and our only remaining inquiry is, what are the degrees of kindred to which this prohibition extends ' And here, as seems to the writer, we meet the main difficulty which has hitherto embarrassed the subject-On what principle is the law to be interpreted? There are obviously two principles, upon either of which it may be interpreted, and we shall come to very different results according as we adopt the one or the other. These two principles may be thus stated:

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1. The sixth verse, which is in the words; none of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness," is a general principle, of which the specifications which follow are only specimens, given for the pose of illustration; so that the full extent of the law can only be ascertained by applying the general principle to all other cases, where the same nearness of kindred exists, as in the cases which are specified.

2. The sixth verse states the general principle, and the specifications which follow define accurately and precisely the cases to which it is to be applied, so that no case is included in the law which is not specified.

It will be necessary for us to determine which of these principles of interpretation is the true one. The first will be called, for the sake of convenience, the principle of implication-because it extends the law by an implication claimed to be embraced in the terms used, or inferable from the nature of the case, to a considerable number of unspecified cases. It is that upon which Dr. Hodge has founded his very ingenious argument, in the case of Rev. Archibald McQueen, as reported in the New York Observer it is the doctrine of the standards of the Presbyterian church, as well as of most of the Protestant communions, having been derived by them all from a common source-the Roman Catholic church. It is also advocated, as a sound and safe principle, and even as absolutely necessary to public morals, by many great and good men. It is therefore to be examined with deference and candor. Still the writer feels himself called on entirely to dissent from it, and to maintain that the specifications which occur in 7-17 verses, are to be regarded as a precise definition of the cases, to which the general principle stated in the sixth verse is to be applied. The reasons of this dissent are the following.

1. The terms of the law do not require the principle of

implication. On the supposition that the specifications were designed completely to define the extent of the general rule, the language would not necessarily be different in any respect from what it is. Of the truth of this assertion the reader must judge for himself by a careful examination of the language of the statute. It is true that the reason of the prohibition is given; but when God gives a law and gives a reason for it, are we required to extend the law to all other cases, where we think the same reason exists? Has God any where recognized any such ability and duty on our part, to judge of reasons and of fitness in matters of divine legislation? On the other hand, if God had designed the law to be applied to other cases by implication, would he not in all probability have made the language different from what it is? Would he not have added an express authority for such extension? 2. If the general principle is not defined by the specifications, it has no definition, it is left indefinite as to its application. It is contended by some that the specified cases are a measure, by which nearness of kin is to be judged of. But what authority have we for this assumption? Certainly no such rule of measurement is recognized by the statute, and the assumption that God designed that they should be so used is entirely gratuitous. There is not in any word of the statute a hint, that this mode of limitation was intended. If, then, the specifications themselves are not a limitation of the general rule, God has provided none, and the Jewish lawyer was left at liberty to extend or contract the range of the principle, according to his own notions of fitness, propriety or necessity. Is this probable?

Dr. Sereno E. Dwight, in his "Hebrew Wife," has suggested, that a conscientious man would not be willing to marry his father's brother's daughter, lest he should commit half the sin of incest. But if this law is not limited to the specification, it is difficult to see why he should consider such a case as involving half the sin of incest, and not the whole of it. Certainly the kindred may be called near, without any misuse of language, and if so, it is embraced, according to this mode of interpretation, under the law. It is not indeed precisely so near as any that are specified, but, as has already been remarked, the law contains no warrant for instituting this standard of measurement. Indeed, according to Dr. Dwight's mode of reasoning, one would suppose that

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a conscientious man would hardly venture to marry at all, for in doing so he certainly runs a great risk of committing some smaller fraction of the sin of incest, if not the half of it.

