desires undergo by reason of accumulated and inherited experiences of the results of satisfying them; and that a will which is merely the automatic representative of the motives which are excited should develop into a will which has some free power of withstanding motives, is apparently inconceivable. Gradual as in many respects may have been the transition from animal to civilized human life, yet the phenomena of man's moral constitution seem to require the hypothesis of there having been at some time a creative act whereby the animal was endowed by God with the germs of a new nature and so became man' (ii. 182).

Well reasoned; but what in that case becomes of the distinction between natural and supernatural morals, upon which Mr. Hughes's division of his subject is founded? And again:

'The position in which man is now placed seems to be in many respects the same as, or a development of, and not to be entirely a substitute for, that in which he looks upon himself as subject to no power but the forces of nature; so that to a comprehension of the principles of the new science a knowledge of the principles of the old science is indispensable' (ii. 3).

In cases where a certain kind of knowledge is necessary for the comprehension of the principles of a science, we are wont to call it a part of the science. And, therefore, if Christian morals require a knowledge of natural morals for their comprehension, they must include them within the range of their science.

Accordingly, we differ from Mr. Hughes when he lays down (ii. 187) that 'the doctrine of a new creation or new birth may be said to be the basis of the science of Christian morals, which is the science of the conduct of a body of men who are placed by the creative acts of God in new and better conditions of moral development.' The new birth of a man does not mean the creation of another man. Ye must be born again,' said our Lord, and His words imply that the persons whom He addresses as 'ye' remain still the same persons, though under the altered condition expressed by the words 'born again.' A change is to pass over man's nature, but the nature remains; and, unless we are to allow that morality is a separate addition to man's nature, the basis of the science of morals which applies to man must be found in that original creation which forms the basis of his being. The new birth is, indeed, the restoration of this nature to its original goodness. The fact which proved the necessity of a new birth was the failure of man's nature to reach the moral standard which properly applies to him, and the test of the completeness of his new birth is in his ability to live up to the same

standard. But the failure of unregenerate human nature to practise a morality which only applied to the regenerate would be no proof at all of the defect which requires so radical a change as the new birth.

The argument which seems to weigh with Mr. Hughes in propounding the doctrine of a threefold science of morals is the poverty of motive which operates in the less-instructed stages of human history. But there is a great difference between the recognition of the inability of men to practise a high morality and the establishment for them of a lower science of morals. Even under the Christian system, there are large portions of the population who have neither the power nor the opportunity to practise, or even learn, the highest morality. Just men make allowance and excuse for them, and we cannot but believe that their Divine Judge does the same. But this allowance for the personal equation no more implies the establishment of a different standard than the forgiveness which a teacher extends to some pupil who, under pressure of sickness, has failed in his task, implies that the task prescribed for him was not the same as that prescribed for all. You cannot construct a science of morals out of the failures and deficiencies either of individuals or periods.

The description of the motives which act upon human nature is the same for every race and time. The desire for happiness and the sense of duty to others exist for all. But the progress of revelation varies the conceptions of the nature of happiness, and of duty, which men entertain. The remembrance of self and the forgetfulness of self, self-love and the love of others, the call to possess and the call to renounce, are the conditions of human conduct from which arise both righteousness and sin. They have operated in human nature ever since it began to exist, if we may not discern them in natures still lower. Nor is it possible that man's moral life should ever move on any other lines without ceasing to be human. But a revelation, whether of the Spirit of God to our thoughts, or of His miraculous power to our outward senses, may elevate one or other of these principles in itself, or change their relations to each other. It may purify selflove so that it shall guide us to the highest and noblest principles of conduct, and drive us to seek our neighbour's good at whatever cost to our selfish impulses. It may array selfrenunciation with such attractions that it shall be welcome to the soul. We can by no means say that such a reconciliation of the varying calls upon human nature was unknown

before Christ came. The attempt to reconcile them is made in every life, and in every virtuous life they are reconciled with a certain success. One good man may have exalted the personal and another the altruistic claims the higher; but no good man can have given to either the exclusive possession of his moral life. Moderation was the maxim of the greatest of ancient moralists; their method of reconciliation was to forbid any principle to urge its claims too far. But Christianity, so far from producing a new science of morals, is remarkable rather for finding the reconciliation of varying principles in cultivating all to their utmost extent and showing that while inferior degrees of egoism and altruism are at war the extremes of each are in perfect agreement. Whosoever shall save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life shall save it. This paradox is the maxim of Christian morals, the first expression of the contradictions of the Christian life in which St. Paul is wont to dwell, its poverty and wealth, its humiliation and glory, its death and its life. But the words are absolutely unscientific in their form and meaning, and cannot be made the foundation for a new science of morals.

