outrages are perpetrated by a few bad men, and do not receive the sanction of the mass of the army. He feels confident, therefore, that all officers and soldiers who have the interest of the service at heart will cordially unite their efforts with his in endeavoring to suppress practices which disgrace the name of a soldier. The General commanding directs that in future all persons connected with this army, who are detected in depredating upon the property of citizens, shall be arrested and brought to trial; and he assures all concerned that crimes of such enormity will admit of no remission of the death penalty which the military law attaches to offences of this nature. When depredations are committed on property in charge of a guard, the commander and other members of the guard will be held responsible for the same as principals, and punished accordingly. By command of Major-General MCCLELLAN. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General. RICHARD B. IRWIN, Aide-de-Camp. Doc. 62. COLONEL TAYLOR'S PROCLAMATION. HEAD-QUARTERS POST AT SPRINGFIELD, APPLICATIONS having been made to me for passes for persons going South with their famiies and property, have caused me to issue the following suggestions and orders, which, I trust, will fully explain the position I shall take upon the question: The time has now arrived when each man must be considered as a friend or a foe to the interest of the State; when avarice, timidity, and duplicity can no longer be excuses for inaction. The rapid and brilliant victories which have crowned the army of Missouri, since its or ganization, the enthusiastic enlistment of the volunteer force for the defence of the State; the unparalleled magnanimity which has been shown by their Commander-in-Chief, General Price, to those taken in arms against the State of Missouri; the faithful manner in which the proclamation of Gen. Price, made after the battle of Wilson's Creek, has been carried out; all call upon the people of Missouri to remain and share the glory which must speedily crown the triumph of liberty over fraud, rapine, and oppression. We are apt to blend private interest and domestic enjoyments too much with the public good-too ready to sacrifice the latter to the former. Where are all the illustrious sacrifices Shall this one, waged upon a principle as sacred that history records in all past revolutions? merely for wealth, and not for principle? The as any, pass without them! Shall it be a war first duty we owe to our family is to place it in a situation of honor, and the noblest inheritance noble virtue, and a name to which true glory we can leave our children is the example of is attached. The late acts of Gen. Fremont in carrying out his proclamation, by liberating the slaves of Col. Snead, indicate, in a manner not to be mistaken, the objects of the present war, as ment; but there is a more sinister motive in the waged on the part of the United States Governproclamation, which the true men of Missouri, by leaving the State with their property, are that will be given by the withdrawal of their assisting to carry out, and that is, the power influence and wealth, to hired bandits and unscrupulous demagogues, to rouse a feeling of envy in the minds of the poorer classes. Missourians! Americans! your country demands interest in this great Commonwealth, just as your sacrifices. Will you give up your proud she is emerging from the thraldom of hired invasion; just as the invader has been driven from and make your homes in other lands, and by your State? Will you selfishly slide away so doing put a weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous enemy to injure the sacred cause which your countrymen now in the field are defending, with their lives? Be firm and true: if sacrifices must be made, make them like men; join the armies of the State; remember, where all are united none can subdue. Without the liberty you are now battling for, wealth will be useless and happiness a dream. Manassas, Wilson's Creek, Lexington, and Washington stand before you; all your most sanguine hopes are realized; the war must be short, as it has been brilliant. Your brightest glory in future time will be that you were a soldier of GRANTING LETTERS OF MARQUE. NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, October 1, 1861. } SIR: In relation to the communication of R. B. Forbes, Esq., a copy of which was sent by you to this Department on the 16th ultimo, inquiring whether letters of marque cannot be furnished for the propeller "Pembroke," which is about to be despatched to China, I have the honor to state that it appears to me there are objections to, and no authority for granting letters of marque in the present contest. I am not aware that Congress, which has the exclusive power of granting letters of marque and reprisal, has authorized such letters to be issued against the insurgents; and were there such authorization, I am not prepared to advise its exercise, because it would, in my view, be a recognition of the assumption of the insurgents that they are a distinct and independent nationality. Under the act of August 5, 1861, "supplementary to an act entitled 