that parodies degrade, or imply a stigma on the subject; on the contrary, they in general imply something serious or sacred in the originals. Without this they would be good for nothing; for the immediate contrast would be wanting, and with this they are sure to tell. The best parodies are, accordingly, the best and most striking things reversed. Witness the common travesties of Homer and Vigil."-Hazlitt, Lect. I.] 316 Those who have a talent for ridicule, which is seldom united with a taste for delicate and refined beauties, are quick-sighted in improprieties; and these they eagerly grasp in order to gratify their favorite propensity. Persons galled are provoked to maintain, that ridicule is improper for grave subjects. Subjects really grave are by no means fit for ridicule: but then it is urged against them, that when it is called in question whether a certain subject be really grave, ridicule is the only means of determining the controversy Hence a celebrated question, Whether ridicule be or be not a test o truth? I give this question a place here, because it tends to illus trate the nature of ridicule. gian The question stated in accurate terms is, Whether the sense of ridicule be the proper test for distinguishing ridiculous objects, from what are not so. Taking it for granted, that ridicule is not a subject of reasoning, but of sense or taste (see chap. x. compared with chap. vii.), I proceed thus. No person doubts but that our sense of beauty is the true test of what is beautiful; and our sense of deur, of what is great or sublime. Is it more doubtful whether our sense of ridicule be the true test of what is ridiculous? It is not only the true test, but indeed the only test; for this subject comes not, more than beauty or grandeur, under the province of reason. If any subject, by the influence of fashion or custom, have acquired a degree of veneration to which naturally it is not entitled, what are the proper means for wiping off the artificial coloring, and displaying the subject in its true light? A man of true taste sees the subject without disguise; but if he hesitate, let him apply the test of ridicule, which separates it from its artificial connections, and exposes it naked with all its native improprieties. 317. But it is urged, that the gravest and most serious matters may be set in a ridiculous light. Hardly so; for where an object is neither risible nor improper, it lies not open in any quarter to an attack from ridicule. But supposing the fact, I foresee not any harmful consequence. By the same sort of reasoning, a talent for wit ought to be condemned, because it may be employed to bur lesque a great or lofty subject. Such irregular use made of a talent for wit or ridicule, cannot long impose upon mankind: it cannot stand the test of correct and delicate taste; and truth will at last 315. A parody. Example from the Rape of the Lock.-Remarks of Hazlitt. 316. Whether ridicule is a test of truth. Question stated in accurate terms aor's argument, The prevail even with the vulgar. To condemn a talent for ridicule be cause it may be perverted to wrong purposes, is not a little ridiculous' could one forbear to smile, if a talent for reasoning were condemned because it also may be perverted? and yet the conclusion in the latter case, would be not less just than in the former: perhaps more just; for no talent is more frequently perverted than that of reason. We had best leave nature to her own operations: the most valuable talents may be abused, and so may that of ridicule: let us bring it under proper culture if we can, without endeavoring to pluck it up by the root. Were we destitute of this test of truth, I know not what might be the consequences: I see not what rule would be left us to prevent splendid trifles passing for matters of importance, and show and form for substance, and superstition or enthusiasm for pure religion. 318. [While there is much truth in the statements above made concerning Ridicule, there is also much and dangerous error. As Dr. Blair observes: "Many vices might be more successfully exploded by employing ridicule against them, than by serious attacks and arguments. At the same time it must be confessed, that ridicule is an instrument of such a nature, that when managed by unskilful or improper hands, there is hazard of its doing mischief, instead of good, to society. For ridicule is far from being, as some have maintained it to be, a test of truth. On the contrary, it is apt to mislead and seduce, by the colors which it throws upon its objects; and it is often more difficult to judge whether these colors be natural and proper, than it is to distinguish between simple truth and error. Licentious writers, therefore, of the comic class, have too often had it in their power