ations is ascribed to the nature of the soul, which, by its constitution is active. To the question, Why does the soul, at any given time, engage in one of the active operations rather than another, it is said, "Every individual will unhesitatingly reply, that these operations are engaged in, in one of two ways: either from deliberate choice, or from habit." The mode of occurrence in the active operations is then said to be two-fold:-1. Voluntary; 2. Spontaneous. The whole subject of the freedom of the will is discussed in a very satisfactory manner, and the account of the constitutional inclinations by which we are influenced, presents the whole matter in a novel light, and renders this part of the work particularly instructive. It enables us to solve the manifestations of man's moral structure, and shows clearly the source of the light and shade of human character. We do not know that we are prepared to adopt the author's philosophy in regard to habitual actions. The facility of performance, does not appear to us to exclude the precursory agency. Does not the author's view, though contrary to his expressed opinion, in regard to spontaneous actions, place them beyond the region of responsibility-at least to a considerable extent?

If, in any action of conformity, or non-conformity to the law of God, the self-determining power of the will is wanting, does it not cease to be praise or blame-worthy? How much better are spontaneous actions of the mind than necessary actions? In all cases, in which the will determines the action, we must suppose renewed effort to be necessary, however slight may be our consciousness of it.

The style of this work, as we have incidentally mentioned, is chaste, perspicuous, and adapted to the subject. It cannot be said of the metaphysics of Dr. Schmucker, as was said of Dr. Brown's, that they are too poetical. The language is precise, and as before stated metaphysical, that is, suited to discussions of this nature. We may mention with most decided approbation the religious aspects of the work. It is Christian metaphysics, and in this respect will take its place by the side of the admirable treatises of Professor Upham. It is the work of a theologian, and in looking at the human mind, he could hardly fail to perceive the theological bearings of his discoveries, and perceiving, to make them known. If we have given high praise to this system of mental philosophy, it has not been indiscriminate. We have endeavored to

give our impressions honestly. We have no sympathy with that criticism which praises, or blames, without reference to truth. Truth should be our guide always, and to this every thing should be sacrificed.

We leave this work with sincere respect for the abilities of the author, gratitude for his labors, which have been brought to so successful an issue, with the sincere wish that he may secure such a reward as a Christian man should desire, and with the determination to make use of his labors, in our future efforts to teach ingenuous youth the philosophy of the noblest part of God's creation,—the immortal mind of immortal man.

ARTICLE IX.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON PANTHEISM.

Translated from the Revue Théologique, by the Junior Editor.

WE have heard incessantly, for some years, that Pantheism threatens to become the dominant system of philosophy, and we are pointed to all the evils, as already pressing on us, which are accumulated on those enervated persons, who have fallen asleep in that base and dangerous doctrine. The apprehensions on this subject seem to us exaggerated. That system may be adopted happily, by some solitary thoughtful, secluded from the noise and bustle of the world, and conversant rather with books than with men, it may even, if you please, gather around it some adepts, and become the banner of a whole sect, as has sometimes happened; but do you suppose that it can effect anything in the world, in the midst of real life, in a moment, and among the people, where everything turns to a frightful positivism, to a disgusting utilitarianism. It is deplorable, indeed, not to be preserved from excess and from an ultra error, and one that is fatal; but the sad spectacle which society presents, ought to make us fear less the ingress of pantheistic doctrines, than the scepticism and egoism which menace the foundations of society.

Pantheism is, from its very nature, little suited to become popular; moreover, a system requiring a considerable amount of exaltation, stands little chance of success in an age when everything seems to be a matter of calculation; and in fine, of all philosophical opinions it is the one most repugnant to French character, of which the two principal traits, activity and the feeling of personality, are incompatible with a mode of perception, which compels man to abdicate his individuality in order to repose in the bosom of the absolute.

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Besides, a mere momentary interest is not enough to call our attention to pantheism; an interest purely scientific and philosophical, as it seems to us, is alone sufficient to engage the mind in an examination of a theory, which, like all the grand systems, is reproduced in every philosophical movement, which has played, and still plays an important part in the history of human thought, and which, more than once, has exercised some influence on theological doctrines. We do not pretend to make a complete work on the subject; our intention is only to offer some considerations for the purpose of exhibiting, in general, what pantheism is, and appreciating it at its proper value. Two things are included in this intention. In the first place we shall endeavor to give an idea of pantheism as complete and exact as we possibly can, and in the second place, point out the causes from which it arises, and at the same time the errors connected with it, and the dangers it presents, either in the field of thought, or in that of practical life.