'An act to protect the commerce of the United States and to punish the crime of piracy,' "the President is au Doo. 63. THE CHEROKEE INDIANS. THE Fort Scott Times published the following letter from JOHN Ross, Chief of the Cherokee Indians, giving his adhesion to the Confederate States: EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, PARK HILL, CHEROKEE NATION, August 24, 1861.) To Major Clark, Ass't Quartermaster, C. S. A.: SIR I herewith forward to your care despatches for Gen. McCulloch, C. S. Army, which I have the honor to request you will cause to be forwarded to him by the earliest express. At a mass meeting of about four thousand Cherokees at Tahlegue on the 21st instant, the Cherokees, with marked unanimity, declared their adherence to the Confederate States, and have given their authorities power to negotiate an alliance with them. In view of this action, a regiment of mounted men will be immediately raised and placed under the command of Colonel John Drew, to meet any exigency that may arise. Having espoused the cause of the Confederate States, we hope to render efficient service in the protracted war which now threatens the country, and to be treated with a liberality and confidence becoming the Confederate States. I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your humble servant, JOHN Ross, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation. Doo. 64. THE CAPTURE OF THE FANNY. STATEMENT OF CAPT. MORRISON. THE following communication from Capt. J. H. Morrison, master of the propeller Fanny, which was captured by the rebels at Chicomicomico on the 1st of October, presents his account of the affair: thorized to instruct the commanders of "armed vessels sailing under the authority of any letters of marque and reprisal granted by the Congress of the United States, or the commanders of any other suitable vessels, to subdue, seize, take, and, if on the high seas, to send into any port of the United States any vessel or boat built, purchased, fitted out, or held," &c. This allusion to letters of marque does not authorize such letters to be issued, nor do I find any other act The propeller Fanny, owned by the Philadel containing such authorization. But the same phia Transportation Company and commanded act, in the second edition, as above quoted, gives by me, was chartered at Philadelphia as a transthe President power to authorize the "com- port, by Lieutenant Crosby of the Navy, about manders of any suitable vessels to subdue, the 1st of July. Myself and crew were shipped seize," &c. Under this clause, letters permis- to manage the transport. On arriving at Forsive, under proper restrictions and guards tress Monroe the Fanny was armed with two against abuse, might be granted to the propeller rifled guns, one a six and the other a nine"Pembroke," so as to meet the views expressed pounder, after which she was employed in variby Mr. Forbes. This would seem to be lawful, ous expeditions where a light-draft steamer was and perhaps not liable to the objections of grant-requisite. In all these, among which may be ing letters of marque against our own citizens. and that too without law or authority from the only constituted power that can grant it. I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter from Messrs. J. M. Forbes & Co. and others, addressed to this Department, on the same subject. I am, very respectfully, your obedient ser- mentioned that of Black River, and Cherrystone Inlet, we were successful. When the expedition was sent down to Hatteras Inlet, the Fanny was employed as one of the gunboats, and was the first to enter Hatteras Inlet. After the success of this expedition was established, the control of the Fanny was given to Capt. Rowan of the Pawnee, and Col. Hawkins of the Zouaves, and the boat employed in various duties about the Sound. In order to show that myself and crew were | house on deck, forward of the boiler, and a not recognized by the Government as officer or shell exploding into it would have blown the seamen, but simply in charge of the propeller, vessel to atoms. Beside this, my boiler was on for the purpose of navigating her, I will state deck, and insufficiently protected against shot that, when the expedition to Ocracoke Inlet from cannon. was planned, my crew declined to go unless it was stipulated that, if any of them fell, their families should be cared for by the Government. Capt. Rowan promised to see to this, and we left on that expedition, under Lieutenants Maxwell and Eastman, on which, fortunately, no lives were lost. Previous to this time and shortly before her loss, the Fanny's gun crew consisted of experienced men from the Naval Brigade, who well | understood the management of guns and were good fighters. When the Fanny was sent to Chicomicomico, on the 29th ult., she went in company with the Putnam and Serious to transport the Indiana regiment to that point. After transferring them to the shore, the Putnam was left behind to act as guard-boat, and furnished with a nine-pound rifle gun from the Fanny, after which the latter and the Serious returned to Hatteras Inlet. When the approach of the rebel steamers was perceived, Capt. Hartt