that their praiseworthy and toilsome studies, though they have conferred rich benefits upon all succeeding ages, have not accomplished every thing, but have left a terra incognita which makes ample room for the investigations of others. The translation of Cousin in this country and the metaphysical treatises of Professor Upham, the Psychology of the lamented President of Marshall College, Dr Rauch, and now, the Mental Philosophy of Dr. Schmucker, may be regarded as convincing evidence both that the science of mind admits of additional elucidation, and that there is a demand for it. It is creditable to our country, and its literature, that so much has been done in this department, and done so well.

Much was anticipated, when, in the forthcoming Psychology of Dr. Rauch, a promise was given, that the metaphysics of the English Language should be incorporated with the German. Many, who had received but vague rumors concerning the metaphysical principles adopted in that land of profound learning, and deep rescarch-Germany-who desired, to be initiated through the medium of our vernacular idiom, and by one who had rendered himself familiar with our modes of thinking and speaking on these subjects, into the explanation of the human mind, as given by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Heinroth, Schubert, and cthers, hailed with joy the appearance of that work, a year or two since. How much was accomplished towards gratifying these desires, and what position the author will take amongst our metaphysicians, it is not our province now to determine. It may not be improper, however, to express the opinion, that neither they who have been lavish in their praises, nor they who have been heated in their condemnation of the work, have hit upon the proper medium. The Psychology of Dr. Schmucker comes before us, too, with peculiar pretensions, and raises in consequence of them, peculiar expectations. It may be asserted, that a system of metaphysics could appear under no more auspicious banner than that which is hung out by this. It professes to be the product not of the study of the patriarchs of the science, but of original examination of the mind, or, to express it in the wonted phraseology of the craft, the exercise of consciousness in regard to the author's mental operations. The propriety and the value of this method all the initiated will concede. Its difficulty has deterred many from undertaking it, and but few comparatively have

pushed it to any great extent. But notwithstanding the magnitude of the undertaking, our author has, during years of patient study, ventured independently to analyze his own mental processes. The history of his procedure, and the classification of our mental actions are here given us. Such a contribution, from such a mind, ought to be regarded as a present of no inconsiderable value.

The matter is viewed by us in this light. There are yet, after ages of study, dark places in the human mind. These are to be illuminated, not by compiling systems from Locke, and Reid, and Stewart, and Brown; not by new arrangements of old matter; not by additional beautiful illustrations of known truths. but by repairing to the mind itself, catching up and detaining its fleeting operations, and making them the subjects of thorough investigation. The author of this book, in the true spirit of the Baconian philosophy, discards for the time, the labors of others, and engages in proper efforts of induction, to obtain firmer footing. In pursuing this course he has not failed. Those who read his book, and we venture to predict that it will be extensively read, will not fail to perceive that he has planted his standard in advance of his predecessors. He takes his place among original aud independent thinkers, and deserves to be enrolled-an honor which we would not allow to the mere compiler, or teacher of mental philosophy-among metaphysicians; with such men as Kant, Heinroth, Schubert in Germany, Locke, Reid, Stewart and Brown, in Great Britain.

His position may be ascertained by the following extracts from his preface. "About sixteen years ago, having been called to take charge of a Theological Seminary, he felt it a duty to devote particular attention to his instructions in this department, and formed a resolution, which has doubtless had some influence on this system. He had considerable acquaintance with the patriarchs of British Metaphysics, Locke, Reid, Stewart, and Brown, as well as some few German authors; but neither of them seemed to present an entirely natural and satisfactory exhibition of his own mental phenomena. He then resolved to study exclusively his own mind, and for ten years, he read no book on this subject. During this period, he spent much of his time in the examination of his own mental phenomena; and having travelled over the whole ground, and employed the leisure of several

