The great object, and the original cause of the war, had been the establishment of precise boundaries in America. This was therefore the very first point to be now attended to; and it must be observed, that it was settled much more accurately, than it promised to be in the negotiation of the foregoing year. For the French, not having ascertained the limits between their own possessions with greater exactness, than they had those which separated them from the British possessions, it was not clear in ceding Canada, how much they really gave up. Disputes might have arisen, and, in fact, did immediately arise upon this subject. Besides, the western limits of the southern British colonies were not mentioned; and those limits were extremely obscure, and subject to many discussions. Such discussions contained in them the seeds of a new war. In the present treaty, it was agreed, that a line drawn along the middle of the river Mississippi, from its source to the river Iberville, and thence along the middle of this river, and the lakes of Maurepas and Pontchartrain, to the sea, should irrevocably fix the bounds of the two nations in North America. This line included a very large tract of country, which formerly made a part of Louisiana, in addition to what was properly called Canada; and these newly acquired territories of Great Britain, were farther enlarged and completely rounded by the cession of Florida, on the part of Spain. As the northern boundaries had been long since settled by the treaty of Utrecht, all occasions of limitary disputes seemed to be effectually cut off; and the British possessions in America were as well defined, as the nature of such a country could possibly admit.

The Newfoundland fishery was a subject of much controversy. In a commercial view it is certainly of great estimation: but it has been considered as even more material in a political light. It is a grand nursery of seamen, and consequently one of the principal resources of the marine. Scarcely any object could be of more importance to two nations, who contended for a superiority of naval power. The English ministry despaired of excluding the French entirely from the fishery, and endeavoured as much as possible to diminish its value to them. In this respect they followed the plan of the former negotiation, except that some improvements were added. a

In the first place, that article of the treaty of Utrecht was established, by which the French were admitted to fish, and to dry their fish on the north-east and north-west parts of Newfoundland, from Cape Bonavista to Point Biche; and were excluded from the rest of the island. They were also permitted to fish within the Gulf of St. Lawrence; but with this limitation,-that they should not approach within three leagues of any of the coasts belonging to England.

The second restriction imposed on the French fishery was, that it should not be exercised but at the distance of fifteen leagues from the coasts of the island of Cape Breton, which was ceded to England. In return for this, the French obtained the full right of the small islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, his most christian majesty engaging not to erect any fortifications on these islands, nor to keep more than fifty soldiers there to enforce the police. In this article the plan of the former negotiation was pursued.

With regard to the pretensions of Spain, she entirely desisted from the right she claimed of fishing on these coasts. A more satisfactory, or more unequivocal expression should, and undoubt edly would have been insisted upon, if it had been of any great consequence, in what terms a right was renounced, which for a long time had never been exercised. The claim itself was almost as obsolete as that of the king of England to the dominions of France. The British ministry laid very little stress on such a trifle; but they suffered it to be thrown, as a sort of make-weight, into the scale of Spanish sacrifices.

When the affairs of the West Indies came to be settled, though they caused great difference of opinion among the public, they did not seem to raise any considerable difficulty in the negotiation. There England had made great conquests, and there also she had made great concessions. She restored to France the islands of Martinico, Guadaloupe, and Marigalante, besides an assignment, or surrender of the neutral island of St. Lucia. Of

her late acquisitions she only retained Dominica, Tobago, St. Vincent's, and the Grenades. To the three former she had an old claim, which was now confirmed: the latter were ceded and guaranteed to her in full right.