asked me what had better be done. I declined to assume any authority in the premises, as he was the commander of the expedition, and responsible. He finally ordered the men to throw the cartridges overboard, and went aft and lowered a boat, to go ashore; as he said, for assistance. To this course I objected, and insisted that he should remain in charge of his men, as I was not willing to assume any responsibility. The rebels opened fire, which we returned with nine shots, which fell short, save one, which struck one boat in the bow. I then took my son, who was lying sick in his berth, and, with a boat's crew, pulled ashore. As I left, Capt. Hartt suggested to the mate that he had better slip the cable, and run the ship ashore. I was about five hundred yards from the Fanny when. the cable was slipped, but she struck immediately. After she struck, Sergeant-Major Peacock ran up the white flag. This was a signal that all had been done that could be, and the remainder of the crew took the spare boat and left. On the morning of the 1st inst., the Fanny was loaded with stores of a valuable character, consisting of clothing, medicines, and one hundred boxes of cartridges, in addition to two hundred pounds of powder in her magazine. The Fanny was then ordered to Chicomicomico to deliver her stores, but no convoy was sent with her. Her gun crew consisted of ten men of Hawkins' Zouaves, under Sergeant-Major Peacock. There were also on board thirty-five men of the Indiana regiment, who were under command of Captain Hartt; he, being the only cap-ness. tain on board, had charge of the boat. I arrived off Chicomicomico about one o'clock and lay at anchor about two and a half miles from shore, in about six feet of water. The Putnam then came alongside, delivered the Fanny's rifled cannon, and left for Hatteras Inlet. The rebels, by this surrender, came into possession of one of the best-assorted cargoes and every thing on board, save thirty cases of cartridges, which were thrown overboard. To have attempted to defend the Fanny, under the circumstances, would have been madThe gun crew knew nothing of gunnery, and I think the Indiana troops on board knew little better. We had enough time from one o'clock to half past four to have discharged every portion of the cargo of the Fanny, and to have destroyed the vessel, had we received assistance from the Indianians on shore. I cannot but feel that it was to their neglect to assist us that the loss of the Fanny may be attributed. Nor do I think it was policy in Capt. Rowan or Ccl. Hawkins to have sent the Fanny to Chicomicomico without an escort or sufficient guard on board, when she had so valuable a cargo. Upon my return to Hatteras Inlet, I made report of the loss to Capt. Rowan, and on Friday, 4th instant, went up to Hampton Roads with my crew. Here I reported to Gen. Mansfield, and detailed the circumstances of the capture of the Fanny. He acquitted me from blame, and furnished me and my crew with passes to Philadelphia. It was not until half past three o'clock that any movement was made by the troops on shore to remove the cargo of the Fanny. I had but two boats, while they had a large lighter and a number of canoes, with which the cargo could have readily been removed in a short time. Finally the commanding officer of the Indiana regiment came off in a canoe with a lighter and took off a cargo of goods for immediate use. About half past four o'clock I saw the rebel side-wheel steamer Northampton heading from Roanoke Island directly toward us; shortly after I saw two smaller boats, propellers, one heading to cut off our retreat and the other so as to get ahead of us. The side- It is true I am not nor have I been recognized wheel steamer was about two hundred and fifty by the Navy Department as commander of the tons' burden and had two thirty-twos forward. Fanny. She has never been regularly comThe other vessels were about one hundred and missioned as a gunboat, although doing nearly twenty tons, and each armed with one twenty-three months' active and successful duty as four-pounder cannon, capable of throwing a sixty-four-pound shot. The powder I had on freight was stored in a such. Neither have my crew been recognized by the Department, and if myself or any of my crew had fallen in any of the many actions in which we have been engaged our families would have had no claim upon the Government. During the time I was in command of the Fanny, myself and crew received pay from the owners of the boat, and not from the Government. I may state here, as the Fanny Cadwallader has been many times mistaken for this vessel, that the original boat chartered by Lieut. Crosby was the Fanny, of Philadelphia, and was owned by the same company. With her various expeditions on the eastern coast of Virginia were prosecuted, and she has done good service. After some time, however, she became disabled, and her crew were transferred to the P. T. Hartt. As it was advisable to retain the prestige of the Fanny's name, the sign upon her stern was transferred to the P. T. Hartt, and she afterward sailed under the name of the Fanny; so that in reality it was the P. T. Hartt, and not