3. The extension of a general enactment, to a variety of unspecified particular cases is very much at variance with the general tenor and character of the laws of Moses.-They are characterized, almost if not entirely without exception, by a minute and precise specification, which leaves nothing to inference or implication. Any one may satisfy himself of the truth of this remark, by collecting the Mosaic legislation, which bears on almost any single subject, as for example the priesthood, the tabernacle service, uncleanness, or the Sabbath. The principle of interpretation from which I dissent, entirely exempts the law of incest from this general characteristic of the code. Now, is it at all probable that a Jew, accustomed to be guided in all his relations to the law, by its abundant, minute and exact specifications, would see the propriety of adopting in this case, an entirely different principle of interpretation, and rest in mere implications and inference? Is it not rather evident, that he would interpret this law just as he would that of uncleanness, as applying to the cases specified and to those only?

4. The cases specified make up a system complete in itself. If they were intended merely as illustrations of the general principle, and not as a precise limitation of it, we should expect of course, that on presenting them all at one view, they would be found to have been selected indiscriminately from the various classes of cases designed to be embraced under the general statute, and to be obviously a part of an incomplete system, which was to be filled out, by applying the general rule to all other cases embraced in its terms. Now it turns out, that on presenting them all at one view, they do not appear to have been so selected, but form a complete and consistent system, without any addition. Instead of being selected indiscriminately from all the different classes, they in every case either include all of a given class, or specify none from it. To set this point in its true light, the following table has been prepared. The reader will here observe, that the specifications extend to four generations, viz., a man's father's generation, his own, his son's, and his grandson's. These are numbered in the table, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, beginning with the father's.

1st generation. 2d generation. 3rd generation. 4th generation.

Let us now examine this table, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it bears the appearance of promiscuous and incidental selection in illustration of a general principle, or of precise limitation of the cases to which a general principle is to be applied? In order that the results of this examination may be stated with clearness and brevity, it will be necessary to premise that there are three classes of relatives embraced in the table, viz., a man's own blood relatives, the blood relatives of his wife, and affines, meaning by the last, such as have become relatives by being married to relatives. With this explanation, the whole table is embraced in the two following rules, viz :

1. A man may marry no blood relative, either of himself or of his wife, in either of the four generations of lineals, nor any collateral blood relative of his own, in the first and second generations.

2. A man is forbidden to marry any affinis, who has been married to any one who was a member of his own family, or who by our usage would bear his name, in the first and third generations of lineals, and in the first and second generations of collaterals.

The reader is here requested to compare the specifications

with the table, and the table with the rules just given, in order to satisfy himself whether or not the writer is borne out in his assertions, that the specifications make, without any additions, a complete system: whether they are capable of being reduced to simple general rules or not-and whether they invariably, in given degrees of kindred, embrace all of a given class or exclude all. Is this then illustration of a general principle, or definition? If a considerable number of cases are intended to be embraced in the law, which are not specified, why are none specified from the classes to which they belong, while all the individuals are specified in each of the classes, from which any cases are taken? If a man's collaterals in the third generation are as much forbidden as in the first, why are they all specified in the first, and not one of them in the third? If the collaterals of the wife are as much forbidden as a man's own, why are all his own collaterals specified, through two generations, and not one collateral of the wife in any generation? Does this look like miscellaneous selection of cases for the purpose of illustration? Had it been designed to illustrate a principle equally applicable to both the first and third generations, would it not have been far more appropriate to the purpose, to have specified father's sister, and sister's daughter, than to have specified both father's sister and mother's sister, and to have omitted both brother's daughter and sister's daughter? Is it not still more improbable that all the illustrations, fourteen in number, should have been selected in the same manner, so that in every instance to which the rule of implication is to be applied, it is to be applied to a whole class, from which not one case has been specified? And yet it is plain that, if the rule of implication is a part of the law, this is a simple statement of the circumstances in which we are left to apply it. The reader will judge whether it is probable that if the principle of implication is the one on which the law was designed to be interpreted, the implied cases would have been all found in this condition.

Again, the specified cases form a system constructed according to two simple general rules, to which there are no exceptions. If now this system is to be extended to other cases not specified, it must be by introducing additional rules, for these rules do not embrace a single case not specified. What then are the additional rules to be? Two are claimed: