with complicated mixtures of different savors, prevail among people of condition: the French, accustomed to artificial red on a female cheek, think the modest coloring of nature altogether insipid.

The same tendency is discovered in the progress of the fine arts among the ancients. Some vestiges of the old Grecian buildings prove them to be of the Doric order: the Ionic succeeded, and seems to have been the favorite order, while architecture was in the height of glory the Corinthian came next in vogue; and in Greece the buildings of that order appear mostly to have been erected after the Romans got footing there. At last came the Composite, with all its extravagances, where simplicity is sacrificed to finery and crowded

ornament.

But what taste is to prevail next? for fashion is a continual flux, and taste must vary with it. After rich and profuse ornaments become familiar, simplicity appears lifeless and insipid; which would be an insurmountable obstruction, should any person of genius and taste endeavor to restore ancient simplicity.

189. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities in matter, seems now fully established. Heat and cold, smell and taste, though seeming to exist in bodies, are discovered to be effects caused by these bodies in a sensitive being: color, which appears to the eye as spread upon a substance, has no existence but in the mind of the spectator.* Qualities of that kind, which owe their existence to the percipient as much as to the object, are termed secondary qualities, and are distinguished from figure, extension, solidity, which, in contradistinction to the former, are termed primary qualities, because they inhere in subjects, whether perceived or not. This distinction suggests a curious inquiry, whether beauty be a primary or only a secondary quality of objects? The question is easily determined with respect to the beauty of color; for, if color be a secondary quality, existing nowhere but in the mind of the spectator, its beauty must exist there also. This conclusion equally holds with respect to the beauty of utility, which is plainly a conception of the mind, arising not from sight, but from reflecting that the thing is fitted for some good end or purpose. The question is more intricate with re

* [Dr. James Beattie takes a more just and enlarged view of this topic, in saying: "Colors inhere not in the colored body, but in the light that falls upon 't; and a body presents to our eye that color which predominates in the rays of light reflected by it; and different bodies reflect different sorts of rays, according to the texture and consistency of their minute parts. Now the component parts of bodies, and the rays of light, are not in the mind; and therefore colors, as well as bodies, are things external; and the word color denotes always an external thing, and never a sensation in the mind."

Again, he justly remarks: "We perceive colors and figures by the eye; we also perceive that some colors and figures are beautiful, and others not. This Fower of perceiving beauty, which the brutes have not, though they see as well as we, I call a secondary sense."]

188. Progress from simplicity to complex forms and profuse ornament, illustrated in arts, cond et, literary style, &c. Also, among the ancients, in architecture.

spect to the beauty of regularity; for, if regularity be a primary quality, why not also its beauty? That this is not a good inference. will appear from considering, that beauty, in its very conception, refers to a percipient; for an object is said to be beautiful, for no other reason but that it appears so to a spectator: the same piece of matter that to a man appears beautiful, may possibly appear ugly to a being of a different species. Beauty, therefore, which for its existence depends on the percipient as much as on the object perceived, cannot be an inherent property in either. And hence it is wittily observed by the poet, that beauty is not in the loved, but in the lover's eye.

person be190. This reasoning is solid; and the only cause of doubt or hesitation is, that we are taught a different lesson by sense: a singular determination of nature makes us perceive both beauty and color as belonging to the object, and, like figure or extension, as inherent properties. This mechanism is uncommon; and when nature, to fulfil her intention, prefers any singular method of operation, we may be certain of some final cause that cannot be reached by ordinary means. For the beauty of some objects we are indebted entirely to nature; but, with respect to the endless variety of objects that owe their beauty to art and culture, the perception of beauty greatly promotes industry; being to us a strong additional incitement to enrich our fields, and improve our manufactures. These however are but slight effects, compared with the connections that are formed among individuals in society by means of this singular mechanism: the qualifications of the head and heart form undoubtedly the most solid and most permanent connections; but external beauty, which lies more in view, has a more extensive influence in forming these connections; at any rate, it concurs in an eminent degree with mental qualifications to produce social intercourse, mutual good-will, and consequently mutual aid and support, which are the life of society.