to cast a ridicule upon characters and objects which did not deserve it." 319. Lord Shaftesbury advocated the same false doctrine as Lord Kames; but Dr. Leland has clearly exposed his error, in the following remarks: "The best and wisest men in all ages have always recommended a calm attention and sobriety of mind, a cool and impartial examination and inquiry, as the properest disposition for finding out truth, and judging concerning it. But according to his lordship's representation of the case, those that apply themselves to the searching out of truth, or judging what is really true, serious, and excellent, must endeavor to put themselves in a merry humor, to raise up a gayety of spirit, and seek whether in the object they are examining they cannot find out something that may be justly laughed at. And it is great odds that a man who is thus disposed will find out something fit, as he imagines, to excite his mirth, in the most serious and important subject in the world. Such a temper is so far from being a help to a fair and unprejudiced nquiry, that it is 317. Objection stated and replied to.-Is ridicule to be abandoned?-Importance of a talent for ridicule. 318. Remark on Kames' doctrine concerning ridicule.-Dr. Blair's observationa one of the greatest hindrances to it. A strong turn to ridicule has a tendency to disqualify a man for cool and sedate reflection, and to render him impatient of the pains that are necessary to a rational and deliberate search." **** 320. Dr. Leland proceeds to say:-"Our noble author, indeed, frequently observes that truth cannot be hurt by ridicule, since, when the ridicule is wrong placed, it will not hold. It will readily be allowed that truth and honesty cannot be the subject of just ridicule; but then this supposes that ridicule itself must be brought to the test of cool reason; and accordingly his lordship acknowledges, that it is in reality a serious study to temper and regulate that humor. And thus, after all, we are to return to gravity and serious reason, as the ultimate test and criterion of ridicule, and of every thing else. But though the most excellent things cannot be justly ridiculed, and ridicule, when thus applied, will, in the judgment of thinking men, render him that uses it ridiculous; yet there are many persons on whom it will have a different effect. The ridicule will be apt to create prejudices in their minds, and to inspire them with a contempt, or at least a disregard of things, which, when represented in a proper light, appear to be of the greatest worth and importance... Weak and unstable minds have been driven into atheism, profaneness, and vice, by the force of ridicule, and have been made ashamed of that which they ought to esteem their glory."] CHAPTER XIII. WIT. 321. Wir is a quality of certain thoughts and expressions: the term is never applied to an action nor a passion, and as little to an external object. However difficult it may be, in many instances, to distinguish a witty thought or expression from one that is not so, yet, in general, it may be laid down that the term wit is appropriated to such thoughts and expressions as are ludicrous, and also occasion some degree of surprise by their singularity. Wit, also, in a figurative sense, expresses a talent for inventing ludicrous thoughts or expres sions: we say commonly a witty man, or a man of wit. 819. Dr. Leland's strictures upon Shaftesbury.-The method of searching out truth suggested by the wisest men.-Lord Shaftesbury's proposed method. Objections to his method.-Effect of a strong turn for ridicule. 320. Remarks on the statement that truth cannot be hurt by ridicule.-Reason the uiti mate test, of what?-Bad effect of ridiculing sacred things. Wit in its proper sense, as explained above, is distinguishable intc two kinds: wit in the thought, and wit in the words or expression. Again, wit in the thought is of two kinds: ludicrous images, and ludicrous combinations of things that have little or no natural relation. Ludicrous images that occasion surprise by their singularity, as having little or no foundation in nature, are fabricated by the imagination: and the imagination is well qualified for the office; being of all our faculties the most active, and the least under restraint. Take the following example: Shylock. You knew (none so well, none so well as you) of my daughter's flight. Sulino. That's certain: I for my part knew the tailor that made the wings she flew withal. Merchant of Venice, Act III. Sc. 1. The image here is undoubtedly witty. It is ludicrous and it must occasion surprise; for having no natural foundation, it is altogether unexpected. [According to Hazlitt, "the ludicrous is where there is a contradiction between the object and our expectations, heightened by some deformity or inconvenience, that is, by its being contrary to what is customary or desirable; as the ridiculous, which is the highest degree of the laughable, is that which is contrary not only to custom, but to sense and reason, or is a voluntary departure from what we have a right to expect from those who are conscious of absurdity and propriety in words, looks, and actions."] 