As the intelligence of the success of the British arms at the Havannah had arrived before the settlement of this part of the treaty relative to the West Indies, it was in order to obtain the restoration of that valuable conquest, that Spain agreed to some articles before enumerated, namely, the eva cuation of all conquests made upon Portugal, or her foreign colonies; the cession of Florida, with the forts of St. Augustine and Pensacola; the renunciation of the right to the Newfoundland fishery; and, in addition to these, Spain also consented not to disturb the English in their occupation of cutting logwood in the bay of Honduras, and to permit them to build houses there for the conveniency of their trade. It was stipulated, however, in this last grant, that they should demolish their fortifications on that coast, as a tacit acknowledgment, that the privilege they were now suffered to enjoy was not founded upon right, but derived from favour. In Africa, Goree was restored to France, and Senegal remained to Great Britain. In the East Indies, all the factories and settlements taken from the French since the beginning of the war, were given up to them, on condition of their engaging in the first place, not to erect any forts, nor to keep any number of soldiers whatsoever in the province of Bengal; and secondly, to acknowledge the reigning subas of Bengal, Decan, and the Carnatic, as the lawful sovereigns of these countries. In Europe, Minorca and Belleisle were to be restored to their former possessors; and the fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk were to be demolished, agreeably to the stipulations of former treaties.

There was one article totally omitted in the present treaty, though it had been the subject of the most warm and obstinate controversy in the former negotiation. This was the restitution of the prizes made by England previous to the declaration of war. On this point, the ministers of the two courts appeared at that time equally positive, the one to demand, the other to refuse such a restitution. It was, indeed, impossible, for the former to relinquish, or for the latter to admit the claim, without bringing some reproach on their respective governments. France could not now make a greater sacrifice to the honour of Great Britain in the eyes of all Europe, than by passing over that matter in total silence.

But if the honour of the British crown was consulted with so much delicacy in this very disputable affair, the fears of the Bourbon courts were not less effectually removed by another article, which stipulated, that the conquests not included in the treaty, either as cessions, or restitutions, should be given up without compensation. France and Spain knew themselves exposed in almost every quarter: they had no armament on foot, from which they could expect any considerable advantages: whereas the British ministry had great reason to hope, that the important expedition against the Philippines could not fail of success. The reduction of Manilla had actually taken place; but the news, though conveyed with extraordinary despatch, did not reach England till the April following.

PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE SIGNED.

SUCH were the chief articles of a treaty which put an end to the most sanguinary and expensive war in which Great Britain had ever been engaged. But, to her honour, it must be added that her ef forts had not, in any contest, been ever crowned with greater glory and success. The preliminaries were signed by the British and French ministers at Fontainbleau, the third of November; and the twenty-fourth of the same month, the duke of Nivernois, who had been employed in the negotiation at the court of London, as ambassador extraor dinary and plenipotentiary from the most christian king, made a speech to his Britannic majesty on the occasion.

But however highly the French ambassador might estimate the blessings of peace, the people of England were very much divided in their sentiments respecting the merits of the treaty. This clash of contending interests and opinions excited throughout the kingdom the most violent heats

F

which were blown into a combustion by every art, and every instrument of party, that had ever prov. ed effectual upon similar occasions.

CHANGES IN THE CABINET.

IN the course of these political conflicts, and particularly after the signing of the preliminaries had been formally announced to the public, some efforts were used to bring about a coalition between the duke of Newcastle and Mr. Pitt, who had hitherto kept aloof from each other, at the head of their respective adherents. They were not so irreconcileable, so completely hostile to one another, as each of them was to the earl of Bute. Common enmity therefore united the two parties; and they joined their endeavours to persuade the people, that the parliament would never ratify, or, at least, pass over without heavy censure, the conditions of a peace so inadequate to the successes of the war, so far below the just expectations of the nation.

The ministry, thus threatened by a formidable opposition, did not fail to take the most effectual steps for securing the approbation of the legislature. Mr. Fox was eminently useful to them on this occasion. Though he continued in his old place of pay master, he undertook to conduct the affairs of government in the house of commons, for which no man could be better qualified. George Grenville, whose employment would naturally have engaged him in that task, resigned the seals of secretary of state, and was appointed first lord of the admiralty. The earl of Halifax had vacated his seat at the head of this board, in order to accept of Grenville's place, as joint secretary with the earl of Egremont. This exchange, as it may be called, was made in order to give full scope to Mr. Fox's talents, with which the useful parliamentary duties of a secretary of state, if a commoner, might in some degree interfere. Other arrangements were also made, and almost the whole landed interest was found to be well affected to the measures of administration. PARLIAMENT MEETS, DISCUSSIONS ON THE PEACE.