additional years to review and mature his views, he now presents to the public the following outline of a system, as in all its parts the result of original, analytic induction.". Dr. Schmucker adds, that the publication appears "after frequent solicitations from those who heard the author's lectures, and from other gentlemen of high literary and scientific rank, who examined the manuscript, and that the work is at length submitted to the public, with an earnest solicitude that it may subserve the cause of truth and human happiness. The author does not flatter himself that his views on all the topics discussed, have reached entire accuracy; he will thankfully receive and carefully weigh any suggestion which may be made, especially if presented in the spirit of benevolence, or of literary comity." In the above remarks, we have an expose of the nature of the work, and it every where bears marks of such an origin. The names of celebrated writers on mental philosophy, do not present themselves on every page to endorse opinions or illustrate facts. The writer speaks for himself. He presents his own mental movements. His prompter is the microcosm within him, in the various phases that it presents under the influence of the material world. In a rapid, but very interesting sketch, there is given an outline of the various systems of classification which have been adopted by metaphysicians. No one is sufficiently comprehensive and clear. The nearest approximations to the author's own views are found in German writers. Their arrangement, as we have frequently met with it in different authors, coincides more nearly with that of our author than he appears to have seen. Our understanding of the three leading powers, Vorstellungs vermögen or Erkentniss vermögen, Gefiehls vermögen, and Begehrens vermögen, as given by them, coincides in the main with the knowledge, feeling, and action of Prof. Schmucker, though the materials embraced in them are somewhat different. Our attention was first directed to it in the Moral, a system of Ethics of the celebrated Dr. Reinhard, the first edition of which, was published before the end of the last century. Professor Fischhaber, with whom we have no acquaintance, has not done justice to the logical character of the German mind, in the order in which he arranges the powers, as cited in this work. The general arrangement is, in other German writers, presented precisely in the order of succession in which our author's is given. Of

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its correctness, no one can doubt. Professor Upham, in his interesting work, on mental science, has at last, fairly arrived at an adjustment of the mental states, which is substantially the same. No other classification will hereafter be used. Whatever terms may be employed to designate these classes of mental operations, they will appear to be equivalent to intellectual sentiment, and active, or as the author expresses it,

1. Cognitive ideas,
2. Sentient ideas,
3. Active operations.

Without discussing the subject, it is taken for granted, that there are no innate ideas. The origin of our knowledge is first explained. The material world in its various aspects, through the medium of the organic senses, is regarded as its source. The whole discussion on this subject is entirely in the spirit of Locke, and indeed throughout the work, we perceive a mode of thinking, and a class of results which harmonize more nearly with those of that celebrated metaphysician than with those of any other.

The remarks on the cognitive class of ideas are admirable. The detail of their extent is very accurately given. The observations on consciousness are deserving of notice, though we do not understand the author to differ from the views of Dr. Brown, endorsed subsequently by Payne. In the account of conscience, we object to our author's position. It belongs rather to the sentient part of our nature, and is closely connected with active operations. Its materials are doubtless furnished by intellections, and it is modified by them; but its essence is the feeling of approbation, or disapprobation, followed by feelings of obligation. Our author, indeed, does make it both cognitive and active, but we wish he had been more explicit on the sentient part, both on account of the importance of the subject, and the apparent rejection, with which he may be charged, of a moral sense.

Unusual pains have been taken in this work to classify the various objects of our knowledge, and a terminology has been introduced, which we confess, we should have preferred not to see. It gives a pedantic air to the work, which ill accords with the manly, lucid, and we will say, metaphysical style of the book. If the ordinary mode of speaking of

external objects had been selected, it would better have suited our taste, and perhaps attracted some who have a great horror of books treating familiar subjects in an unusual manner. We have not much to say about this classification, except that the author has taken new ground, or revived old, in regard to what he calls absolute entities. Here he is a thorough realist, and gives not only name, but a “local habitation" to those fleeting entities, time and space, and number.

To accord the praise of ingenuity to these speculations is easy. It may be admitted that there is some plausibility in what is said of space. It is less difficult to consider it as something existing without, and to give it a place amongst material existences, but when the same is asked for time and number, it produces a pause and a balancing of thought. After all, we must consent to remain, we suppose, where our recent metaphysicians have agreed to place us in this matter, incapable of giving any other account of these ideas, than that they are under certain circumstances suggested to the mind. They have an internal origin. For them, we are indebted to the pure reason as a Kantian would say,—to reflection as a disciple of Locke would express himself, or to original suggestion as would be said by our later writers on metaphysics.

We prefer to occupy the position in which we are placed, by those who tell us-answering the views of those who coincide with our author, and expressing their own,-" if it were of external origin, (the notion of space,) as asserted by Locke, if it could properly be said to come into the mind by the way of sensation, we should be able to make such a reference of it. But let us enquire. It will evidently not be pretended, that the notion of space is to be ascribed to the senses of taste, of smell, or of hearing. And can it be ascribed to the sense of touch? Is it a matter of feeling? A single consideration will suggest a satisfactory answer. will certainly be acknowledged, that we can have no knowledge, by the sense of touch,-with the single exception, perhaps, of the ideas of heat and cold, which are sometimes ascribed to it,-of any thing which does not present some resistance. The degree of resistance may greatly vary, but there will be always some. But no one will undertake to say that resistance is a quality of space, or enters any way

It