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both in the text and notes, that they may readily be distinguished from the original matter, have been inclosed in brackets. The most important of these are derived from Cousin on the Beautiful; from Lectures of Barron, Hazitt, and President Hopkins; from Lord Jeffrey's celebrated dissertation on Beauty (in his Review of Alison on Taste); and from an elaborate essay on the Philosophy of Style, contained in a somewhat recent number of the Westminster Review. By these, and numerous other additions, where they seemed to be most needed, great value has been added to the original work; and in scarcely a less degree, by striking from it a large amount of matter that greatly impairs its excellence and usefulness.
5. It may also be stated, as a part of the Editor's labor, that he has prepared a new Analysis of the work, which, for the convenience both of teacher and student, has been distributed at the bottom of each page, with references to the paragraphs in which the topics are discussed.
It will be seen, therefore, that the present volume is not an abridgment of Kames, but it embraces the entire work, with the exception only of those portions which every instructor and intelligent reader must regards® blemishes, or consider useless, white large additions have been made, from recent and valuable sources to render more complete and satisfactory the comparable treatise (as here presented) of this highly talented, and..justly dis tinguished and popular author.
GENEVA, N. Y., Feb. 2,355.
TERMS DEFINED OR EXPLAINED.
1. EVERY thing we perceive or are conscious of, whether a being or a quality, a passion or an action, is with respect to the percipient termed an object. Some objects appear to be internal, or within the mind; passion, for example, thinking, volition: some external; such as every object of sight, of hearing, of smell, of touch, of taste.
2. That act of the mind which makes known to me an external object, is termed perception. That act of the mind which makes known to me an internal object, is termed consciousness. The power or faculty from which consciousness proceeds, is termed an internal sense. The power or faculty from which perception proceeds, is termed an external sense. This distinction refers to the objects of our knowledge; for the senses, whether external or internal, are all of them powers or faculties of the mind.
3. But as self is an object that cannot be termed either external or internal, the faculty by which I have knowledge of myself, is a sense that cannot properly be termed either internal or external.
4. By the eye we perceive figure, color, motion, &c.: by the ear we perceive the different qualities of sound, high, low, loud, soft : by touch we perceive rough, smooth, hot, cold, &c.: by taste we perceive sweet, sour, bitter, &c.: by smell we perceive fragrant, fetid, &c. These qualities partake the common nature of all qualities, that they are not capable of an independent existence, but must belong to some being of which they are properties or attributes. A being with respect to its properties or attributes is termed a subject or substratum. Every substratum of visible qualities, is termed substance; and of tangible qualities, body.
5. Substance and sound are perceived as existing at a distance from the organ; often at a considerable distance. But smell, touch, and taste are perceived as existing at the organ of sense.
6. The objects of external sense are various. Substances are perceived by the eye; bodies by the touch. Sounds, tastes, and smells, passing commonly under the name of secondary qualities, require more explanation than there is room for here. All the objects of internal sense are attributes: witness deliberation, reason