WHILE the most vigorous preparations were thus making by both parties for a trial of strength, the parliament met on the twenty-fifth of November; and the session was opened by a speech from his majesty.

In answer to this speech, each house prepared an address, containing general compliments of congratulation on the approach of peace, and on the birth of the prince of Wales.

That part of the public, which had been flattered with the hope that the peace would be severely censured by parliament, was totally disappointed, when the preliminary articles came to be taken into consideration by both houses. The opposition in the lords was feeble, and the house did not divide, but approved of the preliminaries, without any qualification or reserve.

The triumph of the minister in the commons was not so easily obtained. The chancellor of the exchequer had laid a copy of the preliminary articles before the house on the twenty-ninth of November, and on the ninth of December they were taken into consideration, and the house was moved to concur in an address to his majesty expressive of their approbation of such advantageous terms. This motion was made by Fox, who took the lead in support of the peace, and was strongly resisted by Pitt, at the head of the few who disapproved of the conditions. The first article which the censurers of the peace attacked was the regulation of the cod fishery. They compared it with what had been proposed in the former treaty. "At a time," they said, "when Great Britain had not half so much right as at present to prescribe terms to her enemies, she only consented to give up one small island, that of St. Pierre, as a shelter to the French fishing boats, and with indispensable restrictions. If these were deemed expedient in the cession of one island, they were doubly necessary in the cession of two. nothing could justify the absolute, unconditional surrender of St. Pierre and of Miquelon, which would enable France to recover her marine, and by degrees to acquire the best part of a fishery, from which she ought," as they alleged, "to have been entirely excluded."

But

In reply to this, it was asserted, "that France would never have agreed to a total dereliction of the fishery: that the cession, on her part, of the

isles of Cape Breton, and St. John to England was more than an equivalent to the sheltering places of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which she was not allowed to fortify, nor to keep any troops in, except such a small number as were barely necessary to enforce the police."

But the restitution of the conquests, particularly of those which had been made in the West Indies, was the object of the severest and most vehement censure." The authors of such an infamous and improvident treaty," said the opponents of administration, "seem to have lost sight of that great fundamental principle, That France is chiefly, if not solely to be dreaded by us in the light of a maritime and commercial power. By the impolitic concessions made to her in the fishery, and by restoring all her valuable West India islands, we have put into her hands the means of repairing her prodi. gious losses, and of becoming once more formidable at sea. The fishery trained up an innumerable multitude of young seamen; and the West India trade employed them when they were trained. France," they observed, "had long since gained a decided superiority over us in this lucrative branch of commerce, and supplied almost all Europe with the rich commodities, which are produced only in that part of the world. By this commerce she enriched her merchants, and augmented her finances; whilst, from a want of sugar-land, which has been long known and severely felt by England, we at once lost the foreign trade, and suffered all the inconveniences of a monopoly at home."

They looked upon the concessions made to Spain, in the same part of the world, as equally unjustifiable. "Florida," they maintained, "was no compensation for the Havannah. The Havanah was an important conquest. From the moment it was taken, all the Spanish treasures and riches in America, lay at our mercy. Spain had purchased the security of all these, and the restoration of Cuba also, with the cession of Florida only. It was no equivalent. There had been a bargain; but the terms were inadequate. They were inade quate in every point, where the principle of reciprocity was affected to be introduced."

They represented the privilege obtained from Spaio, in favour of our logwood-cutters, as too uncertain and precarious to be considered among the list of equivalents. "Instead of establishing," said they, "a solid right in this long contested trade, we have engaged to pull down our forts, and to destroy the only means of protecting it. What security have we, that our logwood cutters shall not be molested in their naked and defenceless situation? The king of Spain's promise! It is not words, but the power of repelling force by force, that can prevent hostilities or injustice."