322. The other branch, of wit in the thought, is that only which is taken notice of by Addison, following Locke, who defines it "to lie in the assemblage of ideas; and putting those together, with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy." (B. . ch. xi. sect. 2.) It may be defined more concisely, and perhaps more accurately, "A junction of things by distant and fanciful relations, which surprise because they are unexpected." (See chapter i.) The following is a proper example: We grant, although he had much wit, He was very shy of using it, As being loth to wear it out; As men their best apparel do.-Hudibras, Canto i. Wit is of all the most elegant recreation: the image enters the mind with gayety, and gives a sudden flash, which is extremely pleasant. Wit thereby Wit thereby gently elevates without straining, raises mirth without dissoluteness, and relaxes while it entertains. 88i. To what the term wit is appropriated.--In a figurative sense, to what applied.Two kinds of wit in the proper sense. Two kinds of wit in thought.-The source of Indicrous images.-Haz itt's account of the ludicrous. [Wit and humor compared.-"Humor is describing the ludi crous as it is in itself; wit is the exposing it, by comparing or contrasting it with something else. Humor is the growth of nature and accident; wit is the product of art and fancy. Humor, as it is shown in books, is an imitation of the natural or acquired absurdities of mankind, or of the ludicrous in accident, situation, and character, wit is the illustrating and heightening the sense of that absurdity by some sudden and unexpected likeness or opposition of one thing to another, which sets off the quality we laugh at or despise in a still more contemptible or striking point of view. Wit, as distinguished from poetry, is the imagination or fancy inverted, and so applied to given objects as to make the little look less, the mean more light and worthless; or to divert our admiration or wean our affections from that which is lofty and impressive, instead of producing a more intense admiration and exalted passion, as poetry does. Wit hovers round the borders of the light and trifling, whether in matters of pleasure or pain; for as soon as it describes the serious seriously, it ceases to be wit, and passes into a different form. The favorite employment of wit is to add littleness to littleness, and heap contempt on insignificance by all the arts of petty and incessant warfare; or if it ever affects to aggrandize and use the language of hyperbole, it is only to betray into derision by a fatal com parison, as in the mock-heroic; or if it treats of serious passion, it must do so as to lower the tone of intense and high-wrought sentiment by the introduction of burlesque and familiar circumstances."Hazlitt.] 323. Wit in the expression, commonly called a play of words, being a bastard sort of wit, is reserved for the last place. I proceed to examples of wit in the thought; and first of ludicrous images. Falstaff, speaking of his taking Sir John Coleville of the Dale: Here he is, and here I yield him; and I beseech your Grace, let it be book'd with the rest of this day's deeds: or, by the Lord, I will have it in a particular ballad else, with mine own picture on the top of it, Coleville kissing my foot: to the which course if I be enforced, if you do not all show like gilt twopences to me; and I, in the clear sky of fame, o'ershine you as much as the full moon doth the cinders of the element, which show like pin's-heads to her; believe not the word of the Noble. Therefore let me have right, and let desert mount -Second Part Henry IV. Act IV. Sc. 6. I knew, when seven justices could not take up a quarrel, but when the parties were met themselves, one of them thought but of an if; as, If you said so, then I said so; and they shook hands, and swore brothers. Your if is the only peacemaker; much virtue in if.-Shakspeare. An I have forgotten what the inside of a church is made of, I am a peppercorn, a brewer's horse: The inside of a church! Company, villanous company, hath been the spoil of me.-Ib. The war hath introduced abundance of polysyllables, which will never be able to live many more campaigns. Speculations, operations, preliminaries, 822. Definitions of the other branch, of wit in the thought. Examole from Hudibras Wit, as a recreation-Wit, distinguished from humor, and from poetry. |