I. General exposition of Pantheism.-Of all the questions presented to the human mind, none is more capable of exciting its curiosity than that of the relation of the world to God. It is evident that, on this subject, we can only express some hypotheses, more or less dependent on some induction and some analogies; but each system furnishes one in harmony always with its own point of view. We are not here to be occupied about those different suppositions, we wish to speak only of that proposed by pantheists, and which constitutes the essense of their system. It may be said that pantheism consists entirely in the hypothesis on which it pretends to explain the relation which God sustains to the universe. It is that which constitutes and characterizes it. To unfold the manner in which it understands and undertakes to explain that relation, is to say what pantheism is all the rest of the system is but a logical consequence of that opinion.

And first, pantheism differs in its notion of that relation from theism. Whilst the latter regards God as the author, and the world as his work, the former looks upon God as a principle, of which the world is a necessary and logical consequence. Hence, there is an essential difference in the ideas which those systems present of the world and of God. According to theism, God and the world differ in their natures; according to pantheism, the world is but an external manifestation of the same essence with the Deity. The former represents God as a conscious and free agent, who created the world by an act of his own will; the latter, as a power living and active, necessarily producing the world as the result of its unceasing activity.

We are now able to form an idea of the whole theory on that important question. The basis is the same in all the systems arising from that point of view; the developments, the proofs, the mode of presentment, are the only things that differ in any of them. In all, God is a natura naturans and the world a natura naturata.* The former is the immanent principle of the latter, as our spirit is the immanent principle of our thoughts, of our intellectual productions. Our thoughts are but our spirit manifested; so, says pantheism, the natura naturata, the world, is but the external manifestation of the natura naturans, of God.

After these general considerations, let us take a glance at the different systems which have successively formed from that point of view. This examination will give us a more precise and more complete idea of the hypothesis which lies at the foundation of all pantheistic systems.

1. The first form under which pantheism is presented in history,† is derived, on the one hand, from a view of the analogy

*Expressions consecrated by usage, anterior to Spinosa, and frequently used by him.

We pass by the pantheistic systems of India, which seem like the classic ground of pantheism. But as our object is not so much an exposition and history of all such systems, as an appreciation of the general value of their foundation, we can, without much inconvenience, allow ourselves this omission; the more so as, excepting some differences, the tendency and psychological source of the pantheism of India are the same as those of neoplatonism, of which we shall speak farther on.

supposed to be discovered between the universe and man, and on the other, from ignorance of the laws of nature. Struck with the regularity of the phenomena of the world, it inquires what is the principle on which it depends. It is believed that the principle must possess something reasonable, since a being without reason would not be able to create and maintain order so perfect as that which presides over the celesval movements and all natural phenomena. The world, therefore, is represented as having a rational principle, directing its operations, just as there is in man a spirit which directs his movements.

Consequently, pantheism admits a soul of the world, and, without determining precisely what that general soul is, it contents itself with considering it as the principle of whatever is; and in order to account for the particularity and diversity of the individual beings, it represents the world as its body, and particular souls as its effusions, its emanations.

It is easy to perceive how that hypothesis flows especially from ignorance of the laws of nature. Not being able to explain the regularity, harmony and constancy of the motions and of the life, which manifest themselves in all the kingdoms of nature, by mathematical laws which they did not understand, and which they could not even suspect, the ancients were led to think them the result of a rational principle, possessing consciousness, or at least a certain degree of knowledge. Thence, they were obliged to find some analogy between man, a being material as to his exterior, but having a spirit within directing all his movements, and that immense universe which also appeared only as a material mass, but whose very regular phenomena betrayed a species of intelligence. That analogy confirmed them in their opinion, and led them to consider it as one living whole, composed of two parts, a soul and a body, which, although distinct, sustain to each other a relation as intimate as that existing between the body and spirit of man.

That species of pantheism, which, among the ancients, was able to rest on an appearance of reason, can evidently have no chance of success in the present actual state of the physical and mathematical sciences. Accordingly, the hypothesis of a soul of the world is no longer met with in modern systems, and if the word is found in some, it is employed in a sense altogether different from that assigned to it by the

ancients.