the Fanny, that was captured. The latter, under the name of H. Burden, is now running between Baltimore and Annapolis, in Government service. I ain a resident of Brooklyn, and well known in New York and Philadelphia, and for capacity as a commander can produce the best of references. For my courage and that of my crew, I refer to Lieut. Crosby, now of the Pembina, Capt. Rowan, and Lieuts. Maxwell and Eastman, of the Pawnee, under whose immediate command I have been. J. H. MORRISON. Mr. Potter, Chairman of the Investigating Committee of the House of Representatives, called the attention of the Navy Department to a statement in the newspapers that Capt. J. II. Morrison, of the steamer Fanny, captured by the Confederates off Cape Hatteras, was imprisoned at Fortress Monroe for refusing to take the oath of allegiance, and inquired if the statement was true in whole or in part. The Department replied as follows: NAVY DEPARTMENT, October 9, 1861. SIR: Your letter of the 8th instant, relative to the newspaper reports concerning the master of the steamer Fanny, has been received. The steamer alluded to was not at the time of her capture in the service of this Department, and has never been employed by it; and the same may be said of her captain. This Department has no knowledge of him whatever, and I have no reason to suppose that at the time of the capture of the Fanny a single person in any way connected with the navy was on board of her. Very respectfully, GIDEON WELLES. Hon. JoпN F. POTTER, Chairman, &c. Doc. 65. OPERATIONS IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. THE following account of the operations of Floyd's and Wise's forces in Western Virginia, is given by a correspondent of the Richmond Dispatch. Its authorship is attributed to Col. Henningsen, well known for his connection with the filibuster expedition from the South: CAMP DEFIANCE, Sept. 25, 1861-10 P. M. On the 14th of September Gen. Floyd and his forces encamped on the summit of the Big Sewell, and ordered the Wise Legion, which, to cover his rear, was drawn up in order of battle at Locust Lane, to camp east of him, at Smales', on the turnpike. The troops of the Wise Legion, who were in no amiable humor at so much retreating, and especially at being obliged to retire from Dogwood Gap without fighting, were much exhausted and annoyed at having been kept on the road from six in the morning till eleven at night, mixed up with an interminable train of wagons belonging to the Floyd Brigade, for the purpose of only proceeding a few miles, and without being able to obtain any definite order as to their destination. On the eastern slope of the Big Sewell, between two small farms called Dixon's and Vaughan's, Gen. Wise selected his camping ground at the place since called Camp Defiance, and which undoubtedly is, with Dogwood Gap, one of the strongest positions between the Alleghanies and the Ohio River. On the 15th and 16th Gen. Floyd was industriously occupied throwing up field-works to the westward of the summit of Big Sewell. The position, however, was not one tenable against a superior force, and this Gen. Floyd seems to have found out. On the night of the 16th to the 17th he made a very precipitate retreat from the Big Sewell, with about three thousand men, to Meadow Bluff, destroying much baggage and abandoning much provision. His troops were under the impression that Gen. Rosecrans was pressing on with fifteen thousand men. After passing the Wise Legion he ordered Gen. Wise on the following day to prepare to cover his rear and to follow him to Meadow Bluff, having information that the enemy was advancing one column by the Wilderness road. It was impossible for Gen. Wise to comply with both orders, even had they been positive, and in fact one was not executed at all. It was only by maintaining its position at all hazards, that the Legion could protect the rear of the Floyd Brigade. The experience of Dogwood Gap, occupied in force, with artillery, by the enemy, a few hours after the Wise Legion left it, by Gen. Floyd's order, showed clearly, and the event at Camp Defiance subsequently confirmed, that on the abandonment of the latter position, the enemy would immediately occupy it in force. Floyd's Brigade was much demoralized since his retreat from Camp Gauley and the following retreat. The Wise Legion, willing enough to fight, would have been equally demoralized by retreating any further. Meadow Bluff affords no position. No real demonstration had yet or has since been made on the Wilderness road, nor did there exist any reason why there should be, since the enemy could more conveniently, if in force sufficient, strike the turnpike further eastward, as for instance at the Little Sewell. If the Wise Legion had retreated and been followed up by superior forces its existence was imperilled, and thereby the rear of the Floyd Brigade left unprotected. But, at all events, that retreat was impossible of execution without the abandonment of baggage, because Gen. Floyd had detained many wagons belonging to the already insufficient transportation of the Wise Legion, and because the roads had been so much cut up by the vast train of