H. His Immenfity yet farther proves his Unity: For fuppofe there were many Gods, they could not be confufedly exiftent one in another, but each of them would have his peculiar Objects and Imploys, which destroys the notion of Immenfity.

III. God cannot be infinite in his Perfections, and yet be divided; no, that implies a Contradiction. For fuppofe there were many Gods, they must neceffarily be fomething different from one another, otherwise there could not be many Gods. If they were in any thing different from one another, it must be either in Perfection or in Imperfection. It cannot be in Imperfection, because the Godhead could not then be infinitely Perfect. Neither can it be in Perfection, becaufe then the one would have Perfections which were not in the other, and confequently the last would not be abfolutely Perfect, or infinite in Perfection.

IV. Whatsoever is multiplied, is for that fame Reafon very Imperfect; for where Unity alone is not fufficient, there only Multiplicity is requifite. Whereas that which has no need of being multiplied, is fupreamly perfect, because all things are then centred in one. That Kingdom falls to decay, which is divided into feveral petty Royalties; whereas on the contrary, that Empire grows to a much more flourishing Perfection, which from feveral States is reduced into one. There are feveral Torches required to light us, and their Imperfection appears from their Multiplicity. But there needs but one Sun for that fame purpofe, because his Excellence confifts in his Unity. As therefore we are informed by common Senfe, either that there is

no

no God at all, or that we must conceive the most perfect Idea of him that poffibly can be framed ; fo in like manner it informs us of his Unity. Twould be very strange that Alexander the Great, fhould have thought himself too perfect to have any Equals in the World, and boldly have affirmed, that it was impoffible there should be Two Alexanders on the Earth, any more than Two Suns in the Heaven; and yet that Man fhould be fo audacious as to give God any Equals, and put up any Rival Pretenders against the Deity.

V. Lastly, either God exists neceffarily, or he does not If he does not exist neceffarily, he must have some precedent Principle, which determined him rather to exift, than not to exift, and then he cannot be a God. If he exifts neceffarily, he is of himself whatever he is; and if he be of himself whatever he is, nothing is wanting to him; for from whence could proceed his Imperfection? And if nothing be wanting to him, he needs no Companions. Besides, if he exists of himself, he poffeffes all manner of Perfections, as we have proved already; and if fo, he cannot be multiplied, because many Infinites could not confift together, by reason the qualities of the one, would be abfolutely the fame with the qualities of the other, and confequently there being do diftinction betwixt them, they would be many, and yet not be many. This is a decifive proof.

But methinks we have infifted too much upon efe Principles, which are fo little contested in efe Times. Let us now pafs on to the rest God's Attributes which his Idea is compofed

pecially to his Wisdom, Goodness, and

Juftice,

Justice, which have an essential and neceffary re

lation to Religion.

CHA P. III.

That Wisdom, Goodness, and Juftice do neceffarily belong to the Idea of God.

ΤΗ

Hat Deity which exifts neceffarily of it self, and is but one, (as we have juft now proved) is neither Matter, nor the effect of Matter; it cannot be Matter it felf, because Matter is not only incapable of framing any fuch Projects and Designs as was the Production of the World, but likewife does not exist of it felf, neither has it Motion, nor the determination of Motion, as it has been fhewed already. It cannot be therefore for that fame Reafon the effect of Mat

ter.

'Tis no less ridiculous for fome to affirm, that God is but a large Soul which animates the World in fome proportion as our rational Soul animates our Body, makes Plants to grow on the Earth, produces Senfation in Brutes, Ratiocination in Men, and gives Thoughts without comparison far nobler to the Heavens and the Stars, whofe Matter is much more fubtle and refined, than that of Terrestrial and Sublunary Bodies.

I confefs it seems at first, a pretty conceit to imagin, that the fame Soul both at once, fuffers and is joyful; that it is fenfible of Pain in a Man that expires in the midst of Tor

ments,

ments, but contrariwife is affected with Pleasure in a Man that wallows in his Voluptuoufness that it is afflicted and abused, while it exists in a Brute, but that it afflicts and torments in a Man. And lastly, That the Fury of the Oppreffors, and the Complaints of the Oppreffed, fpring equally from the fame Soul which animates all kinds of Beings,

But perhaps they'll reply, that the different parts of Matter to which the Soul is united, occaon all these diversities and apparent contrarieties; and that Matter by its variety, determines the Soul to that diversity of Sensation, as it seems obfervable in our own Composition. But this Union of the Univerfal Soul to Matter, on purpofe that it fhould depend upon it, and act conformably to its Laws, is a Second Fancy much more ridiculous and whimsical than the former.

For this Union is either Free and Voluntary, or it is Necessary and Conftrained: If it be Conftrained, or meerly Neceffary, we then conceive God as an unhappy Being, that cannot fet himfelf at liberty when he pleafes, But if this Union be Free and Voluntary, we then conceive him as an odd-humour'd and unaccountable Spirit, that confines himself to act only according to the Laws of a Blind Matter, destitute of all Senfe.

However, 'tis of no great moment to us, whether we fute thefe Speculations or not. We are verlling the Incredulous fhould still hug ancy, and w e them the more

hat Pro

fe by followas they be, hether God has

has a Body or not, whether he be the Soul of the World or not, they must however neceffarily acknowledge his Wisdom, Goodness and Juftice, not to mention his Power, which of all his Attributes is the most undeniable; and that's as much as we defire.

For one of these Three things, we must neceffarily grant, concerning thofe Vertues in general, either that they properly and really belong to God, or else that God has fome certain qualities in himself answerable to those Vertues which produce, (if I may so speak,) the fame Effect in him, as thofe Vertues do in us: Or laftly, that God has none of thofe Vertues in himfelf, nor any Qualities anfwerable to those Ver

tues.

If Knowledge and Wisdom, Juftice and Goodnefs do properly and really belong to God, we need no longer to contend about them: And if God has any Perfections in himself answerable to those Vertues, then are we in the right to argue as if he properly poffeft them. But if he has none of thofe Vertues in himself, nor any Perfection answerable to those Vertues, it follows from thence, that the Existence of God must be thereby destroyed. For what was that which perfwaded us of that Truth? 'Twas that Wisdom which we obferve difplayed all over the Universe, and of which there are fo many fignal Characters to be found within our felves. If therefore you annihilate God's Wifdom, as well as his Goodnefs and Juftice, and if you likewife believe, he has no fuch Perfections in himfelf

Verti

th

are any ways answerable to thofe

not avoid calling into question Existence, and thereby you fall