We do not find it easy to reconcile Mr. Hughes's theory either with the Christian doctrine of the Fall, or with that unity and mutual sympathy of the human race which is the message of science apart from revelation:

'As natural morals and Jewish morals presuppose in man higher moral capabilities than any that belong, or ever can belong, to the animal creation, so Christian morals presuppose in the Christian higher moral capabilities than any that belong, or can ever belong, to the mere natural once-born man' (ii. 187).

This theory, like Professor Drummond's Natural Law in the Spiritual World, puts upon revelation the tremendous strain of asserting that it produces a new race of men who differ as much from the other men who people the world as one natural species of animal differs from another: a belief which the characteristics of the converted and unconverted as we see them do not justify. Experience enables everyone to test the scientific statement that the man and the monkey are of different natural species; does the experience of anyone discern a corresponding difference between the Christian and the Jew? If such a difference is to be accepted, it is not upon experience, but upon revelation, that the proof of it must rest. And when you throw yourself so unreservedly upon revelation, are you free at the same time to cut out of

revelation one of its most important parts-the doctrine that man unchristianized is not in the condition in which his Creator placed him, and that restoration to that original condition is the work of the second Adam?

The latter part of Mr. Hughes's work becomes theological rather than ethical in its character. Whether this is strictly consistent with the title and object of the book, it gives rise to some interesting discussions, among the first of which is the question from what act in the life of the Lord the new birth of mankind can be said to date. The new birth,' says Mr. Hughes, dates historically from very shortly after the death and resurrection and ascension into heaven of Jesus Christ' (ii. 187). We do not doubt that it is from that period that the powers of the new birth became absolutely effective as a gift to men, and that the whole heavenly machinery by which it is disseminated was made ready. Yet even upon this statement we should have to place some reservation in order to meet the doctrine of St. John concerning the effect of the Lord's presence on earth-As many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on His name.' But when we speak of one historical date for the new birth we cannot be alluding to the actual gift as operating in individuals. It is obvious that we must be speaking of the great event in the history of redemption which earned or conquered the gift and left nothing remaining but to pass it on to men. Now it would seem to us very plain that the birth of the second Adam must be the event which bears this character. Surely the new birth must correspond to the old birth. How could we persuade ourselves that though man was born when Adam was created, man was not new-born when Jesus was born, but after He had accomplished His life and death? When the new man was born mankind was, by the very nature of the fact, new-born. What followed in either case concerned, not the birth, but the meaning and effect which the birth should have upon the succeeding race. What followed in the case of Adam was sin, and therefore the birth of his succeeding race is tainted with sin. What followed in the case of Jesus was victory over sin and death, and therefore the new birth in Him comes to us endowed with all the powers of His atonement and His resurrection.

The question from what period does the new birth historically date is therefore ambiguous, since it may refer to the race or to the separate individuals of the race. If we take it in the former sense we date it from the Incarnation; if in the

latter, from each man's baptism. And so speaks the Collect for Christmas Day, in which the act of Christ in taking our nature upon Him and being born of a pure virgin is paralleled by our regeneration as God's children by adoption and grace. It is true that baptism, which is the means of our new birth, brings us into union with His death and resurrection. So many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into His death; we were buried with Him in baptism, wherein also we are risen with Him. These are the characters with which our new birth is marked on account of the gracious work of Him in whom we are born again. But they do not constitute the new birth, nor give us the historical date when our race was new-born, any more than the sin which stains our natural birth can be said to constitute natural birth, or the first sin give us the date when the race of man was naturally born.

Mr. Hughes's theory of sin and its remission is very elaborate, and we do not know that we always succeed in apprehending his meaning, or that we understand the benefit of reducing to so extremely abstract a form ideas which, as living facts, the simplest people have been able to follow. With Mr. Hughes there is, first of all, not one kind of will but three-the free will, the necessary will, and the intelligent will. These terms we take to mean pure will and will allied on the one hand with habit and on the other with consciousness and intelligence. But we doubt whether it is really in the power of our analysis ever to detect will in its purity, disengaged from intellect or from desire. Will is a transcendental idea. We know that will is there, but it always makes its appearance in life compounded with the coarser materials of which the visible world is made up. And to our minds it is more intelligible to speak of will, desire, and intention than of three species of will.

In each of these three wills Mr. Hughes discerns the capacity to resist the will of God and the constraint of right. But he calls upon us to 'make a careful distinction between two kinds of disorderly conduct which seem to be represented in these three modes-between conduct for which we feel direct and immediate responsibility and accountability, and conduct in connexion with which this feeling is not experienced. The former it will be convenient to speak of as sin, and the latter as sinfulness' (ii. 98). Sinfulness, we suppose, is generally taken to mean an evil disposition, the result of evil conduct in the past and the source of evil conduct in the present. And while the unawakened soul is equally unconscious of its sins