the Floyd Brigade. The writer counted twenty-eight wagons belonging to and following the last regiment of Gen. Floyd's brigade, which was just twenty more than accompanied the regiment which closed up Wise's column. Under these circumstances Gen. Wise resolved to make a stand where he was encamped, and where, on the morning after his reaching the ground, he had begun to throw up intrenchments. Here it was impossible for an enemy to bring more than two guns or a thousand men to bear on any part of his position; and on every point, within a few minutes, Gen. Wise could bring six of his eight pieces and two-thirds of his force into play, beside the advantage of intrenchments. In addition, most of the officers of the Legion spoke openly of resigning if compelled to retreat any further. On the 18th Gen. Wise addressed the troops of his Legion, stating substantially that hitherto he had never retreated but in obedience to superior orders. That here he was determined to make a stand. That his force consisted only of one thousand seven hundred infantry and artillery, and that the enemy was alleged to be fifteen thousand strong. That this he did not believe, but that his men must be prepared to fight two or three or several to one, and even if the enemy were in the full force stated, the position admitted of successful defence, and he was determined to abide the issue. He warned them that they would probably be attacked front and rear for successive days, and he called on any officer or soldier who felt doubtful of the result, or unwilling to stand by him in this trial, to step forward, promising that they should be marched at once to Meadow Bluff. This speech, delivered successively to the three regiments of infantry and to the artillery, was received with the wildest enthusiasm. Not one solitary individual in the Legion failed to respond, and the spirits of the corps were raised and maintained at the highest fighting pitch. The provisions and baggage-wagons were withdrawn into safe positions, and the camp on all sides strengthened. In this attitude the Legion remained till about the 20th, when it was strengthened by the arrival of Capt. Romer's artillery company, with one gun, and by that of one Virginia, one North Carolina, and three Georgia companies, which swelled the forces of the Wise Legion to over two thousand men. About this time Gen. Lee arrived in Gen. Floyd's camp, at Meadow Bluff, and wrote to Gen. Wise, advising him to fall back if executable, without delay. Before acting on this advice Gen. Wise requested Gen. Lee to inspect the position in person. On the 22d Gen. Lee arrived at Camp Defiance, and, after a careful survey of the ground, ordered Gen. Wise to maintain his position until further orders. The enemy had meanwhile advanced to within three or four miles, and several skirmishes had taken place between his outposts and the remaining cavalry of the Legion, under Major Bacon, formerly captain of mounted rangers in Nicaragua, and afterward aid to Gen. Garnett, and wounded by the side of that General when he fell. The rest of the cavalry was still under its gallant colonel, J. L. Davis, and Lieut.-Col. Clarkson, south of the New River, where they had pushed a daring and successful foray up to within twelve miles of Charleston. One night Gen. Wise, with a few picked companions, including the Richmond Blues and Mississippi Rangers, of the Second regiment, under Capt. Imboden, attempted to feel and ambuscade the enemy and drive in their outposts, killing three of them, the General himself lying down for several hours in a pitiless shower. Notwithstanding, all that could be ascertained of the enemy was that he was on the turnpike, probably from five thousand to six thousand strong. On the afternoon of the 23d, while the infantry and artillery of the Legion were rehearsing their part on the contemplated points of attack, the enemy suddenly appeared, driving in our pickets. The next morning the summit of the Big Sewell was whitened with his tents, and skirmishing commenced and continued till the evening. On our side two gun detachments of the artillery and three companies of the Second regiment of the Legion, of which Col. Henningsen is colonel, but in consequence of his having charge of the infantry and artillery, under the immediate command of Lieut.-Col. Frank Anderson-who distinguished himself by the daring exploit of capturing Castillo, in Nicaragua, with forty-eight men, after Lockridge and Titus had failed with eight hundred— Capt. Imboden's, Capt. Lewis's, and Capt. Crane's University company were the companies engaged, with one six-pounder and one howitzer, under Major Gibbs, of South Carolina, Capt. McComas and Lieut. Pairo, of Richmond. The casualties were but trifling on our side, though we have to regret the death of Lient. Howell, of Mississippi, (of Capt. McDonnell's company,) and that of one of Capt. Imboden's gallant rangers. Capt. Lewis was shot through the breast, but is doing well. Three privates were wounded in the above-named companies, one very severely. The only loss in the artillery was Lieut. Pairo's horse, shot under him. The enemy was obviously only feeling for the |