["That which in the smallest compass exhibits the greatest variety of beauty, is a fine human face. The features are of various sizes and forms; the corresponding ones exactly uniform; and each has that shape, size, position, and proportion, which is most convenient. Here too is the greatest beauty of colors, which are blended, varied, and disposed with marvellous delicacy. But the chief beauty of the countenance arises from its expression, of sagacity, good-nature, cheerfulness, modesty, and other moral and intellectual virtues. Without such expression, no face can be truly beautiful, and with it, none can be really ugly. Human beauty, therefore, at least that of the face, is not merely a corporeal quality; but derives its origin

189. Do heat and cold, smell, taste, and color, exist in material bodies?-Dr. Beattio's remarks on color.-Secondary qualities and primary distinguished.-Whether beauty is a primary or secondary quality of bodies.--What is said of beauty of color; of beauty of utility; of beauty of regularity.-What beauty, in its very conception, refers to.

and essential characters from the soul; and almost any person may, in some degree, acquire it, who is at pains to improve his understanding, to repress criminal thoughts, and to cherish good affections; as every one must lose it, whatever features or complexion there may be to boast of who leaves the mind uncultivated, or a prey to evil passions, or a slave to trifling pursuits."-Beattie.

Cole, the distinguished American painter, speaks thus of beauty: "Irving was rather disappointed in the scenes in which Scott so much delighted. After all, beauty is in the mind. A scene is rather an index to feelings and associations. History and poetry made the barren hills of Scotland glorious to Scott: Irving remembered the majestic forests and the rich luxuriance of his own country. What a beautiful exemplification of the power of poetry was that remark of the old carpenter who had been a companion of Burns and it seemed to him that the country had grown more beautiful since Burns had written his bonnie little sangs about it."" To the remarks made by our author on the subject of beauty, the following from Cousin make a valuable addition:

"Above real beauty, is a beauty of another order-ideal beauty. The ideal resides neither in an individual, nor in a collection of individuals. Nature or experience furnishes us the occasion of conceiving it, but it is essentially distinct. Let it once be conceived, and all natural figures, though never so beautiful, are only images of a superior beauty which they do not realize. Give me a beautiful action, and I will imagine one still more beautiful. The Apollo itself is open to criticism in more than one respect. The ideal continually recedes as we approach it. Its last termination is in the infinite, that is to say, in God; or, to speak mcre correctly, the true and absolute ideal is nothing else than God himself."

"God is, par excellence, the beautiful-for what object satisfies more all our faculties, our reason, our imagination, our heart! He offers to reason the highest idea, beyond which it has nothing more to seek; to imagination the most ravishing contemplation; to the heart a sovereign object of love. He is, then, perfectly beautiful; but is he not sublime, also, in other ways? If he extends the horizon of thought, it is to confound it in the abyss of his greatness. If the soul blooms at the spectacle of his goodness, has it not also reason to be affrighted at the idea of his justice, which is not less present to it? At the same time that he is the life, the light, the inovement, the ineffable grace of visible and finite nature, he is also called the Eternal, the Invisible, the Infinite, the Absolute Unity, and the Being of beings."-Lect. vii. p. 151, Appleton's Ed.]

190. What lesson, on this subject, our senses teach.-The ends answered by this refer ence of beauty to the object and not to the percipient.-Connections formed among indi viduals in society. -Remarks on the human face.-Cole's remarks on beauty.-Cousin'a remarks on ideal beauty.

PART II.

THE THEORY OF BEAUTY.

(Condensed from LORD JEFFREY's Review of Alison on Taste, 1841.)

191. THERE are some decisive objections against the nction of beauty being a simple sensation, or the object of a separate and peculiar faculty.