They concluded their strictures on the subject of restitutions with asserting that Goree on the coast of Africa had been surrendered without the least apparent necessity; that in the East-Indies, though the treaty mentioned an engagement for mutual restitution of conquests, the restitution was all from one side. We had conquered every thing, we retained nothing. In Europe, France had only one conquest to restore, Minorca; and for this island, we had given her the East-Indies, the West Indies and Africa. Belleisle alone, they affirmed, was a sufficient equivalent. The advocates for the peace defended all those concessions on the following grounds:

"The original object of the war," said they," was the security of our colonies upon the continent of America. The danger to which these colonies were exposed, and, in consequence of that danger, the immense waste of blood and treasure which ensued to Great Britain, together with the calamities which were, from the same source, poured upon the four quarters of the world, left no sort of doubt that it was not only our best, but our only policy, to guard against all possibility of the return of such evils. Experience has shown us, that while France pos sesses any single place in America, whence she may molest our settlements, they can never enjoy any repose; and, of course, that we are secure from being plunged again into those calamities, from which we have at length, and with so much difficulty, happily emerged. To remove France from our neighbourhood in America, or to contract her power within the narrowest limits possible was, therefore, the most capital advantage we could obtain, and was worth purchasing by almost any concession (1),>

never

They insisted that the absolute security derived from this plan, included in itself an indemnification: they pointed out the great increase of population in those colonies within a few years. They showed, that their trade with the mother country had uniformly increased with this population. North America alone would supply the deficiencies of our trade in every other part of the world. Having, for these reasons, made very large demands in North America, it was necessary to relax in other parts. France would never be brought to any very considerable cession in the West Indies: but her power and increase there could never become formidable, because the existence of her settlements depended upon ours in North America, she not being any longer left a place, whence they can be supplied with provisions.

They did not deny the importance of the Havannah; but they, at the same time, insisted upon the value of the objects which had been obtained in return for it. The whole country of Florida, with fort St. Augustine and the bay of Pensacola, was far from being a contemptible acquisition. It extended the British dominions along the coast to the mouth of the Mississippi: it removed an asylum for the slaves of the English colonies, who were continually making their escape to St. Augustine: it afforded a large extent of improveable territory, a strong frontier, and a good port in the bay of Mex. ico, both for the convenience of trade, and the annoyance of the Spaniards in any future contest. The liberty and security, which the king of Spain engaged to afford to the English logwood cutters, was another material consideration; and though the fortifications on the coast were to be demolished, it did not appear by what other means a claim of such a peculiar nature could be adjusted. "We never," said they, "set up any pretensions to the territory, nor even directly to the produce; but only a privilege of cutting and taking away this wood by indulgence. That privilege is now confirmed. What more, consistently with reason and justice, could we demand? The right of erecting fortifications would imply an absolute, direct, and exclusive dominion over the territory itself, to which we had not even the shadow of a claim."

They asked, whether his catholic majesty could have made a fuller or more adequate compensation for the Havannah, without dismembering his em pire, or exposing its commerce to inevitable ruin? "Had Great Britain," as they argued, "fought for herself alone, and restricted her efforts to her own element, she might have assumed a more peremp tory tone in dictating the terms of the treaty; and, if they were not acquiesced in, she might have resolved to keep all her conquests, and to prosecute bostilities to the full accomplishment of her wishes. But she was saddled with the protection of her allies; and, on their account, involved in a double continental war, the expense of which overbalanced all the advantages she could derive from the success of her arms. France and Spain had declared, in plain terms, that, without the restitution of the islands and of the Havannah, peace could be of no service to them; that they would rather hazard the continuance of the war, which, in the long run, must exhaust the finances and credit of England; and, in the mean time, redouble their efforts in making an entire conquest of Portugal, which it could not be in the power of the British auxiliaries to prevent."

