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to prevent our advance. They called to our men not to go forward, and some attempted to prevent by force their doing so. The effect upon my command was what I apprehended the line was somewhat disordered, and in part forced to form into a column, but still advanced rapidly. The fire of the enemy's musketry and artillery, furious as it was before, now became still hotter. The stone wall was a sheet of flame that enveloped the head and flanks of the column. Officers and men were falling rapidly, and the head of the column was at length brought to a stand when close up to the wall. Up to this time not a shot had been fired by the column, but now some firing began. It lasted but a minute, when, in spite of all our efforts, the column turned and began to retire slowly. attempted to rally the brigade behind the natural embankment so often mentioned, but the united efforts of General Tyler, myself, our staff, and the other officers could not arrest the retiring mass."

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At four o'clock in the afternoon General Hooker crossed the river, and a fresh assaulting column was formed, watched earnestly by General Burnside from the Lacey House on the opposite bank of the river. General Getty's brigade, by making a flank movement, succeeded in gaining a stone wall which had been occupied by the Confederate sharp-shooters during the day. General Hooker's other brigade started for the entrenchments on the heights with fixed bayonets. The field batteries, which, owing to the restricted space, had been of little use all day, were brought vigorously into play, and from both sides two miles of guns rained forth fiery missiles athwart the dark background of the coming night. Volleys of musketry were poured forth in profusion. Rushing up the heights, General Hooker's troops had approached within a stone's

throw of the entrenchments, when the hill swarmed forth in new reinforcements of Confederate infantry, who, rush ing upon General Hooker's men, drove them back. The turn of a die decides such situations. The day was lost, and the Union troops retired. Immediately cannon and musketry ceased their roar, and in a few moments the silence of death succeeded the stormy fury of the ten hours' battle.

General Burnside, turning, walked off through the garden of the Lacey House and, mounting his horse, galloped back to his headquarters. Summoning his general officers, he promptly formed his plans for the next morning. He ordered General Sumner to take the Ninth Corps and attack the entrenchments on the heights by regiments. There were eighteen old regiments and some new ones, and the commanding general thought that these, by coming quickly up, one after the other, would be able to carry the stone wall and the batteries in front, forcing the enemy into their entrenchments, and by going in with them they would not be able to fire to any great extent.

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OPPOSITION BY THE GENERALS TO A RENEWAL OF THE ATTACK OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF ITS DISASTERS AND ASSUMPTION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY-MILITARY CRITICISMS LINCOLN'S ADDRESS TO THE TROOPS ANOTHER MOVEMENT - INSUBORDI NATE GENERALS- LETTER FROM LINCOLN - THE MUD CAMPAIGN GENERAL ORDERS NO. 8-RESIGNS.

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N the morning of the 14th of December, 1862, just before the column was to have started, General Sumner came to headquarters and said: "General Burnside, I hope you will desist from this attack; I do not know of any general officer who approves of it, and I think it will prove disastrous to the army." Advice of that kind from General Sumner, who had always been in favor of an advance whenever it was possible, caused General Burnside to hesitate. He kept the column of attack formed, and sent over for the division and corps commanders, with whom he consulted, and they voted against the attack. He then sent for General Franklin, who was on the left, and he was exactly of the same opinion. This

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caused General Burnside to decide that he ought not to make the attack he had contemplated. Besides," to use General Burnside's own words, inasmuch as the President of the United States had told me not to be in haste in making this attack, that he would give me all the support that he could, but he did not want the Army of the Potomac destroyed, I felt that I could not take the responsibility of ordering the attack, notwithstanding my own belief at the time that the works of the enemy could be carried."

The orders were countermanded, and the next day, under a flag of truce, the dead were buried. At night the army moved back across the Rappahannock. The night was intensely dark, the wind blowing furiously from the east, and the pontoon bridges swinging with every gust. The bridges were taken up after the troops had crossed, and the weary soldiers found rest in their old camps. The following dispatch officially announced the fact to those at Washington:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
December 16, 6 P. M.

Major-General Halleck, Commander-in-Chief:

TACP }

The Army of the Potomac was withdrawn to this side of the Rappahannock River, because I felt fully convinced that the position in front could not be carried, and it was a military necessity either to attack the enemy or retire. A repulse would have been disastrous to us under existing circumstances.

The army was withdrawn at night, without the knowledge of the enemy, and without loss, either of property or men.

AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE,

Major-General Commanding.

A few days afterwards General Burnside wrote a long letter to General Halleck, which is a model of manliness and true courage. While the popular heart was swelling with indignation over the repulse at Fredericksburg;

while the howl of wrath went up from every quarter against the officials at Washington for not having supplied the pontoon bridges, and while, one after another, his subordinate commanders sought to cast the responsibility on others, General Burnside stood up squarely and firmly, and said, "I am responsible for the movement." Never did his open-hearted, fearless, transparent honesty shine forth more splendidly than in this letter, in which, after narrating the movement, he says:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
FALMOUTH, Dec. 19, 1862.

Maj-Gen, H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief United States Army, Washington:

To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus recrossing the river in the face of the enemy, I owe everything.

For the failure in the attack, I am responsible, as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by them was never exceeded, and would have carried the points had it been possible.

To the families and friends of the dead, I can only offer my heartfelt sympathies; but for the wounded, I can offer my earnest prayers for their comfort and final recovery.

The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on to this line, rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you left the whole movement in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me responsible.

I will visit you very soon, and give you more definite information; and finally, will send you my detailed report, in which a special acknowledgment will be made of the services of the different grand divisions, corps, and my general and personal staff, of the departments of the Army of the Potomac, to whom I am much indebted for their hearty support and cooperation.

I will add here, that the movement was made earlier than you expected, and after the President, Secretary, and yourself requested me not to be in haste, for the reason that we were supplied much sooner by the different staff departments than was anticipated when I last saw you.

Our killed amount to 1,152; our wounded to about nine thousand, and our prisoners to about seven hundred, which last have been paroled and exchanged for about the same number taken by us.

The wounded were all removed to this side of the river, and are being well cared for, and the dead were all buried under a flag of truce.

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