The first, is the want of agreement as to the presence and existence of beauty in particular objects, among men whose, organization is perfect, and who are plainly possessed of the faculty, whatever it may be, by which beauty is discerned. Now no such thing happens, or can be conceived to happen, in the case of any other simple sensation, or the exercise of any other distinct faculty. Where one man sees light, all men who have eyes see light also. All men allow grass to be green, and sugar to be sweet. to be sweet. With regard to beauty, however, the case is entirely different. One man sees it perpetually, where to another it is quite invisible, or even where its reverse seems to be conspicuous. But how can we believe that beauty is the object of a peculiar sense or faculty, when persons undoubtedly possessed of the faculty, and even in an eminent degree, can discover nothing of it in objects where it is distinctly felt and perceived by others with the same use of the faculty? This consideration seems conclusive against the supposition of beauty being a real property of objects, addressing itself to the power of Taste, as a separate sense or faculty; and it suggests that our sense of it is the result of other more elementary feelings into which it may be resolved.

192. A second objection arises from the almost infinite variety of things to which the property of beauty is ascribed, and the impossibility of imagining any one inherent quality which can belong to them all, and yet at the same time possess so much unity as to pass universally by the same name, and be recognized as the peculiar object of a separate sense or faculty. The form of a fine tree is beautiful, and the form of a fine woman, and the form of a column, and a vase, and a chandelier; yet how can it be said that the form of a woman has any thing in common with that of a tree or a temple? or to which of the senses, by which forms are distinguished, can it appear that they have any resemblance or affinity? The matter, however, becomes still more inextricable when we

191. The first objection urged against the notion of beauty being a simple sensation.

recollect that beauty does not belong merely to forms or colors, but to sounds, and perhaps to the objects of other senses; nay, that in all languages and in all nations it is not supposed to reside exclusively in material objects, but to belong also to sentiments and ideas, and intellectual and moral existences. But if things intellectual and totally segregated from matter may thus possess beauty, how can it possibly be a quality of material objects? or what sense or faculty can that be whose proper office it is to intimate to us the existence of some property which is common to a flower and a demonstration, a valley and an eloquent discourse?

193. If, in reply, it be said that all these objects, however various and dissimilar, agree at least in being agreeable, and that this agreeableness, which is the only quality they possess in common, may probably be the beauty which is ascribed to them all, we answer :-that though the agreeableness of such objects depends plainly enough upon their beauty, it by no means follows, but quite the contrary, that their beauty depends upon their agreeableness, the latter being the more comprehensive, or generic term, under which beauty must rank as one of the species.

(1) Agreeableness, in general, cannot be the same with beauty, because there are very many things in the highest degree agreeable that can in no sense be called beautiful. We learn nothing of the nature of beauty, therefore, by merely classing it among our pleasurable emotions.

(2) Among all the objects that are agreeable, whether they are also beautiful or not, scarcely any two are agreeable on account of the same qualities, or even suggest their agreeableness to the same faculty or organ. The truth is, that agreeableness is not properly a quality of any object whatsoever, but the effect or result of certain qualities, the nature of which, in any particular instance, we can generally define pretty exactly, or of which we know at least with certainly that they manifest themselves respectively to some one particular sense or faculty, and to no other; and consequently, it would be just as obviously ridiculous to suppose a faculty or organ, whose office it was to perceive agreeableness in general, as to suppose that agreeableness was a distinct quality that could thus be perceived. The words beauty and beautiful are universally felt to mean something much more definite than agreeableness or gratification in general; and the force and clearness of our perception of that something is demonstrated by the readiness with which we determine, in any particular instance, whether the object of a given pleasurable emotion is or is not properly described as beauty.

194. In our opinion, our sense of beauty depends entirely on our

192. The second objection.--Whether beauty belong to forms or colors alone. 193. It is replied that various objects of beauty are alike in one respect, that of agreea bleness, and that this may be the beauty which is ascribed to them all. Two answers to this statement.