With respect to the other cessions, they thought the rock of Goree of very little consequence, while Great Britain retained the possession of Senegal, which gave her the command of the chief trade of the interior parts of the country. The article which related to the East Indies, was, in their opinion, perfectly agreeable to the wishes of the directors of the English company; and did not afford all those advantages to France, which might be imagined at first view. "If," said they," we examine this matter closely, we shall find, that our late enemies have not gained much by having their factories and settlements restored to them: first, because the fortifications, erected at a vast expense in all those settlements, have been totally destroyed; and it cannot be expected, in the present situation of the French company, that they can, in the course of many years, if at all, rebuild them in the same manner. Besides, they are restrained by an express article from even making the attempt in the province of Bengal, and the kingdom of Orixa, or

from keeping the least military force in either. Secondly, they have also agreed to acknowledge the reigning Subas of the chief provinces in the Peninsula, as the lawful sovereigns; and these princes are all in our interest, as either owing the acquisition, or depending for the preservation of their power on our arms; by which means our company is become, in effect, arbiter of that great and opulent coast, from the Ganges to Cape Comorin, and from the same Cape to the mouth of the Indus. What important sacrifices, then, have we made in the East Indies? And, if the points yielded by Great Britain in all other parts of the globe are so fully justifiable on the principles of sound and liberal policy, surely, the most wilful perverseness will not dare to deny that in Europe the balance is considerably in her favour, the island of Minorca having been given her in exchange for Belleisle, besides obliging France to demolish the works belonging to the harbour of Dunkirk." When the house divided, there appeared three hundred and nineteen for the address, and sixtyfive against it. A committee was appointed to prepare it; and on its being reported next day, another debate ensued, in which nothing new was introduced, except a reproach on the ministry for not having insisted on the dissolution of the family compact. It was not likely, that such an extravagant and presumptuous idea should have occurred to them in the course of the negotiation. That compact, after all the noise it made in the political world at that time, was nothing more than a defensive alliance between the two branches of the house of Bourbon for the mutual guarantee of their respective dominions, which any two nations have a right to contract: and a mutual concession of commercial privileges, with which every power has an undoubted right to indulge its allies, without giving just cause of offence to any neighbouring nation. On the twenty-first of December both houses adjourned to the twentieth of January.

THREE CHEROKEE CHIEFS ARRIVE IN

ENGLAND.

PUBLIC curiosity was soon after amused by the arrival of three Cherokee chiefs from South Carolina, the object of whose embassy was to settle a lasting peace with the English nation. They arrived in May, but had not their first audience of the king till the ninth of July. The principal person of the three, called Outacite, or Man-killer, on account of his martial exploits, was introduced by lord Eglinton, and conducted by the master of the ceremonies. The king received them with great affability, and directed that they should be entertained at his expense. Their behaviour in his presence was remarkably decent. They expressed no emotions of surprize at any object, however curious in its own nature, or seemingly adapted to strike the imagination of a savage. This was accounted for by some people from their total ignorance of our language, and their want of means to express their sentiments otherwise than by their gestures. But even these would have served to indicate, however imperfectly, the impression made upon them by such sights. Their indifference to all those objects of novelty and grandeur was therefore ascribed to a sort of brutal insensibility, which seems to be the character of the North American tribes in general, notwithstanding all the encomiums which some writers have lavished on the natural good sense and sagacity of those savages. They carried home with them articles of peace between his majesty and their nation, with a handsome present of warlike instruments, and such other things as they seemed to place the greatest value on.

In vain have some cynics, as if actuated by a wish to degrade their own species, drawn laboured and disingenuous parallels between savage and civilized life, in which they strove to turn the scale in favour of the former. Such men wrote from their closets, and wrote the dictates of ignorance, affectation, or malignity. Their fanciful remarks want the necessary foundation of facts, or experience, for their support. Every opportunity of intercourse with the savages of North America has shown them to be stupid and unsocial in time of peace, and in war capable only of acts of treachery and ferocity. Such were the impressions made upon the minds of the most accurate observers by